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This study examines audit committee effectiveness from the perspective of 
audit committee members of New Zealand listed companies.  Using a responsive 
interviewing technique, data were obtained from 21 semi-structured, questionnaire-
based interviews with current audit committee members.  The data were analysed 
using a qualitative approach, namely, reflective analysis.  The research results 
revealed that performing audit committee duties is an intended process, comprising at 
least two distinctive intentional orientations, in terms of which audit committee 
members tend to justify the effectiveness of their respective audit committees.  
Therefore, investigating audit committee members’ intentional sense-making 
processes behind their audit committee activities can be argued to be of value in 
understanding the effectiveness of an audit committee.  The research reveals that the 
audit committee acts as an instrument for the board of directors and the findings 
challenge several public expectations of audit committees, most noticeably the notion 
of ‘independence’.  The study illustrates the potential value for corporate governance 
stakeholders in considering the individuality of audit committee members, within the 
context of their specific organisations, in promoting corporate governance best 
practice. 
Keywords:   Audit committee effectiveness, listed companies, New Zealand, 
corporate governance, board of directors, accountability, compliance, 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
1.1 Research background 
1.1.1 Audit committees and global corporate governance reforms 
Audit committee effectiveness has been a focus of international corporate 
governance reform for many years.  Kalbers and Fogarty (1998) suggested that the 
genesis of audit committees as a part of corporate governance structure is rooted in the 
reactions to the abuse of power by corporate management which led to financial scandals, 
financial reporting defalcations, and unjustifiable manipulation of accounting policies.  
Discussion of the impact of audit committees on listed companies dates back to 
1938, following the United States (US) Supreme Court’s decision in the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) vs McKesson and Robbins Inc. case on fraudulent financial 
reporting  (Markham, 2006). The company recognised assets and earnings of $19 million 
through fictitious inventories and sales. One of the recommended practices that emerged 
from the McKesson-Robbins scandal was the New York Stock Exchange’s (NYSE) and 
the SEC’s endorsement of establishing audit committees in listed companies to improve 
the integrity of corporate financial information in 1939 and l940 respectively. 
The interest in audit committee effectiveness came to the attention of the SEC again 
following a series of lawsuits involving companies’ directors in corporate financial frauds 
and misconduct in the late 1960s and 1970 (DeZoort, 1997).  The scandals involved 
financial reporting misstatement on a massive scale, for example, the collapse of the 
Investors Overseas Services (Markham, 2006).  In 1970, the SEC recommended that all 
listed companies must establish audit committees that include independent directors.  
Then, in 1972, the SEC further recommended that audit committees should meet annually 
(U.S. SEC, 1972).  Listed companies in the United States were also required to disclose 
compliance with the above requirements in their proxies (U.S. SEC, 1974).  According to 
Birkett (1986), the increased adoption of audit committees in the US corporations in 
1970s was the result of joint promotion efforts by the Congress, the SEC and the 
accounting and legal professions.  At the same time, the audit committee mechanism 
started to garner the attention of scholars.   Studies show that the percentage of firms with 
audit committees in the USA went from nearly ten percent in 1958 to nearly forty percent 
in 1972, to over ninety percent in 1982 (Harrison, 1987). 
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Once again in the 1990s, as in the 1970s, earnings management and creative 
accounting practices were discovered in corporations and investigated as a threat to 
market integrity associated with corporate governance (Harrast & Mason-Olsen, 2007).  
A number of research projects sponsored by practitioners or government bodies were 
published, for example, the  Blue Ribbon Committee (1999) in the United States; the  
Cadbury Committee  (1992) in the United Kingdom (UK); and the Dey Committee 
(1994) in Canada.  Simultaneously, several survey studies were published by international 
accounting firms, for example, PricewaterhouseCoopers  (Dooley, 1993) and  KPMG 
(1999), calling for more effective audit committees. 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 required - for the first time at a statutory level - all 
listed companies in the United States to establish an audit committee as a subcommittee 
of the board of directors (Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, SEC2 - Definitions). It established 
a mandatory requirement for the audit committee to have at least one financial expert and 
prescribed the audit committee’s role in ensuring the auditor’s independence (Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002, Title II - Auditor Independence) and in overseeing corporate financial 
reporting responsibilities (Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Title III - Corporate 
Responsibility). 
One of the expectations of the implementation of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 
was to enhance the audit committee’s functioning and effectiveness in monitoring the 
corporate financial reporting process (Vera-Muñoz, 2005).  However, some argued that 
the legislation was passed in anger and haste in responding to the confidence crisis caused 
by the financial scandals at Enron and WorldCom (Nordberg, 2008).  Furthermore, 
McDonnell describes the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 as “an appealing reform” 
(McDonnell, 2008, p. 1) for financial reporting stakeholders, but it suffers from a lack of 
innovation and substance (Cunningham, 2002).  Despite inconsistent comments about the 
impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, the Act triggered a new round of corporate 
governance reforms on a global scale.  Its key provisions have been reflected in recent 
regulatory reforms in other large capital markets in Asia, Europe and Latin America 
(Tafara, 2006). 
Audit committee effectiveness is one of the key emphases of this international 
corporate governance reform. The requirements for audit committee composition and 
functioning on almost all stock exchanges have become more prescriptive and more 
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rigorous. Some commentators state that these requirements have been applied as a box-
ticking approach (Davis, 2002; Barma, 2007).   
Have the audit committees indeed prevented or reduced the occurrence of 
management abuse of power in corporate settings?   In other words, has the effectiveness 
of audit committees been proven?  According to Kalbers and Fogarty (1998), an audit 
committee, as a bureaucratically established corporate governance structure, did not 
naturally result in effectiveness; therefore, the presumption that corporate governance 
could be improved by adopting audit committees did not necessarily follow.  The 
inconsistent and inconclusive empirical evidence about the effectiveness of audit 
committees will be discussed in detail in Chapter Two, Literature Review.   
Given that the effectiveness of audit committees has not been proven, if listed 
companies disclose all aspects of their audit committees in accordance with stock 
exchange requirements, is this evidence of compliance with regulation, or is it evidence 
of having effectively functioning audit committees? What substantially makes an 
effective audit committee? These and other similar questions motivated this research. 
1.1.2 Overview of the existing body of knowledge regarding audit committees 
The audit committee, as one of the most important elements of corporate 
governance, has been the subject of much discussion by practitioners and policy makers, 
and researched by scholars. 
The existing literature on audit committees can be characterized as: (1) theoretical 
hypotheses adopted from its contextual areas, for example, agency theory is applied in 
corporate governance research and stewardship theory is applied in studies of firms’ 
directors; (2) being dominated by empirical research drawing upon archival data  
(DeZoort, Hermanson, Archambeault, & Reed, 2002); and (3) the research results 
represent a considerable level of inconsistency and are thus inconclusive  (Spira, 1998).   
Little research, however, has examined the perceptions that audit committee members 
have – particularly about their audit committees’ responsibilities and the factors that assist 
them to carry out their audit committee functions effectively. 
1.1.3 Audit committees in New Zealand listed companies 
Although studies of audit committees in New Zealand date back to the 1990s, they 
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have been sparse (Bradbury, 1990; Porter & Gendall, 1998). The studies share the same 
characteristics as existing audit committee research in other countries, namely, they have 
a single paradigm and are dominated by empirical studies (Turley & Zaman, 2004; 
DeZoort et al, 2002). 
 Audit committee developments in New Zealand reflect the international impact of 
corporate governance reforms. While the adoption of these practices in New Zealand 
companies appears to be comparatively slow, the movement to improve overall 
organizational accountability in New Zealand is emerging as well as anywhere in the 
world (Bradbury, 1990). 
After an extensive process of public consultation, the New Zealand Securities 
Commission released Corporate Governance in New Zealand Principles and Guidelines 
(the Principles) in February 2004.   The Principles consulted the existing corporate 
governance research that was done in New Zealand and overseas, and recognised that 
New Zealand must heed policies and practices in other countries and ‘aspire to standards 
of behaviour consistent with rising expectations in international capital markets’ (The 
Securities Commission, New Zealand, 2004).   The Principles do not impose any new 
legal obligations on New Zealand issuers.   This is because the Principles recognise that 
‘different types of entities can take different approaches to achieving good corporate 
governance. Good governance practices should reflect the nature of each entity, its 
ownership structure, and the range and interests of stakeholders’ (The Securities 
Commission, New Zealand, 2004).  However, the Commission expects boards of 
directors of listed companies to observe and to report to their investors and other 
stakeholders about the application of the Principles. 
The Principles have a separation section regarding board committees.  Principle 3.4 
provides that publicly owned companies should establish audit committees comprising 
only non-executive directors, a majority of whom are independent, with at least one 
director who is a chartered accountant.  Meanwhile the audit committee chairperson 
should be an independent director, who is not the chairperson of the entire board.  
According to the New Zealand Securities Commission, the responsibilities of an audit 
committee include recommending the appointment of external and internal auditors; 
overseeing the entity-auditor relationship; and promoting the integrity of the entity's 
financial reporting (The Securities Commission, New Zealand, 2004). 
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Simultaneously, the New Zealand Exchange (NZX) released its new corporate 
governance regime on 15 August 2003. The regime is in the form of a Corporate 
Governance Best Practice Code (the Code) and a number of governance-focused 
amendments to the NZX Listing Rules. The framework for the regime adopted by the 
NZX is a mix of prescriptive and disclosure-based rules. The amendments to the Listing 
Rules require listed companies to compose their boards of directors in a certain way and 
impose certain rules around the composition and operation of a listed company’s audit 
committee. The Code is a model for best practice.  Compliance with the Code is 
voluntary (NZX Ltd, 2003). 
Both the Principles and the Code have the objective of bringing New Zealand 
markets into line with other developed countries’ security markets.  Both the Principles 
and the Code emphasise the importance of establishing audit committees in publicly 
owned companies.   It is noteworthy that the Principles, however, specify that the 
accountability of the board as a whole must be maintained, including in relation to work 
undertaken by committees.  In other words, board committees, including audit 
committees, do not bear separate accountability.  The Code also recognises that good 
corporate governance practices lie ultimately in the accountability of company directors, 
instead of with any particular regulatory requirement per se. 
The assumptions underlying this research are in line with the tone of the NZX, 
namely that: 
(1) An effective audit committee is crucial for good corporate governance; and 
(2) Audit committee effectiveness lies ultimately in the conduct of the committee 
members (NZX Ltd, 2003). 
1.1.4  Research objective 
This is a positive research study which uses a qualitative method to expand the 
existing body of knowledge on audit committee effectiveness. The objective of the study 
is to enhance understanding of the qualitative factors that give rise to an effective audit 
committee and to enrich the discussion of how to evaluate the contribution of audit 
committees to listed companies. The study argues that the effectiveness of an audit 
committee ultimately lies in the attributes and conscious efforts of its committee 
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members.  The study contributes to the general research problem ‘what gives rise to an 
effective audit committee?’ by providing several insights and explanations.   It is hoped 
that this study will encourage further and broader investigation into the many aspects, 
including an effective audit committee, which contribute to improved corporate 
governance for companies.   
1.2 Statement of research questions 
In dismissing the New Zealand Registrar of Companies' lawsuit against the directors 
of the iconic New Zealand company - Feltex, in August 2010, Judge Jan Doogue ruled 
that the board of directors, including the four members of its audit committee, had acted 
with sufficient care, but blamed the company’s accounting firm Ernst & Young (E&Y).  
Feltex had been placed in receivership and then liquidation in 2006, two years after listing 
on the NZX.    Judge Doogue said, “Having engaged E&Y to act as the company’s 
international financial reporting standards (IFRS) advisers, the directors could 
legitimately expect that the review would pay particular attention to ensuring that the 
IFRS requirements were met.  Questions asked by members of the Feltex board’s audit 
committee demonstrated this, as did the fact that the express purpose of the IFRS review 
sought by Feltex was ‘restoring Feltex’s credibility in the market as recommended by 
E&Y’”  (Krause, 2010).   If an effective audit committee is expected to enhance the 
integrity of financial reporting and the independent audit, it needs to be asked why a 
diligent audit committee - as ruled by the judge - could not prevent the company’s 
auditors from issuing an unreliable opinion.   
As stated previously, the motivation for this research is to answer the general 
research problem: “What gives rise to an effective audit committee?”   It is an exploratory 
study that aims to identify qualitative factors that contribute to an audit committee’s 
effectiveness in carrying out its function. The general research problem is investigated by 
answering four interrelated, specific research questions: 
(1) What do audit committee members perceive the desired objectives of an audit 
committee to be? 




(3) How do members help attain the desired audit committee objectives? 
(4) How do members assess the extent to which the audit committee objectives have 
been achieved? 
The relationship between the four research questions is illustrated in Figure 1-1.  
1.2.1 Research question 1: what do audit committee members perceive the desired 
objectives of an audit committee to be? 
This question is designed to investigate audit committee members’ perceptions of 
the role of the audit committee within the context of their company. It is not only aimed at 
obtaining an account of the responsibility of the audit committee, but also at 
understanding what the important factors or events for individual members are in linking 
the role of the audit committee to a specific organisational setting and to the member’s 
role. 
1.2.2 Research question 2: what do the members bring to an audit committee in order to 
achieve its desired objectives? 
This question is designed to gain an insight into: (1) how audit committee members 
explain their own presence in their specific audit committee; and (2) how they justify this 
to match the committee’s role as identified in research question 1. This research question, 
unlike other audit committee quantitative research studies, does not assume that 
independence and financial expertise are the desirable attributes for being an audit 
committee member, but provides an opportunity for actual audit committee members to 





1.2.3 Research question 3: how do members help attain the desired audit committee 
objectives? 
Further to research question 2, research question 3 goes beyond the members’ 
personal attributes. It is designed to investigate members’ observations from their 
experiences on how they use the delegated audit committee authority and facilities to 
achieve the desired outcomes. The emphasis is not only on those authorities and facilities 
per se, but also on the members’ perceptions of the cause-and-effect relationships 
between those authorities and facilities and their audit committee responsibilities. 
1.2.4 Research question 4: how do members assess the extent to which the audit 
committee objectives have been achieved? 
The aim of research question 4 is not to document an assessment of the audit 
committees’ performance, but to understand how, i.e. from what perspective(s), members 
of the audit committee determine the extent to which they believe that their duties have 
been fulfilled and how they justify this belief, or degree of comfort. This research 
Figure 1-1: The relationship between the research questions 
Research question 1: What 
do audit committee members 
perceive the desired 
objectives of an audit 
committee to be? 
 
Research question 2: What 
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Research question 3: 
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committee objectives? 
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question provides an area for in-depth discussion of the main reasons for the presence of 
audit committees in firms. 
The rationale for the development and selection of these four specific research 
questions is discussed in Chapter Four, Research Design and Data Collection. 
1.3 Organisation of the study 
This thesis consists of seven chapters. 
Chapter One is an introductory overview of the research. It explains the background 
that motivated this research. The research objective and the statement of the research 
questions in the chapter outline the general and the four interrelated, detailed research 
questions. 
Chapter Two, titled “Literature Review”, serves two purposes. Firstly, the review of 
the empirical audit committee literature to date aims to identify gaps in the existing body 
of knowledge.  Secondly, the review of research methodologies is intended to justify the 
choice of the research design. 
Chapter Three describes and explains the theoretical framework on which the study 
is based. It discusses, inter alia, sociological and positive accounting theories that guide 
the gathering, analysis, and interpretation of the qualitative data, and the audit committee 
theories which underpin the interview questions.  
Chapter Four describes and explains the research design, the data collection 
method, the interview questionnaire design, and the protocol of the interviews. The 
chapter also describes the interview and data collection processes. 
Chapter Five explains the data analysis process.  
Chapter Six documents the research results and discussions. 
Chapter Seven, the final chapter, discusses the implications of the research from 
both a theoretical and a methodological perspective, specifies the limitations of the study, 




Chapter Two: Literature Review 
2.1 Introduction  
There is a large body of previous research on audit committees.  This literature 
needs to be reviewed to provide a foundation and a catalyst for this research.  The 
purpose of this literature review is to examine the existing research studies on audit 
committees, with a view to identifying any gaps in the existing body of knowledge about 
audit committee effectiveness.  
The literature review is divided into two sections:  
1) Syntheses of audit committee literature  
In this section, three syntheses of the audit committee literature by DeZoort, 
Hermanson, Archambeault and Reed (2002); Turley and Zaman (2004); and Bédard and 
Gendron (2010) are evaluated.  Other corporate governance syntheses that are relevant to 
this research are also discussed.  
2) Empirical research on audit committees subsequent to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
(2002)   
In this section, empirical research studies published subsequent to the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act (2002), hereafter SOX (2002), are examined and evaluated within a framework 
developed from the previous syntheses.    
Although the existing research on audit committees has been dominated by 
empirical research, there is a growing trend for exploratory studies on audit committee 
operations and interactions with other parties within the corporate governance 
mechanism. The existing qualitative studies on audit committee effectiveness are 
discussed from the perspectives of background theory, research design, and their research 
results in Chapter Three, Theoretical Framework, in order to justify the originality of this 






2.2 Syntheses of empirical audit committee literature  
2.2.1. Overview 
The large volume of corporate governance literature has produced several literature 
reviews on audit committees.  A study by DeZoort, et al (2002) was the first systematic 
review of audit committee literature focusing on the factors contributing to audit 
committee effectiveness from an agency theory perspective. In contrast to DeZoort et al 
(2002), who focused on the factors contributing to audit committee effectiveness, Turley 
and Zaman (2004) synthesised the research on the impact of audit committee output on 
corporate governance. Bédard and Gendron (2010) have provided the most updated audit 
committee literature review, requesting future researchers to adopt different theoretical, 
methodological, and geographical points of view, rather than focusing solely on a positive 
accounting approach.  In this section, the above three syntheses will be critically 
discussed in order to organise the existing audit committee research.   
2.2.2. DeZoort et al (2002) –synthesis of the determinants of audit committee 
effectiveness  
To organise the literature on the determinants of audit committee effectiveness, 
DeZoort et al (2002) developed a framework to classify the contributing factors of ‘an 
effective audit committee’ into four dimensions, namely composition, authority, 
resources, and diligence (p. 41).  This framework is illustrated in Figure 2-1. 
DeZoort et al (2002) asserted that an effective audit committee could protect 
stakeholders’ interests by ensuring reliable financial reporting, effective internal control, 
and high quality risk management (i.e. by way of the output of audit committees).  
DeZoort et al (2002) were the first to systematically summarise the audit committee 
characteristics that have been tested for establishing associations with audit committee 
effectiveness.  Their framework demonstrated that an audit committees should be 
equipped with appropriate members, authorities, and resources (i.e. the process factor of 





Figure 2-1: Determinants of audit committee effectiveness – DeZoort et al (2002) 
 
DeZoort et al (2002) identified several limitations of the empirical research.  The 
measurement of the determinants of audit committee effectiveness suffered from a lack of 
meaningful substance, for example, the diligence of audit committees was only quantified 
by the frequency of meetings (p. 58).  They believed that to enrich the measurements, 
observations should be the desirable data collection method rather than the use of archival 
records.  
There are also limitations within the DeZoort et al (2002) synthesis per se.  Firstly, 
the objective of an effective audit committee, defined as ‘to protect stakeholders’ 
interests’ (p. 39) reflects a public expectation.  This objective is in line with the 
expectations of regulators and listing rules for the creation of audit committees, especially 
in public companies.  Such assumptions are rooted in public perception, rather than being 
a matter of fact (Petra, 2005).  
Secondly, a discussion of the meaning of ‘effectiveness’ in regard to an audit 
committee is missing from the DeZoort et al (2002) synthesis.  Effectiveness literally 
means the ability to produce the expected outcome (Webster English Dictionary, 1987).  
Diligence: 
 Meeting frequency  
 Activities  (as 
disclosed) 




 Experience   
Authority: 
 Responsibilities  
 Board delegation 
 Management support   
Resources: 
 Size 
 Support from internal 
and external auditors    Input 
Process 
Output 
Adapted from DeZoort, Hermanson, Archambealt and Reed (2002), p. 43 
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If effectiveness represents an ability to accomplish, then audit committee effectiveness 
should be explained as an ability, instead of a mere association between the 
characteristics and outputs of an audit committee.   
As detailed in Chapter One, this research is aimed at obtaining an in-depth account 
of the beliefs and experiences pertaining to the effectiveness of audit committees in New 
Zealand listed companies.  The research design addresses the above two limitations, 
firstly by investigating the perceptions of audit committee objectives held by audit 
committee members within the organisational context, instead of assuming public 
expectations.  Secondly, the audit committee members provide an insight of the 
mechanism (including both the contributing factors and their ability to utilise these 
contributing factors) that they believe facilitates the attainment of their perceived audit 
committee objectives. 
2.2.3. Turley and Zaman (2004) –synthesis of the audit committee effects on 
corporate governance  
In contrast to DeZoort et al (2002), who focused on factors contributing to audit 
committee effectiveness, Turley and Zaman (2004) synthesised the impact on corporate 
governance as the output of the audit committee.  They also developed a framework to 
organise the empirical research under review.  The effects of audit committees were 
categorised in terms of: (a) the expectations that led to their establishment, and (b) the 
corporate governance effects represented by audit function, financial reporting quality, 
and firm performance.    The Turley and Zaman (2004) framework may be represented as 
in Figure 2-2. 
Without assuming that audit committees were adopted to fulfil a public 
expectation, Turley and Zaman (2004) pointed out that understanding the impact of audit 
committees could assist in formulating appropriate expectations about the audit 







Figure 2-2: Framework of the effects of audit committees 
 
Turley and Zaman (2004) criticised the empirical audit committee literature’s 
mixed results with respect to claims about the audit committee’s corporate governance 
effects.  The unexpected testing results on audit committee impacts were not explained, 
for example, audit committees’ presence was not associated with the likelihood of fraud 
(Beasley, 1996).  The theoretical framework underpinning the empirical research on audit 
committees was predominantly within agency theory.  Agency theory was also deployed 
to support the formation of other corporate governance mechanisms, for example, boards 
 
 
Structural incentives for 
adopting an audit 
committee: 
— Potential reduction of 
agency costs; 
— Leverage 
— Links with other 
arrangement, e.g. 
• Large audit firms 






— Number of meetings 
— Independence 
— Expertise 






— Process and 
communication 
— Internal control and 
internal audit 
  Financial reporting quality: 
— Errors and irregularities 
— Adopting accounting 
standards and selecting 
accounting policies 
— Litigation for 
misstatements 
— Audit qualification 
 
  Corporate performance: 
— Share price 
— Wealth creation 
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of directors and management incentive plans.   It was unclear whether it was the audit 
committee, or several corporate governance mechanisms which contributed jointly to an 
outcome (Turley & Zaman 2004; 2007).    
In addressing the limitations of existing evidence and the importance of researching 
audit committees, they indicated directions for future studies.  Turley and Zaman (2004) 
argued that having an audit committee in place and/or presenting certain characteristics 
did not automatically generate effectiveness.  Therefore, further research on investigating 
the organisational setting inside audit committees is needed.  Firstly, it is possible to 
theoretically reconceptualise the audit committee underlying members’ behaviour, 
corporate culture, and other institutional and organisational contexts.  Secondly, the 
extant research methods should include qualitative research design, especially field 
studies, to investigate both the intended and unintended consequences of audit 
committees (Turley & Zaman, 2004).   The qualitative research design of this study 
addresses the need expressed by Turley and Zaman (2004), employing a qualitative 
approach to enrich the understanding of the audit committee effectiveness within 
organisational contexts.   This research also argues that the effectiveness of an audit 
committee should only be evaluated within an overall corporate governance setting of the 
organisation.   
2.2.4. Bédard and Gendron (2010) –synthesis of the relationship between 
audit committee characteristics and strengthening the financial 
reporting system 
The authors reviewed the existing audit committee literature with the intention of 
evaluating the extent to which audit committees are effective in terms of contributing to a 
positive financial reporting environment. They surveyed 103 papers published from 1994 
to 2008 in different accounting journals.   Bédard and Gendron (2010) extended the 
aforementioned research frameworks and mapped out a comprehensive landscape of 
existing audit committee studies.   This may be represented as in Figure 2-3.
  
Figure 2-3: Audit committee research landscape 
The objective of Bédard’s and Gendron’s (2010) synthesis is to evaluate the extent to which audit committees contribute to the 
strengthening of financial reporting.   In addition to the audit committee input-process-output continuum covered by the previous two syntheses, 
Bédard and Gendron (2010) extended their review to include the theoretical, methodological aspects of the existing audit committee studies, as 
well as the studies from different countries.     
In terms of synthesising the existing research findings, they reported that a large proportion of the studies report a positive association 
between effectiveness and the presence, independence, and competencies of the audit committee.  However, meeting frequencies and the size of 
the committee were not conclusively associated positively with audit committee effectiveness.  
Bédard and Gendron (2010) also identified the gap of literature and the opportunities of future research by criticising that the majority of 
audit committee studies were relational and explanatory based on economics theories.  Very few studies were exploratory. Psychological and 
sociological studies were scarce.   Investigations on audit committees in jurisdictions which did not follow the Anglo-Saxon model of corporate 
governance were also scant.  An important aspect of their literature review called for enriching the body of knowledge on audit committees from 
different theoretical, methodological, and geographical points of view.   The current research largely answers this call of Bédard and Gendron 
(2010) by obtaining an insight into audit committees in New Zealand listed companies through a sociological theoretical framework and 
qualitative research design.  Figure 2-3 presents the landscape of audit committee research framework integrating these three important reviews.         
  
Theoretical framew rk of boards of direc r research  
 Legal perspective 
 Positive accounting theories  
 Socio ogical theories; and  
 Psychological theories Dimensions of audit committee effectiveness 
Dimensions of audit committee input 
Composition (measured as a 
proportion of membership): 
 Independence   
o employment relationship  
o personal relationship  
o business relationship  
 Competence  
o financial literacy  
o financial expertise 
o governance and other 
expertise 
Authority as specified by the 
charter:  
 oversight of external 
communications monitoring of 
the internal control system, and 




 Monetary resources  
 Information resources  
Overall corporate 
governance environment 
 Corporate governance 
structure  
 Post-SOX changes   
 
Internal control 
 internal audit  
 disclosure on weakness  
 members’ judgement on 
internal control issues  
 
Financial rep rting 
 earnings management  
 misstatement 
 voluntary disclosure  
 directors’ assessment on 
financial reporting 
quality 
 forecast reliability 
 
External auditing  
 auditor selection 
 audit scope 
 remuneration 
 auditors’ independence 
 audit opinion 




 cost of capital  
 market reactions  
 voting at the annual 
general meeting  
 perceptions of the 
audit quality and 
auditors’ 
independence  
Audit committee process 
 Meeting freq ency 
 Agenda  
 Relationship  
 Power  







2.2.5. Other relevant corporate governance syntheses 
Gramling, Maletta, Schneider, and Church (2004) synthesised the existing internal 
audit literature to discuss the current and potential role of the corporate internal audit 
function.   The interrelationship between audit committees and the firm’s internal audit 
function is regarded as influential to the quality of corporate governance as a whole.  
However, only a limited number of empirical research focuses on this area by surveying 
internal auditors and associating internal audit function with audit committee characteristics.  
Gramling et al (2004) encouraged future internal audit research to expand investigations to 
audit committee qualitative characteristics including inquisitiveness, willingness to pursue 
issues, and scepticism.  They also suggested potential gaps between the audit committee’s 
expectation and current internal audit performance.  This research posits that the interaction 
with internal auditors constitutes one of the significant aspects of audit committees’ 
operation.  The research result confirms that audit committee members’ characteristics, such 
as inquisitiveness and willingness to pursue issues, assist their performance.  
 Cohen, Krishnamoorthy, and Wright (2004) suggested a corporate governance mosaic 
in relation to the existing research regarding financial reporting quality.  Studies on the 
association between audit committees and financial reporting quality were evaluated in-depth 
and potential future research was identified (Cohen et al, 2004, p. 141).  The three under-
researched areas of audit committees are: a) the interactions between boards of directors and 
audit committees; b) a comparison of audit committee characteristics reflecting the influence 
of corporate governance reform, for example, pre- and post the passage of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act; and c) the influence of industrial context on audit committees, for example, less 
regulated industries.   Addressing the areas identified by Cohen et al (2004), this research 
investigates and provides evidence that the interaction with the boards of directors constitutes 
one of the significant aspects of audit committees’ operation.   
Jefferies (1999) argued that a literature review should incorporate statistical 
techniques, for example, meta-analyses and best-evidence syntheses.  If not used, the 
conclusions of literature syntheses have to rely solely on the authors’ interpretation (McGaw, 
1997;  Sandelowski, 1997).    Pomeroy and Thornton (2007) conducted a meta-analysis on 27 
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empirical research studies testing the associations of audit committee independence with 
financial reporting quality, and concluded that most of the inconsistency in the association 
was due to the variety of measurements adopted in measuring financial reporting quality.  
They criticised the fact that statistical technologies were scarcely applied in accounting 
literature reviews and also raised concerns about conceptual constructs.  Such concerns 
reflect the problematic nature of the notion of measurement according to the physical 
sciences (Campbell, 1938) when applied to a social science, such as corporate governance. 
2.2.6. Summary of review of audit committee literature syntheses 
This study argues that conceptualisation of the factors involved in audit committee 
effectiveness is a vital addition to the existing body of knowledge.  If inconsistent 
measurements are responsible for mixed empirical testing results, the loosely defined 
‘effectiveness’ of an audit committee might be the reason.  Furthermore, as shown in all of 
the preceding syntheses, the overall research on audit committees suffers from a lack of 
insight into the operation of the audit committees, which in turn has led to the existing 
weaknesses in the conceptualisation of audit committee effectiveness.   
In the next section, the empirical audit committee literature since the SOX (2002) will 
be evaluated.  This is not intended to repeat the efforts of Bédard and Gendron (2010), but 
rather to focus on the empirical findings and identify the gaps in knowledge of audit 
committee effectiveness, to which this research aims to contribute.  
2.3 Empirical audit committee literature since the SOX (2002) 
Since the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, research on audit committees 
has expanded geographically from the US and the UK to other share markets, for example, 
Carson (2002) in Australia, Chau and Leung (2006) in Hong Kong, Rainsbury, Bradbury, 
and Cahan (2008) in New Zealand.  In the latter countries, the mandatory requirements for 
establishing audit committees are less rigid than those in the USA and the UK, and can be 
regarded as followers of countries at the front line of corporate governance reform.   
There have also been studies on audit committees in European share markets, for 
example, Melis (2004) in Italy, Piot (2004) in France, Knechel and Willekens (2006) in 
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Belgium,  and  Osma and Noguer (2007) in Spain.   These studies not only shed light on 
audit committees operating in the European jurisdictions in contrast to the Anglo-American 
system (Collier & Zaman, 2005), but also enriched the discussion of audit committees in 
different institutional backgrounds.     The research on audit committees also spread to less 
developed countries, for example, Al–Twaijry, Brierley, and Gwilliam (2002) in Saudi 
Arabia, Alleyn, Howard, and Greenidge (2006) in Barbados, Barako, Hancock, and Izan 
(2006) in Kenya, Okike (2007) in Nigeria, and Tengamnuay and Stapleton (2008) in 
Thailand.  These research studies are of a descriptive nature and evaluate the presence and 
operation of audit committees in their ‘infancy’, which are ‘finding their feet’ (Spira, 1998, p. 
42).  There have been observations that the establishment of audit committees in these 
countries is largely driven by the US literature (Alleyn, Howard,& Greenidge, 2006) and 
regulatory recommendations, even prior to the establishment of such audit committees 
becoming mandatory.   These studies expanded the discussion of audit committees in the 
context of more diversified political and cultural backgrounds.  More importantly, these 
studies revealed the features and implications of audit committees driven largely by 
compliance (Haron, Jantan, & Pheng, 2005).   
There has also been a development of research on audit committees of non-profit 
organisations within the context of corporate governance, for example, Vermeer, 
Raghunandan, and Forgione (2006), and Iyer and Watkins (2008).    Non-profit organisations 
( bear) responsibility for maximising the efficiency of utilising the funds provided.  There has 
been a strong demand for non-profit organisations to employ the same good corporate 
governance practices as in the private sector (Iyer &Watkins, 2008).  However, the public 
expectation and board accountability for those non-profit organisations largely depend on 
their fund providers and the nature of their services, for example, public medical care and 
tertiary education.  These studies are constructed on resource dependency theory instead of 
agency framework, which has been largely adopted by corporate governance research in the 





2.3.1. The framework for reviewing empirical audit committee literature  
The audit committee empirical research since the syntheses of DeZoort et al (2002) 
and Turley and Zaman (2004) has expanded the discussion of audit committee inputs, 
functioning processes, and outputs.  Previous associations have been retested with new data.  
Furthermore, new variables which proxy audit committee inputs, functioning processes, and 
outputs have been tested, but the results have been mixed.  Innovative research designs 
incorporating social psychological theories to interpret the research findings are being used 
increasingly.   
To organise this section of the literature review, a framework is developed by 
combining the frameworks of DeZoort et al (2002) and Turley and Zaman (2004).  This 
framework involves pooling and analysing the empirical studies into the following 
categories: (a) determinants of audit committee formation and composition
1
; (b) audit 
committee composition characteristics
2
; (c) audit committee functions and activities
2
; and (d) 
audit committees’ corporate governance impacts.  The framework is illustrated in Figure 2-4.   
Figure 2-4: Framework for reviewing the recent empirical audit committee literature 
 
                                                     
1
 Adapted from the DeZoort et al (2002) synthesis.  
2
 Adapted from the Turley &  Zaman (2004) synthesis. 
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Each of these dimensions of audit committee research is discussed by: (1) examining 
developments since the DeZoort et al (2002) and Turley and Zaman (2004) syntheses; (2) 
summarising the research findings, (3) discussions, and (4) identifying gaps in the existing 
research.  
2.3.2. Determinants of audit committee formation and composition 
(1) Recent developments 
Prior to the SOX (2002), the formation of audit committees was voluntary.  According 
to Turley and Zaman (2004), the formation of audit committees was usually an attempt to 
reduce agency costs.  The variables hypothesised to support such a proposition were 
therefore mainly agency cost proxies (Dey, 2008; Rainsbury, Bradbury & Cahan, 2008).     
Subsequent to the SOX (2002), research into the audit committee’s formation has been 
geographically spread to other share markets where the regulatory requirement on the audit 
committee formation is regarded as less rigid than those of the United States and the United 
Kingdom.  
(2) Synthesis of the determinants of audit committee formation and 
composition  
As a result of regulatory requirements, the establishment of audit committees in listed 
companies has been regarded as standard corporate governance practice for most of the 
world’s major stock exchanges.   Despite some inconsistency in the research findings, it is 
generally established that the determinants of an audit committee: (i) formation, (ii) 
independence, and (iii) financial expertise, are associated with:  
(1) Ownership structure  
(2) Leverage  
(3) Source of funding  
(4) Board of directors’ characteristics; and 




I. Determinants of audit committee formation 
The discussion of the determinants of audit committee formation has been expanded 
and enriched.   Using ownership structure as an example, Chau and Leung (2006) 
investigated the association between family ownership and the establishment of audit 
committees in Hong Kong listed companies, while Piot (2004) and Ruiz-Barbadillo, Biedma-
López and Gómez-Aguilar (2007) examined the association between management ownership 
and the formation of audit committees in European companies.  In addition, Vermeer, 
Raghunandan and Forgione (2006) and Iyer and Watkins (2008) studied the formation of 
audit committees in not-for-profit organisations, expanding the scope of the theoretical 
framework that can be applied to explain the formation of audit committees.  See Table 2-1.
  
Table 2-1: Summary of post-SOX (2002) research into the determinants of audit committee formation and composition 
Studies Ownership structure Leverage Source of funding BOD characteristics Firm characteristics 
Piot (2004) Negative association 
(+)
3
 with level of 
insider ownership 
Positive association 
() with debt to 
equity structure 
 Positive association (+) 
with board size 
Positive association (+) 
with the level of 
operational diversity 
 
Positive association (+) 
with firm size 
Chau and Leung 
(2006) 
Negative association 
(+) with family 
dominated ownership 
  Positive association (+) 





  Positive association 
(+) in non-profit 
organisations with 
level of government 
funding  
 
No association (-) in 
non-profit 
organisations with 
long-term debt or 
donations 
 Positive association (+) 
with the size of the non-
profit organisations, but 
negative association (-) 
with universities and 
hospitals  
Iyer and Watkins 
(2008) 
   Positive association (+) 
with board size 
 
Positive association (+) 
with board independence 
Positive association (+) 
with the size of the 
budget  
Rainsbury, Bradbury 
and Cahan (2008) 
 No association (-) 
with debt to equity 
structure 
 Positive association (+) 
with board size 
 
Positive association (+) 
with board independence 
No association (-) with 
firms’ growth 
opportunity measured by 
the market to book ratio   
                                                     
3
 (+) indicates that the test result confirmed the expectation of the audit committee impact, whereas (-) indicates that the test result did not support the expected 






I. Determinants of audit committee financial expertise 
Given that the nature of the audit committee function is to oversee the financial 
reporting process, having financial experts serving on the audit committee has become a 
common practice in listed firms.   With respect to members’ competencies, Section 407 of the 
SOX (2002) requires listed public firms to include at least one member who is a financial 
expert, or to disclose reasons for not adopting this requirement. Since then, two research 
studies in the USA have examined the number of financial experts on audit committees in 
relation to the ownership structure, leverage, and firm characteristics.  See Table 2-2 for the 
studies’ findings.  
Table 2-2: Determinants of audit committees’ financial expertise 
Studies Ownership 
structure 
Leverage Firm characteristics 
Carcello, 
Hollingsworth and 
Neal (2006)  
Positive association 
(+)with level of 
institutional 
ownership 
 Positive associations 
(+) with firm size, level 
of litigious risk and 
firms’ financing 
activities 
Dey (2008) Positive association 




(+) with debt to 
equity structure 
Positive associations 
(+) with other agency 
conflict attributes, 
including firm size, 
industrial complexity, 
growth, level of 
operating risk, and free 
cash flows 
Having financial experts on audit committees reflects the public expectation.  
However, what are the benefits of their financial expertise?  Synthesis of the corporate 
governance impact of financial expertise will be discussed in section 2.3.3.  
II.  Determinants of audit committee independence 
Although independence is considered to be a crucial element for an audit committee to 
be effective in discharging its responsibilities, there has been disagreement about the ideal 
proportion of independent directors and what causes it to vary between firms.  See Table 2-3 
for a summary of the studies.
  
Table 2-3: Determinants of audit committee independence 
Studies Ownership structure Leverage Source of funding BOD 
characteristics 
Firm characteristics 
Cotter and Silvester 
(2003) 
 Negative association (-)
4
 
with debt to equity 
structure  
 Positive association 
(+) with board 
independence 
 
Piot (2004) Negative association 
(+) with level of 
insider ownership 
Weak association (-) with 
debt to equity structure  




  Positive association (+) 
in non-profit 
organisations with level 
of government funding 
 
No association (-) in 
non-profit organisations 
with long-term debt or 
donations 
 Positive association (+) with the size of 
non-profit organisations, but negative 





    Positive association (+) with firms’ 






(+) with level of 
management 
ownership 
  Positive association 
(+) with board 
independence  
Negative association (+) with 
CEO/director duality 
Dey (2008) Positive association (+) 
with separation of 
ownership and 
management  
Positive association (+) 
with debt to equity 
structure 
  Positive associations (+) with overall 
agency conflict, including firm size, 
industrial complexity, growth, level of 




 No association (-) with 
debt to equity structure  
  No association (-) with firms’ growth 
opportunity 
                                                     
4
 (+) indicates that the test result confirmed the expectation of the audit committee impact, whereas (-) indicates that the test result did not support the expected impact of 







Firstly, firm size as a determinant of audit committee formation and composition is 
inconsistently measured, but results in relatively consistent, positive test results with a few 
exceptions. Fama and Jensen (1983) suggested that agency conflicts become more severe as firm 
size increases and that greater control of managerial actions is therefore required.  If this is so, a 
positive relationship between firm size and desirable audit committee composition and control 
activities would be expected (Dey, 2008).  Research has established that firm size was positively 
associated with audit committee existence (Piot, 2004; Iyer & Watkins, 2008).   Firm size, 
however, was measured in different ways in these studies.  Piot (2004) and Vermeer, 
Raghunandan and Forgione (2006) measured firm size as the book value of total assets.  
Carcello, Hollingsworth and Neal (2006) and Raghunandan and Rama (2007) used total market 
value (share price at the year-end times total shares outstanding) to measure firm size.   Dey 
(2008) measured firm size as the natural logarithm of sales, but did not provide any explanation 
for adopting this specific measurement.   By surveying the CFOs of 215 non-profit 
organisations, Iyer and Watkins (2008) suggested that the size of their budgets was positively 
associated with the formation of audit committees.   
Vermeer, Raghunandan and Forgione (2006) examined the formation and composition of 
audit committees in 128 non-profit organisations in the USA.  They found that the voluntary 
establishment of audit committees and the committees’ independence were positively associated 
with reliance on government funding rather than reliance on long-term debt or donors.  They 
also provided evidence that contrary to expectation, universities and hospitals were less likely to 
have solely independent directors on the audit committee, even though they were usually large in 
size and subject to a high level of public scrutiny of their efficiency.   
Secondly, leverage, usually measured as the ratio of long-term debt to total assets, is also 
presumed to be one of the important determinants for firms adopting an audit committee on a 
voluntary basis (Turley & Zaman, 2004).  As agency conflicts rise with the level of debt, debt 
holders may require better governance mechanisms in place to safeguard their interests 
5 
(Jensen 
& Meckling, 1976).   Leverage is therefore normally hypothesised as being positively associated 
with the establishment of good quality audit committees.  However, in circumstances of the 
                                                     
5
  Under a high leverage structure, owner–managers have an incentive to prioritise shareholders’ benefits to the 
detriment of the creditors’ benefits. 
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voluntary adoption of audit committees, only Dey (2008) confirmed that high leverage correlates 
with audit committee members being independent and having a high level of expertise.  The 
other studies did not support the hypothesis that leverage is a significant determinant of audit 
committee formation and independence.    
The mixed results of the association between leverage and audit committee variables are 
displayed in Table 2-4. 
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Thirdly, audit committees’ formation and composition are also associated with firms’ 
industrial contexts, in particular their litigious risk, but this is not consistent across industries 
(Ashbaugh, LaFond & Mayhew, 2003).  Firms with high litigious risk tended to emphasise more 
formal corporate governance settings, including audit committees (Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins & 
LaFond, 2006b).  Piot (2004) provided evidence that in the generally less litigious environment 
of France, the formation of audit committees was associated with the firms’ operating 
diversification.   However, in New Zealand, where the corporate governance rules are also 
considered relatively less rigid, the formation and independence of audit committees was not 
associated with the firms’ growth opportunities (Goodwin, 2003).  Carcello, Hollingsworth and 
Neal (2006) observed that subsequent to initial public offerings, firms were more likely to 
designate financial experts on their audit committees.  Charitou, Louca and Panayides (2007) 
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confirmed that firms listed on both the Canadian and USA share markets tended to have more 
independent audit committees.   
(4) Gaps in the existing qualitative research on the determinants of audit 
committee formation and composition  
When observing audit committee establishment, (independence and financial expertise) 
and their determinants, some propositions regarding an audit committee’s nature can be 
discussed (Tsui, Subramaniam, & Hoy, 2006).  Firstly, the audit committee, as a sub-structure of 
the board of directors, carries out its function through board delegation.  Therefore, audit 
committee members are obliged to understand and represent the board’s expectations and report 
to the board about the outcome of its delegation.  Little research has been done about the 
interaction between the audit committee and the board.     
Secondly, the agency problem, ownership structure, and litigious/industrial risks are key 
issues of corporate governance.  To perform their role in corporate governance efficiently, audit 
committee members need to interpret their delegated duties according to their specific 
organisational setting; such interpretation involves subjective and professional judgement.  Little 
has been documented about how audit committee members reflectively interpret their role, their 
attributes, and their efforts in relating to their particular organisations.   It is questionable 
whether financial or accounting expertise is the only desirable characteristic contributing to the 
performance of the audit committee role.   This research study aims to address the above gaps by 
providing qualitative evidence about how individual audit committee members justify the 
existence of their committee and identify the contributing factors which help them perform their 
daily audit committee tasks. 
2.3.3. Audit committee characteristics 
(1) Recent developments 
The two most common audit committee composition characteristics are members’ 
independence and competency.   The body of research regarding audit committee members’ 
independence and financial accounting expertise has been recognised by, and incorporated into, 
several leading corporate governance regimes, for example, the SOX (2002) of the USA, the 
OECD Principles of Corporate Governance (2004), and the Combined Code on Corporate 
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Governance of the UK  (Financial Reporting Council, 2003).   Recently, qualitative audit 
committee research has expanded the discussion of audit committee members’ expertise beyond 
financial- or accounting-related qualifications and experience (Abbott, Parker, Peters & 
Rughunandan, 2003a; Lee, Mande & Ortman, 2004).  Bédard, Chtourou and Courteau (2004) 
and Xie, Davidson and DaDalt (2003) found that audit committee members with corporate 
expertise were associated with high quality financial reporting.  
Although audit committee composition research since SOX (2002) has been dominated by 
investigations into the determinants and impact of audit committee independence and expertise, 
there have been a growing number of studies that examined the relationship between the size of 
audit committees and their impact on corporate governance.   The results were very inconsistent.   
For example, Karamanou and Vafeas (2005) concluded that larger audit committees were 
negatively associated with forecast-induced returns for firms in the USA; Bédard, Chtourou and 
Courteau (2004) found that there was no association between audit committee size and financial 
reporting quality for Canadian firms, whereas Pucheta-Martínez and Fuentes (2007) found that 
in Spanish firms, downsizing an audit committee reduced the likelihood of receiving a qualified 
audit report. 
According to Beasley (1996), directors’ tenure is an important attribute of corporate 
governance.  The average tenure of audit committee members has recently been introduced as a 
new variable into the existing audit committee literature – Yang and Krishnan (2005) and 
Mustafa and Meier (2006) established that the average length of tenure of audit committee 
members was associated with higher financial reporting quality and a lower likelihood of the 
misappropriation of assets.  Directors holding multiple directorships in several organisations has 
become more common in recent years.   There has been intense debate about whether multi-
directorships are an indication of the reputation of the directors or a signal of directors being 
over-committed (Pritchard, Ferris & Jagannathan, 2003).   On the one hand, audit committee 
members’ multi-directorships are contributing to better financial reporting quality (Vafeas, 2005; 
Yang & Krishnan, 2005).  On the other hand, busy directors are less likely to accept auditors’ 
suggested adjustments (Hunton & Rose, 2008), or are more likely to leave the firm when 





(2) Synthesis of audit committee characteristics 
I. Independence 
According to DeZoort et al (2002) an independent audit committee promotes the best 
interests of corporate stakeholders.  The importance of having an independent committee in 
listed firms has been accepted by most of the world’s leading corporate governance regimes.   
According to section 301 of the SOX (2002), each member of an audit committee shall be 
independent.    Section 301 further specifies that an independent director may not accept any 
consulting or other compensatory fee from the organisation he or she serves, or be an affiliated 
person of the organisation.  The Combined Code on Corporate Governance (Financial Reporting 
Council, 2003) specifies that the board should establish an audit committee of at least three 
members, who should all be independent, non-executive directors.  The OECD Principles of 
Corporate Governance (2004) emphasise that a corporate board of directors should establish an 
independent audit committee.  The qualitative research on audit committee independence 
published since SOX (2002) is summarised in Table 2-5.  
Table 2-5: Summary of post-SOX (2002) research into the corporate governance (CG) 
impact of audit committee independence 
Studies Financial reporting quality Audit quality 
Abbott, Parker, Peters 
and Raghunandan, 
2003a 
 Negative association (+)6 with 
auditor independence 
(measured as the ratio of non-
audit service fees to audit fees) 
Abbott, Parker, Peters 
and Raghunandan, 
2003b 
 Positive association () with 
level of audit fees 
Raghunandan and 
Rama, 2003 
 Negative association (+) with 
shareholder votes on auditor's 
ratification 
Abbott, Parker and 
Peters, 2004 
Negative association (+)  with 
the likelihood of annual results 
restatement 
 
Bédard, Chtourou and 
Courteau, 2004 
Negative association (+)  with 
the level of earnings 
management 
 
Lee, Mande and 
Ortman, 2004 
 Negative association (+) with 
auditors’ resignation 
Davidson, Goodwin-
Stewart and Kent, 2005 
No association (-) with the 
level of earnings management 
 
                                                     
6
 (+) indicates that the test result confirmed the expectation of the audit committee impact, whereas (-) indicates that 
the test result did not support the expected impact of the audit committee. 
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Studies Financial reporting quality Audit quality 
Karamanou and Vafeas, 
2005 
Negative association (-) with 
forecast accuracy 
 
Vafeas, 2005 Negative association (+)  with 




and Forgione, 2006 
 Positive association (+) with 
the tendency to recruit Big4 
accounting firms as auditors in 
non-profit organisations 
Chen and Zhou, 2007  Positive association (+) with 
the tendency for early 
dismissal of Arthur Andersen  
Koh, Laplante and 
Tong, 2007 
Negative association (+)  with 
the level of abnormal accruals  
 
Lennox and Park, 2007  Negative association (+) with 
the formation of affiliations 
between  the management and 
auditors 
Baxter and Cotter, 2008 Positive association (-)  with 
the level of earnings 
management 
 
Boo and Sharma, 2008a  Positive association () with 
level of audit fees 
Owens-Jackson, 
Robinson and Shelton, 
2009 
Negative association (+)  with 
the likelihood of financial 
reporting fraud 
 
Ghosh, Marra, and 
Moon (2010) 
No association (-) with the 
level of earnings management 
 
Although members’ independence has long been accepted as good practice in corporate 
governance, it still remains one of the most common variables in the audit committee 
composition literature.  As shown in Table 2-5, in many aspects the audit committee 
independence literature produced mixed results which failed to prove the fulfilment of 
expectation on independent directors safeguarding the interests of investors.   
 II. Expertise 
Members’ expertise is another commonly tested composition characteristic of audit 
committees.  It is expected that an audit committee should have some members who are financial 
accounting experts (section 407, SOX, 2002).     
There has been some debate regarding precisely what the expected financial or accounting 
expertise is.  For example, the rules of the SEC define an “audit committee financial expert” as a 
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person who has each of five attributes pertaining to a sufficient understanding of accounting 
principles, financial statements, internal control, and audit committee functions
7
.  According to 
the Combined Code of Corporate Governance in the UK (Financial Reporting Council, 2003), 
the board of a listed company should “satisfy itself” that at least one of its independent non-
executives has recent and relevant financial experience. The Code is not specific about what 
constitutes “relevant experience”. However, according to the New Zealand Securities 
Commission (2004), ‘financial expert’ refers to current membership of the New Zealand 
Institute of Chartered Accountants (NZICA).   It is evident, therefore, that in different 
jurisdictions, the meaning of ‘financial expert’ may vary.  This may reduce the comparability of 
studies on audit committee financial expertise between different countries.     
Bédard et al (2004) argue that, in order to fulfil their responsibilities, audit committee 





.   However, they only found a negative 
association between corporate governance expertise and the likelihood of aggressive earnings 
management; there was no association established between earnings quality and firm-specific 
expertise (Bédard et al, 2004).  Xie, Davidson and DaDalt (2003) found the proportion of audit 
committee members with corporate or investment banking backgrounds to be negatively related 
to the level of earnings management.  The impact of having financial experts on audit 
committees is also double sided. On the one hand, audit committee financial expertise tended to 
enhance the diligence of the committee and the quality of reporting and auditing (Abbott, Parker, 
Peters & Raghunandan, 2003; Bédard et al, 2004; and Baxter & Cotter, 2008).  On the other 
hand, financially sophisticated directors can be aggressive and risk-taking, and therefore may act 
in a contrary manner (DeZoort, Hermanson & Houston, 2003a).     The research results of the 
corporate governance impact of audit committee expertise are displayed in Table 2-6.    
 
                                                     
7
 (1) An understanding of GAAP and financial statements; (2) the ability to assess the general application of such 
principles in connection with accounting for estimates, accruals and reserves; (3) experience preparing, auditing, 
analysing, or evaluating financial statements that present a breadth and level of complexity of accounting issues that 
are generally comparable to the breadth and complexity of issues that can reasonably be expected to be raised by the 
company’s financial statements, or experience actively supervising one or more persons engaged in such activities;  
(4) an understanding of internal controls and procedures for financial reporting; and  (5) an understanding of audit 
committee functions.  
8
 Be an experienced corporate director. 
9
 Have reasonably long experience with a particular firm. 
  




Corporate governance impact 
Financial reporting quality Audit quality Audit committee diligence Market reaction 
McDaniel, Martin, 
Maines and Peecher, 
2002 
Being auditing 
managers or EMBA 
students 
  Positive association (+)
10
 with 
the competence of assessing 
financial reporting quality  
 
DeZoort, Hermanson 
and Houston, 2003a 
Being financially 
literate 
  Negative association (-) with 
the likelihood of recommending 





Number of financial 
experts  
 No association with (-) 
shareholder votes on auditor's 
ratification 
  
Abbott, Parker, Peters 
and Raghunandan, 
2003a 
Number of financial 
experts  
 Positive association () with 
the level of audit fee 
  
Xie, Davidson and 
DaDalt, 2003 
Corporate or investment 
banking background 
Negative association with (+) the 
level of earnings management 
   
Bédard, Chtourou and 
Courteau, 2004 
Number of financial 
experts  
Negative association with (+) the 
level of earnings management 
   
Lee, Mande and 
Ortman., 2004 
Number of financial 
experts  
 Weak association (-) with 
auditor's resignation 
  
Abbott, Parker and 
Peters, 2004 
Number of financial 
experts  
Negative association with (+) the 
likelihood of annual result 
restatement 
   
Davidson, Xie and Xu, 
2004 
Number of financial 
experts 
   Positive association (+) 
with the share price 
Farber, 2005 Number of financial 
experts  
Negative association (+) with the 
detection of fraud 
   
Karamanou and Vafeas, 
2005 
Number of financial 
experts  
Mixed association () with the 
decision of whether or not to issue a 
forecast 
   
Defond, Hann and Hu, 
2005 
Number of financial 
experts  
   Positive association (+) 
with the share price 
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Corporate governance impact 
Financial reporting quality Audit quality Audit committee diligence Market reaction 
Chen, Moroney and 
Houghton, 2005 
Number of financial 
experts  




Mangena and Pike, 
2005 
Number of financial 
experts  
Positive association (+) with the 
extent of interim disclosure 
   
Yang and Krishnan, 
2005 
Number of financial 
experts  
No association (-) with the level of 
quarterly earnings management 
   
Goodwin-Stewart and 
Kent, 2006 
Number of financial 
experts  
 Mixed () association with 
the level of audit fees 
  
Zhang, Zhou and Zhou, 
2007 
Number of financial 
experts  
Negative association (+) with the 
disclosure of internal control 
weaknesses 
   
Chen and Zhou, 2007 Number of financial 
experts  
 Positive association (+) with 
the early dismissal of Arthur 
Andersen  
  
Baxter and Cotter, 2008 Number of accounting 
experts 
Negative association (-) with 
estimation errors 
   
Krishnan and 
Visvanathan, 2008 
Number of financial 
experts 
Positive association (+) with 
conservatism 
   
Bédard, Coulombe and 
Courteau, 2008 
Number of financial 
experts  
No association (-) with the precision 
of earnings forecasts  
   
Kelton and Yang, 2008 Number of financial 
experts  
Positive association (+)  with the 
transparency of internet-based 
financial reporting 
   
Marciukaityte and 
Varma, 2008 
Number of financial 
experts  
Negative association (+) with large 
losses on restatement 
   
Mangena and 
Tauringana, 2008 
Number of financial 
experts  
Positive association (+) with the 
involvement of external auditors in 
interim reporting  







Having financial experts serving on the audit committee is expected to contribute 
to firms’ financial reporting quality.  However, Baxter and Cotter (2008) found some 
evidence of a higher level of discretionary accruals in firms with a greater proportion of 
qualified accountants on their audit committees.   This may also be interpreted as a 
contradictory effect of audit committee expertise.   
Audit committee financial expertise is also expected to enhance audit quality, but 
the test results are also mixed.   Abbott et al (2003a) and Goodwin-Stewart and Kent 
(2006) both found that the expertise of audit committee members is associated with 
higher audit fees.  Chen, Moroney and Houghton (2005) argued that the proportion of 
audit committee members with financial qualifications was not related to the use of an 
industry specialist audit firm.   According to Lee, Mande and Ortman (2004), there was 
only weak statistical evidence that as the proportion of financial experts on the audit 
committee increases, the likelihood of an auditor resignation decreases.  Raghunandan 
and Rama (2003) proposed that the audit committee could influence the monitoring of 
auditor-client relationships and thereby influence shareholder perceptions about auditor 
independence and overall audit performance, but they did not find any association 
between audit committee financial expertise and the shareholders’ vote on auditor’s 
ratification. 
(3) Gaps in the existing qualitative research on audit committee 
characteristics  
The existing research gives rise to several questions. Firstly, how do audit 
committee members interpret the word ‘independence’ in the context of their role?  As 
reflected by an auditing professional pronouncement, ‘independence’ is an appearance 
while ‘objectivity’ is a state of mind (The Institute of Internal Auditors, 2005).   
Qualitative research is capable of identifying the disclosed independent audit committee 
members in firms’ annual reports, but cannot prove that a presumed independent audit 
committee member is in fact acting objectively.  This research seeks to obtain first-hand 
accounts from audit committee members of how they construct and interpret their 
‘objectivity’ during their interaction with the management, the auditors and the board of 
directors.      
Secondly, what types of expertise are assisting audit committee members to fulfil 
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their duties?   Listed companies are diversified in many respects - jurisdiction, industries, 
and scale, as well as their various historical and cultural backgrounds.   The audit 
committee is expected to enhance a firm’s financial reporting and audit quality.  Financial 
reporting, however, is influenced by firms’ inherent business risks and the controls in 
place to reduce such risks (COSO Integrated Risk Management and Internal Control 
Framework, 1992).    This research aims to obtain accounts of what factors assist audit 
committee members to perform their roles effectively.  The expected responses will not 
be limited to the backgrounds or qualifications of audit committee members, but will 
include their personal attributes.   
2.3.4. Audit committee diligence and activities  
(1) Recent developments 
DeZoort et al (2002) were critical of the existing qualitative literature only 
measuring audit committee diligence by using the number of audit committee meetings 
held, as per the disclosed information.   The qualitative research on audit committee 
activities and diligence has since been expanded, but meeting frequency (i.e. the number 
of audit committee meetings) remains the dominant proxy for audit committee diligence.   
Various studies (see Table 2-7) have shown that audit committee meeting frequency is 
associated with financial reporting quality and audit quality. 
There have also been studies on audit committee activities other than meetings.  
Gaynor, McDaniel and Neal (2006) conducted a study with 100 participants of the KPMG 
Audit Committee Roundtable during 2003, specifically evaluating the audit committee 
members’ judgement on whether or not to approve non-audit services provided by firms’ 
auditors.    Carcello, Hollingsworth and Neal (2006) surveyed 217 USA companies 
during 2001 and 2002 and established that firms’ internal audit budgets were higher when  
audit committees got involved in reviewing the budget.   DeZoort, Hermanson and 
Houston (2003a) found that audit committee members were more likely to recommend 
adjustments to the financial statements when the auditor consistently supported such 
adjustments.   
(2) Synthesis of audit committee diligence and activities  
As discussed previously, audit committee meeting frequency remains the major 
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proxy for representing audit committee diligence.  Despite some exceptions, audit 
committee diligence appears to contribute to improved financial reporting quality, audit 
quality, and level of disclosure.  The qualitative research results of the corporate 
governance impact of audit committee diligence measured by meeting frequency are 
displayed in Table 2-7.    
Table 2-7: Summary of post—SOX (2002) research into the corporate governance 




Audit quality Market reaction 
Abbott, Parker, 
Peters and  
Rughunandan, 2003a 
 Negative association (+)
11
 
with the ratio of non-audit 
service fees to audit fees 
 
Abbott, Parker, 
Peters and  
Raghunandan, 2003b 
 No association with level 
of () auditor’s fee 
 
Anderson, Mansi and  
Reeb, 2004 
  Negative association 
(+) with yield spread 
Bédard, Chtourou 
and  Courteau, 2004 
No association (-) with 
the level of earnings 
management 
  
Abbott, Parker and  
Peters, 2004 
Negative association (+) 




Farber, 2005 Negative association (+) 
with detected fraud 
 No association (-) 





 Positive association 
(+) with the share 
price 
Chen, Moroney and  
Houghton, 2005 




Vafeas, 2005 Negative association (+) 
with the level of 
earnings management  
  
Krishnan and Ye, 
2005 
  Negative association 
(+) with the level of 
shareholders’ 
participation 
                                                     
11
 (+) indicates that the test result confirmed the expectation of the audit committee impact, whereas (-) 






Audit quality Market reaction 
Bronson, Carcello 
and  Raghunandan, 
2006 
Positive association (+) 
with voluntary 
disclosure of 




and  Kent, 2006 
 Positive association () 
with the level of audit fees 
 
Koh, Laplante and  
Tong, 2007 
Negative association (+) 




Chen and Zhou, 
2007 
 Positive association (+) 
with choosing a Big4 
successor auditor 
 
Baxter and Cotter, 
2008 
No association (-) with 
earnings quality 
  
Kent and Stewart, 
2008 
Positive association (+) 
with the extent of 
disclosures 
  
Li, Pike and Haniffa, 
2008 
Positive association (+) 




and  Stewart, 2008 
Positive association () 





Robinson and  
Shelton, 2009 
Negative association (+) 
with the likelihood of 
financial reporting fraud 
  
(3) Discussion  
As stated by DeZoort et al (2002), the diligence of audit committees has been 
predominantly measured in terms of audit committee meeting frequency.   Despite the 
inconsistency of the results, it has been established that audit committee meeting 
frequency is associated with financial reporting quality, audit quality, and firms’ 
disclosure practices.   
Several observations can be made from the research. Firstly, can an active audit 
committee improve the quality of financial reporting?  The test results are mixed.  Vafeas 
(2005) and Koh, Laplante and Tong (2007) established that audit committee meeting 
39 
 
frequency is associated with higher earnings quality. On the contrary, Bédard, Chtourou 
and Courteau (2004) and Baxter and Cotter (2008) found that audit committee meeting 
frequency was not significantly related to earnings quality.   It is expected that active 
audit committees will result in a high quantity and/or quality of disclosure.  Firms’ 
disclosure of financial and non-financial information may also reflect the level of 
sophistication instead of the conservatism of either the firm, or the committee members 
themselves.   O’Sullivan, Percy and Stewart (2008) established that audit committee 
meeting frequency is positively associated with the disclosure of forward-looking 
information.   Furthermore, Li, Pike and Haniffa (2008) tested a sample of 100 UK listed 
firms between 2004 and 2005 and confirmed their hypothesis that a positive relationship 
existed between the level of intellectual capital disclosure 
12
and frequency of audit 
committee meetings.  They found that disclosure of ‘intellectual capital’ included human, 
structural, and relational information that was valuable for investors, as such information 
helped reduce uncertainty about future prospects and facilitated a more precise valuation 
of the company.   
Secondly, the findings of research studies, intended to investigate the relationship 
between audit committee meeting frequency and audit quality, are also inconsistent and 
subject to various interpretations.  Chen and Zhou (2007) found that firms with more 
frequent audit committee meetings were more likely to choose a Big4 auditor.     
Goodwin-Stewart and Kent (2006) found that more frequent audit committee meetings 
were related to higher audit fees in their database of 401 Australian firms in 2000.   In a 
further study on ASX companies in 2000, Chen, Moroney and Houghton (2005) found 
that the frequency of audit committee meetings did not indicate the use of an industry 
specialist audit firm.  Choosing Big4 audit firms or paying a high level of audit fees 
signal two sides of the same coin.  On one hand, it may be interpreted that active audit 
committees are more demanding of auditors’ reputations and the scope of their work.  On 
the other hand, spending more on the audit does not automatically result in a higher 
quality of audit and financial reporting, considering the involvement of Big4 Accounting 
firms in several corporate financial scandals.     Further discussion about using audit fees 
as a measure of audit committee corporate governance impact can be found in section 
2.3.5 
                                                     
12
 The level of intellectual capital disclosure was used as a measure of disclosure transparency. 
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(4) Gaps in the existing qualitative research on audit committee 
diligence and activities 
This study argues that meeting frequency is a signal of the liveliness, rather than 
the diligence of audit committees.  The lack of a set of comprehensive measures for audit 
committee diligence may lie in the nature of the qualitative research, as it is debatable 
whether it is logical to measure audit committee diligence without considering what the 
committees have been assigned as duties by their organisations.  
Secondly, this research study also questions the underlying assumption that audit 
committees only function through audit committee meetings.  As stated by Spira (2005), 
audit committee meetings are “a private performance to a public audience’ (p. 23). Only a 
part of the audit committee’s function is carried out by ceremonial process, i.e. in the 
formal meetings. Gendron and Bédard (2005) and Turley and Zaman (2007) also 
concluded that there were comprehensive informal processes of audit committees which 
contributed to the overall achievement of audit committee objectives.   Therefore, studies 
on audit committee meeting frequency only provide limited evidence about audit 
committee diligence.  This research will therefore examine audit committee members’ 
perceptions of diligence by endeavouring to develop an understanding of how members 
perform their jobs to achieve the audit committee’s desired outcomes.  More specifically, 
this research aims to obtain an understanding of how audit committees resolve issues 
affecting their assigned responsibilities.    
Thirdly, from the preceding discussion, it is evident that little is known about how 
audit committees interact with other parties which work with them.  From the literature 
review, it is seen that audit committees work with the management, the external auditors, 
the internal auditor, and the board of directors, including ‘meeting behind closed doors’ 
(Spira, 2005, p. 4).  This research examines this further by inviting the interviewees to 
describe situations in which audit committees interact with each of the above-mentioned 
parties, enabling a clear picture to emerge of the various tasks performed by audit 
committees, why they perform those tasks and how they complete those tasks. Finally, an 
analysis of those tasks and interactions will be related to the audit committee objectives.   
2.3.5. Audit committee corporate governance impacts 
(1) Recent developments 
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Since Turley and Zaman (2004), the qualitative studies on audit committee 
corporate governance effects have been expanded beyond audit function, financial 
reporting quality, and firm performance.   Synthesising the audit committee literature 
after 2002, the corporate governance impacts of audit committees include: a) financial 
reporting quality; b) audit quality; c) share market reaction; d) disclosure practices; and e) 
internal audit function.   Furthermore, Anderson, Mansi and Reeb (2004) argued that the 
cost of debt is lower in firms with larger and more active audit committees.   Although 
agency theory remains the dominant theoretical framework, there has been a broad range 
of measurements developed to test the above-mentioned impacts.  The results, however, 
are mixed.   Most of the studies investigating the corporate governance impacts of audit 
committees have been discussed previously in this chapter, when reviewing the 
determinants of audit committee formation and composition, audit committee 
composition characteristics, and audit committee diligence and activities.    
(2) Synthesis of the measurement of audit committee corporate 
governance impacts 
According to Turley and Zaman (2004), measuring financial reporting quality is 
difficult, but can be achieved by identifying relevant signals.   These signals include 
regulatory investigations and sanctions in respect of fraudulent annual reports, earnings 
management, and audit qualification.    It is argued that the practice of earnings 
management is related to the strength of internal corporate governance mechanisms 
(Davidson, Xie & Xu, 2004), which can be represented by the strength of the audit 
committee.   Therefore, it is expected that the likelihood of earnings management would 
be negatively associated with the presence, independence, expertise, and the activities of 
audit committees (Vafeas, 2005).  Earnings management can be measured by the level of 
income-increasing or income-decreasing abnormal accruals (Bédard, Chtourou & 
Courteau, 2004), small increases in earnings ((Davidson, Xie & Xu, 2004), level of 
discretionary accruals (Cohen, Gaynor, Krishnamoorthy and Wright, 2007) and working 
capital accruals (Dechow & Dichev, 2002). The mixed results of these recent qualitative 
studies on an audit committee’s impact on a firm’s financial reporting quality, as 
signalled by the level of earnings management, are listed in Table 2-8.
  
Table 2-8: Summary of post-SOX (2002) research into  financial reporting quality signalled by earnings management 
Studies 
Audit committee related variables 




Xie, Davidson and 
DaDalt, 2003 






members with corporate governance 
and investment banking backgrounds 











Negative association (+) with 
members’ governance expertise. 
Negative association (+) with audit 
committees that are mandated to 
oversee the financial reporting process  






   





Negative association (+) with multi-
membership on various audit 
committees 




     
Yang  and Krishnan, 
2005 
  No association 
(-) 
No association (-) No 
association (-) 
Positive association (-) with members’ 
level of shareholding  
Negative association (+) with average 
tenure of members 
Koh, Laplante and Tong, 
2007 






Jaggi and Leung, 2007 Negative 
association (+) 
    Positive association (-) with family 
members present on the audit 
committee 
Baxter and Cotter, 2008 Weak to no 
association(-) 
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One measure of financial reporting quality is the likelihood of annual result 
restatements.    According to Abbott et al (2004), audit committee independence, 
financial expertise, and meeting frequency are significantly and negatively associated 
with the occurrence of annual result restatements.  Archanbeault, DeZoort and 
Hermanson (2008) argued that audit committees’ contributions to the financial reporting 
quality could be impaired by remunerating members with stock-options.   Both long-term 
and short-term incentive compensations provided to audit committee members are 
positively associated with the likelihood of annual result restatements.    
Defective financial reporting may result in audit report qualification and regulatory 
investigation and enforcement.  Farber (2005) investigated 87 USA firms under SEC 
investigation and enforcement between 1982 and 2000, and found that these firms had 
fewer financial experts on their audit committees and held fewer audit committee 
meetings. Owens-Jackson, Robinson and Shelton (2009) further argued that the likelihood 
of firms being sanctioned by the SEC for fraudulent financial reporting was negatively 
associated with the independence of the audit committee.  
According to Chambers (2005), the audit committee’s oversight of the external 
audit function reflects the original reason for forming an audit committee.   The external 
audit function has been evaluated in many ways, with audit quality proxied by the level of 
external auditors’ remuneration, independence, reputation, industrial specialisation, 
and/or suspicious auditors’ resignations (Turley & Zaman, 2002).    
With respect to audit fees, there are different arguments about whether an effective 
audit committee should result in higher or lower auditor’s remuneration (Turley and 
Zaman, 2002).   If an audit committee hires more prestigious audit firms, or has broader 
audit coverage, the audit fees are higher (Abbott et al, 2003).   On the other hand, if the 
audit committee is more competent and active, the members will strive to reduce the level 
of risks perceived by the auditors, resulting in a lower audit fee (Steward & Munro, 
2007).  Given the different interpretations about the level of auditors’ remuneration, the 
qualitative research results linking the audit committee variables to audit fees are 
inconclusive.  These are illustrated in Table 2-9.
  
Table 2-9: Summary of post-SOX (2002) research on external audit quality signalled by level of audit fees 
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In addition to using auditors’ remuneration, audit quality may also be measured in 
other ways.  According to Chen, Moroney and Houghton (2005), independent audit 
committees tend to hire industry-specialised auditors, but the committees’ financial 
expertise and meeting frequencies are not associated with an auditor’s industrial 
specialisation.  This result may reflect the previously mentioned argument that competent 
and active audit committees reduce the auditor’s workload and need for specialisation.   
 External auditors’ retention and reputation is also used to reflect audit quality.  
Piot (2004) provided evidence that the existence of an audit committee in French listed 
firms was associated with the auditor’s reputation. Lee, Mande and Ortman (2004) 
established that the existence of an audit committee reduced the likelihood of an auditor’s 
resignation.  Therefore, a functioning audit committee effectively resolves the stand-offs 
between the auditors and the management.   Following the auditor’s resignation, fully 
independent audit committees chose a successor auditor of higher reputation than those 
recommended by non-independent audit committees.  However, only weak statistical 
evidence supports the argument that audit committees’ financial expertise reduces the 
likelihood of auditor resignation.   Chen and Zhou (2007) observed 821 firms which 
recruited Arthur Andersen and dismissed the firm between 2001 and 2002, prior to the 
Enron fraud being revealed to the public.  They established that firms with independent 
and competent audit committees dismissed Arthur Andersen earlier, and firms with larger 
and more active audit committees were more likely to choose a Big4 successor auditor.    
Following the enhanced regulatory requirements for disclosure, for example, the 
ASX, NZX, and LSX listing rules, listed firms are required to disclose a statement of 
corporate governance.  It is believed that the impact of audit committees on firms’ 
disclosure practices is an important issue. Chau and Leung (2006) and Barako, Hancock 
and Izan (2006) established that the existence of an audit committee is positively 
correlated to the level of voluntary corporate governance disclosure in Hong Kong and 
Kenya, where the adoption of an audit committee is only recommended.    Chen, Carson 
and Simnett (2007) argued that firms with better corporate governance structures (i.e. 
having an audit committee) were more likely to disseminate interim financial information 
to shareholders. Mangena and Pike (2005) investigated the motivation for, and influence 
of, the extent of interim disclosure and found that increased shareholdings by audit 
committee members reduced the level of interim disclosure.  Furthermore, audit 
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committee financial expertise had a positive impact on the level of interim disclosure, 
whereas the size of the audit committee had no impact on the level of interim disclosure.   
It is expected that a functioning audit committee can enhance the firm’s overall 
disclosure transparency. Kelton and Yang (2008) found that diligent audit committees 
with higher levels of financial expertise were associated with increased levels of internet 
disclosure.  Kent and Stewart (2008) established that ASX firms with more frequent audit 
committee meetings tended to have more disclosure about the impact of adopting IFRs 
since 2005. With respect to size, only smaller audit committees and small audit 
committees with fewer audit committee members who were financial experts tended to 
have more disclosure on the impact of adopting IFRs.   
It is believed that good corporate governance improves the quality of information 
available to financial analysts (Byard, Li, & Weintrop, 2006).    Disclosure practice 
therefore can also be investigated through the forecast information released by firms.  The 
presence and the independence of an audit committee were positively associated with the 
disclosure of forward-looking information (O’Sullivan, Percy, & Stewart, 2008).  
However, according to Byard, Li and Weintrop (2006), audit committee independence did 
not result in forecast accuracy in USA firms between 1999 and 2002.   Karamanou and 
Vafeas (2005) further found that increased audit committee independence was associated 
with lower forecast accuracy.  This finding was also supported by Bédard, Coulombe and 
Courteau (2008), who reported no association between the presence and composition 
characteristics of an audit committee and the precision of management forecasts.   
Market reaction is also an indication of the assessment of firms’ corporate 
governance, as perceived by the shareholders.   Investors believe in better corporate 
governance under a strong audit committee than under a relatively weak audit committee 
(Kaplan & Mauldin, 2008).  According to Davidson, Xie and Xu (2004), DeFond, Hann 
and Hu (2005), and Farber (2005), share price was positively related to audit committee 
financial expertise and diligence.   In contrast to the market value, which is the 
assessment of firms through the perception of shareholders, firms may also be valued by 
using an objective index (Chan & Li, 2008).  Brown and Caylor (2006) found no 
association between audit committee composition and firm value using an objective 
index.   Chan and Li (2008) established that the independence of an audit committee leads 
to higher firm value, but this is only when a majority of independent directors serve on 
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the board.     
It is also argued that internal control and the internal audit function should be 
overseen by the audit committee (DeZoort et al, 2002).   The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 
required listed firms to have an internal audit function and section 404 of the Act further 
provided that firms must disclose an assessment of the internal control by the auditors.   
After the commencement of the Act, Zhang, Zhou and Zhou (2007) found that firms were 
more likely to be identified with an internal control weakness if their audit committee’s 
financial expertise was low.   Krishnan and Visvananthan (2007) further argued that firms 
that reported internal control weaknesses were characterised by audit committees that met 
more frequently and had a lower level of financial expertise.   According to Vermeer, 
Raghunandan and Forgione (2006), under a voluntary basis, non-profit organisations were 
more likely to have an internal audit function when the financial expertise of their audit 
committees was high.   Arena and Azzone (2009) confirmed the positive impact of a close 
link between internal auditors and the audit committee on the effectiveness of the internal 
audit function.    
(3) Gaps in the existing qualitative research on audit committee corporate 
governance impacts  
It is generally accepted that an effective audit committee should enhance corporate 
governance (DeZoort et al, 2002).    However, ‘governance’ has not been previously 
defined and there is no consensus about its meaning.   Sir Adrian Cadbury (1992) 
described corporate governance as the way in which organisations are directed and 
controlled.   The New Zealand Securities Commission (2003) defines corporate 
governance as the set of structures and behaviours by which a company or other entity is 
directed and managed.  According to the International Standards for the Professional 
Practice of Internal Auditing (2008), governance is a combination of processes and 
structures implemented by the board to inform, direct, manage, and monitor the activities 
of the organisation towards the achievement of its objectives.  Observing the major 
corporate governance regulatory regimes, namely the Cadbury Committee Code of Best 
Practice (1992), the Combined Code on Corporate Governance (Financial Reporting 
Council, 2003),  the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance (2002), and the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, there are overlapping and differentiated areas that are 
expected to be covered by corporate governance.   There are also two distinctive styles of 
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corporate governance regulation.  One is represented by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which is 
described as black-letter law (Piper, 2005), emphasising compliance and enforceability, 
which are backed by legal enforcement.  The other style is promoted predominantly in 
commonwealth nations as setting rules for benchmarks and providing guidelines for best 
practice.  Those guidelines are recommended for adoption, but any departure can be 
justified on a case by case basis.   
Given the broad range of corporate governance definitions and the different 
regulatory regimes for safeguarding corporate governance, evaluating the outcome of 
governance is a complex matter.  The previously synthesised audit committee corporate 
governance impacts, namely financial reporting quality, audit quality, disclosure practice, 
internal control, and internal audit, cannot necessarily be regarded as a comprehensive 
assessment of corporate governance impact.    Furthermore, given that the research results 
are inconsistent and inconclusive, this begs the question as to what corporate governance 
impacts an effective audit committee should have. 
2.4  Summary  
Most of the existing research on audit committees has been based on large samples 
selected from archival data or surveys, but has rarely investigated what has happened 
within audit committees.    In summarising the literature review of the existing research, 
the following areas can be identified as gaps within the existing body of knowledge.  
The qualitative research associated the determinants of audit committee 
establishment and composition with the characteristics of their boards, the agency 
conflict, leverage, and litigious risks.  However, little is known about how audit 
committees interact with their boards.  Furthermore, little has been documented about 
how audit committee members reflectively interpret their roles, their attributes, and their 
efforts in relating to their particular organisation.    This research provides an opportunity 
for audit committee members to interpret the role of audit committees and of themselves 
as individual members, and to describe the occasions, either routine or ad hoc, when their 
committees report to their boards on their delegated duties.     
Regardless of the inconsistency of the research results, it has been established by 
the qualitative research that an audit committee should be equipped with independent and 
financially literate members.  In addition, committee members’ multi-directorships and 
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the average length of tenure have also been examined in recent studies.  Given the 
inconsistent qualitative evidence, several questions regarding an audit committee’s 
composition arise.  Firstly, how do members interpret the word ‘independence’ within the 
context of their specific committees?  Secondly, what expertise or attributes assist audit 
committee members to fulfil their duties?   This research seeks to obtain first-hand 
accounts from members of how they construct and interpret independence during their 
interactions with management, the board, and the auditors.   This research also aims to 
document the accounts of the factors that have assisted the audit committee members to 
perform their roles effectively, including their personal backgrounds, experience, 
qualifications, and any other relevant attributes.  
As stated by DeZoort et al (2002), the diligence of audit committees has been 
narrowly measured as audit committee meeting frequency.   This research argues that the 
difficulty of not being able to establish a set of comprehensive measures for audit 
committee diligence may lie in the nature of the qualitative research.  Their research also 
refutes the underlying assumption that audit committees only function through audit 
committee meetings.  This research examines audit committee members’ perceptions of 
diligence, with a research question aimed at understanding how members carry out their 
jobs to achieve the audit committee’s desired outcomes.   Furthermore, this study aims to 
obtain an understanding of how audit committees resolve issues around their assigned 
responsibilities, either on a routine or an ad hoc basis.   
The existing qualitative audit committee research identified the corporate 
governance impacts of audit committees as the financial reporting quality, audit quality, 
disclosure practice, internal control, and internal audit.  Separately, however, none of 
these impacts reflects a comprehensive assessment of corporate governance.    The test 
results are also inconsistent and inconclusive. Therefore, this study intends to provide 
further evidence on the insight of the audit committee operation and effectiveness. 
To align all of the above gaps in the existing body of knowledge on audit 
committees, this research invites the participants to describe a situation in which the audit 
committee interacts with each of the board of directors, the management, and the auditors.  
This will enable a clear picture of the various tasks performed by audit committees, why 
they perform those tasks, and how they complete those tasks, to be drawn.  Finally, the 
analysis of those tasks and interactions will be considered within the context of the audit 
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committee objectives.   
A detailed explanation of the research design is provided in Chapter Four, Research 
Design.   Before the research design of this study can be fully understood, however, it is 
necessary to discuss the theoretical framework that underlies the research design.   
Accordingly, Chapter Three, Theoretical Framework will discuss: 1) the theoretical 
frameworks and findings of the existing qualitative audit committee research, 2) the 
sociological theories that guide the gathering, analysis and interpretation of the data, and 
3) the descriptive theories of audit committees, which underpin the interview questions of 
the research.  
51 
 
Chapter Three: Theoretical Framework 
3.1. Introduction  
This chapter describes the theoretical framework on which the study is based.  It 
discusses: 1) the theoretical frameworks of the existing audit committee qualitative 
research, 2) the sociological theories and the methodological approach that guide the 
gathering, analysis, and interpretation of the data in the study, and 3) the descriptive 
theories of audit committees which underlie the interview questions of the research.   
3.2. On the notion of theory  
According to Mitchell & Cody (1993), knowledge is theory-laden and research 
methods are theory-driven.  The word ‘theory’, however, has been defined in a variety of 
ways by scholars and philosophers, for example, as a logically interrelated series of 
propositions that are used to specify the empirically meaningful relationships among a set 
of concepts (Babbie, 2005).  Similarly, Argyris and Schon (1974) defined theory as a set 
of interconnected propositions referring to a common subject (a ‘referent’).  This notion 
of theory is also known as “scientific theory”, which emphasises that a theory has a 
descriptive nature.  This particular definition of scientific theory has been widely used in 
qualitative research (Weis, 1998).  Following this notion of theory, qualitative research 
aims to document, describe and interpret the data.  The patterns presented by such data 
form predictions for future research, which will verify, modify, or reject such patterns.   
In a different vein, Corbin and Strauss (1998) believed that theory provides a 
model of why the world is the way it is.  They argued that whereas theory is a 
simplification of the world, it nonetheless is aimed at clarifying and explaining aspects of 
a phenomenon.   Silver (1983) developed this theme further; criticising the scientific view 
of theory, stating that it had eliminated the true beauty, the emotional significance of 
theory, and its relevance to everyday life.  She defined theory as a unique way of 
perceiving reality, as an expression of someone’s insight into some aspect of nature, 
being of a perceptive and explanatory nature, rather than a descriptive one.  Weis (1998) 
argued further that no single theory was intended to explain everything about everyday 
life.  Rather, a theory was designed to explain a particular phenomenon, and it had no 
conceptual apparatus to explain other phenomena (Klein & White, 1996).   Following this 
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notion of theory, qualitative research aims to provide a fresh and a different perspective 
of an aspect of a phenomenon (Henstrand, 2006).   
As ‘theory’ has been ‘imprecisely’ defined (Flinders & Mills, 1993),   the 
particular notion of theory employed is therefore ‘chosen’ by the particular type of 
research. This study favours Silver’s (1983) conceptualisation of theory.  It is not that this 
research has adopted a particular theory; rather, this research has evolved from a journey 
similar to those of Silver (1983), Henstrand (2006), and many other researchers’ 
approaches taken towards a particular phenomenon of everyday life.   The following 
section documents the approach for building the theoretical framework.  Since this study 
involves examining the effectiveness of audit committees using qualitative research 
theory, two specific theoretical frameworks adopted by existing qualitative research on 
audit committees are discussed.  The research design and data analysis framework 
adopted for the research are also discussed.     
As mentioned previously, qualitative research aims to provide a fresh and a 
different perspective of an aspect of a phenomenon.  Although the studies on audit 
committees have been dominated by the use of quantitative paradigms, there have been a 
number of qualitative studies aimed at obtaining an insight into the audit committee 
operation.   The following section discusses two theoretical frameworks of the existing 
qualitative research on audit committees. 
3.3. Theoretical framework underpinning of the existing qualitative research on 
audit committees  
Among the qualitative audit committee studies, Spira (1998; 2002), and Gendron 
and Bédard (2005) constructed their research method and data analysis using sociological 
theoretical frameworks.  In this section, these two theoretical frameworks are outlined and 
discussed in order to explain and justify the theoretical framework used in this study. 
 
3.3.1 Spira (1998; 2002) - investigating audit committees through actor-
network theory 
Spira (1998; 2002) challenged the assumption that audit committees are 
established to improve the auditor’s independence and thus improve the financial 
reporting quality.  She started her argument with an outline of audit committee evolution 
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in the broad context of corporate governance development on an international scale.  
Based on a scrutiny of the cause and effect relationships of several events of different 
corporate governance regimes, such as the setting up of the Cadbury Committee (1992) 
and the increasing popularity of audit committees in public companies, she argued that 
the establishment and activities of audit committees was the outcome of power 
relationships of actor networking.  Based on the actor-networking theory (‘ANT’) 
(Callon, 1983), her research concluded that audit committee meetings and the questioning 
process usually demonstrated in audit committee daily activities were ‘ceremonial’ and 
‘play an important part in offering comfort and reassurance to investors and lenders’ 
(Spira, 1998, p. 1).  
Complementary to institutional theory, ANT provides explanations of how 
networks
15
 overcome resistance and internalise the desired outcome (Callon, 1983).   
ANT is most prominently associated with the French sociologists Bruno Latour and 
Michel Callon. The theory describes a networking between human and non-human actors.  
The actors are defined as “discrete individual, corporate, or collective social units" 
(Wasserman & Faust, 1994, p. 17).  The actors are tied together into networks built and 
maintained in order to achieve a particular goal, for instance, achieving audit committee 
effectiveness.   Such a process of networking is regarded as ‘translation’ (Spira, 1998, p. 
58).   In the process of translation, non-human actors
16, for example, in the audit 
committee context, the Cadbury Committee Report (1992), or the audit committee charter 
of individual companies, play an important role, as well as human actors.  This is 
regarded as the ‘punctuation’ effect (Spira, 1998, p .58).  Using this framework, the 
development of the audit committee mechanism and the institutionalisation of regular 
audit committee activities may be mapped out as in Figure 3-1. 
                                                     
15
 This study interprets ‘network’ in Spira’s (1998; 2002) studies to be at both the micro level, i.e. the 
individual firm, and the macro level, i.e. the stakeholders of financial reporting. 
 
16
 The reports, or charters, however, still need to be developed by actors, human in this case. So they are not 
devoid of the influence of actors. 
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Figure 3-1: Theoretical Framework of Spira (1998 and 2002) 
Obligatory points of passage: 
the network established 
becomes functionally 
indispensable.   
ANT adapted from Spira (1998)  
Problematisation: an actor 
seeks to develop influence in 
order to solve a problem. 
Interessement: the actor 
interposes itself between the 
actors that it seeks to enrol and 
the rival associations of these 
actors in other networks.  
Enrolment: the outcome of 
successful interessement in that 
the actors, especially those 
from the rival associations, are 
enrolled.  
Mobilisation 
(punctualisation): the network 
established becomes more 
transportable (institutionalised).   
Obligatory points of passage: the shifting of power 
between the above mentioned networks was a continuous 
theme of the audit committee.  In order to get the work 
done, some parties within and outside audit committees 
circumvent the requirements of the Cadbury Report (1992) 
by interpreting them by ‘letter’ instead of by ‘spirit’.  
The interpretation of research theoretical framework 
adopted by Spira (1998)  
Interessement: setting up of the Cadbury Committee or 
Treadway Committee in reaction to the emergency focus 
on the financial aspects of corporate governance.   The 
Cadbury solution is to interpose the audit committee, 
composed of independent directors, between the auditors 
and the executive directors, who can be interpreted as the 
‘rival associations’. 
Enrolment: firms are willing to incur the costs of setting 
up an audit committee to enrol the accounting profession 
(including the sponsors of the Cadbury Committee) to 
avoid the possible burden of legislation.  At a micro (firm) 
level, two distinctive networks, the executive and non-
executive directors, are both keen to enrol the auditors.    
Mobilisation: the formation of an audit committee was 
promoted by the Cadbury Committee Report (1992), or 
other equivalent documents, or professional 
pronouncements.  At the firm level, audit committee 
charters were issued.   These documents became influential 
instruments of networking associated with audit 
committees.  
Problematisation: organisations, e.g. sponsors of the 
Cadbury Committee, call for a reaction to the increasingly 




Spira’s (1998; 2002) studies focused on the role of rituals in audit committee 
meetings, examining to what extent audit committees’ effectiveness was embedded in the 
routine activities, such as asking questions and meeting with auditors without the 
management’s presence.  Spira (1998) interviewed audit committee members of UK 
listed companies.  Based on her qualitative investigation of the audit committees’ 
operations, Spira (1998; 2002) argued that the expectation of establishing independent 
audit committees to improve audit quality and financial reporting quality was ‘unproven’, 
but audit committees do assist companies to present an image concerning the quality of 
the statutory audit and financial reporting.  Therefore audit committee formal activities, 
i.e. audit committee meetings, were primarily ceremonial, being a ‘private performance to 
a public audience.’  In addition to revealing an insight into audit committee processes, 
Spira’s (1998) study has contributed theoretically to the development of audit committee 
research methodology. 
3.3.2 Gendron and Bédard (2005) - the constitution of audit committee 
effectiveness 
According to Gendron and Bédard (2005), neither the existing qualitative nor 
qualitative research into audit committee effectiveness has focused on the meaning of the 
word ‘effectiveness’.  They argued that firstly, the meaning of audit committees was 
internally constructed, rather than objectively measured, and secondly, the meaning of 
audit committee effectiveness varied according to different contexts (Gendron & Bédard, 
2005).  Therefore, their focus was on the process that constitutes the meaning of audit 
committee effectiveness.   
The theoretical framework adopted by Gendron and Bédard (2005) was largely 
drawn from Schutz’s (1967) social constructivist approach towards theoretical 
developments.  A major focus of social constructionism is to uncover the ways in which 
individuals and groups construct their perceived social reality through their interactions. It 
aims to explain the ways through which social phenomena are created, institutionalised, 
known, and made into tradition by humans.  Gendron and Bédard justified their 
theoretical foundation for qualitative investigation by referring to the actors’ reflectivity 
and the role this plays in the process of constructing meanings of particular social 
phenomena.  Therefore, audit committee members and other parties (for example, internal 
56 
 
auditors, external auditors, and executives) who attended audit committee meetings, 
‘ascribed meaning to the committee’s effectiveness’ (Gendron & Bédard, 2005, p. 215).    
Based on 22 interviews of audit committee meeting attendees from three Canadian listed 
companies, Gendron and Bédard (2005) found that the constructionist process of audit 
committee meeting attendees involves ‘two layers of meaning, the symbolic and the 
substantive’ (p. 215).  The main conclusions drawn by Gendron and Bédard (2005) are 
demonstrated in Figure 3-2.  
Figure 3-2: The interpretation of the constitution of audit committee effectiveness by 











According to Gendron and Bédard (2005), the constitution of the meaning of audit 
committee involves a heterogeneous set of emotions that vary from confidence to anxiety.  
Substantive interpretation 
(Containing a heterogeneous set 
of emotions that vary from 
confidence to anxiety.) 
Interpretations of the substance 
of meetings: focusing on 
technical accounting issues and 
audit committee members’ skill 
at questioning. 
Interpretations of informal 
practices: the motivation to 
discuss audit committee issues 
outside meetings is very high to 
avoid unexpected issues being 
brought up in meetings.  
Symbolic interpretation 
(Straight forward) 
Audit committee member’s 
background, including 
independence, financial and 
accounting expertise.  
Ceremonial features of audit 
committee meetings, including 
the well prepared agendas with 
the routine issues included, and 
the atmosphere of the meetings.  
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In contrast to Spira (1998; 2005), Gendron and Bédard (2005) went beyond the rituals 
within the meetings, to include informal processes outside audit committee meetings.    
3.3.3 Other qualitative audit committee research  
Turley and Zaman (2007) and Sarens, de Beelde and Everaert (2009) utilised the 
case study method to qualitatively explore audit committee operations.  The key focus of 
Turley and Zaman (2007) was on the role of an informal process outside audit committee 
meetings, whereas Sarens, de Beelde and Everaert (2009) mainly investigated the 
interactions between internal auditors and the audit committee members.  However, these 
research studies did not discuss the sociological theories underpinning their research 
design and data analysis.  The research results of Turley and Zaman (2007) and Sarens, 
de Beelde and Everaert (2009) are incorporated with discussions in Chapter Six, Research 
Findings and Discussion.  
3.3.4 Summary 
The existing qualitative research on audit committee effectiveness has a common 
theme, namely, the interpretation of the interactions embedded in an audit committee’s 
daily life.  These studies focus on a particular group of audit committee meeting attendees 
in their entirety rather than focusing on individual members.  Therefore, none of the 
previously discussed qualitative studies were able to provide an explanation of the role of 
an ‘audit committee’, the role of ‘committee members’, or why audit committee members 
perform certain activities from the perspective of the individual audit committee 
members. 
This study argues that the ultimate effectiveness of audit committees relies on 
members’ attributes and efforts.  The abovementioned interactions within specific audit 
committees are only vehicles for members’ attributes and efforts in order to perform the 
audit committee function.  Therefore, this research is intended to investigate how 
individual audit committee members justify: (1) the objectives of the overall audit 
committee mechanism; (2) their role as committee members; (3) and why they perform 
certain activities. In other words, to perform their audit committee roles, members must 
make sense of their role in relating to their particular audit committees.  In addition, they 
should be able to justify why they do what they do regarding the objectives of audit 
committees.  Therefore, investigating intention and the intentional processes of individual 
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audit committee members who live through the daily life of their committee will be of 
value to the existing body of knowledge regarding audit committees.  Such a research 
objective can be achieved only by employing an interpretative approach.   Drawing upon 
the primary principle of phenomenology, any given social phenomenon is intended by the 
people who live through it.  Such intentional influence is abstracted by processes of 
making sense.   This research is intended to capture and interpret such intentional 
processes and thereby to provide a fresh explanation of audit committee effectiveness.   
The research will thus contribute to the literature by extending the existing knowledge of 
audit committee members making sense of achieving the intended outcome of their roles. 
3.4. Research roadmap 
The philosophical stance of theory as discussed in section 3.2, (On the notion of 
theory) forms the foundation of research; it defines what research question(s) to ask; 
meanwhile theory is built upon concepts, constructs and propositions, which have been 
described as the "building blocks" of theory (Babbie, 2005; Silver 1983; Henstrand, 
2006).  As a researcher moves from concepts to the level of theory, there is also a 
movement from concrete experiences to a level of abstract description (See Figure 3-3, 
The building blocks of theory).   








As stated previously, the motivation for this research is to answer the general 
research problem: “What substantially gives rise to an effective audit committee?” It is an 
exploratory study that aims to identify qualitative factors that contribute to audit 
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committee effectiveness in carrying out its function.  While this research does not claim 
to create ‘theories’ for audit committee effectiveness, it is expected that it will be possible 
to draw a conclusion on the determinants of audit committee effectiveness.   As illustrated 
in Figure 3-4, the research roadmap reflects the building blocks of theory.  
Figure 3-4: The research roadmap 
 
The general research problem is investigated by answering four interrelated, 
specific research questions, namely: 
(1) What do audit committee members perceive the desired objectives of an audit 
committee to be? 
(2) What do the members bring to an audit committee in order to achieve its 
desired objectives? 
(3) How do members help attain the desired audit committee objectives? 
(4) How do members assess the extent to which the audit committee objectives 
have been achieved? 
The theoretical roadmap as illustrated in Figure 3-4 aims to answer the four 
research questions.  How these questions are answered, is in turn driven by the theoretical 
Research roadmap 
Concepts of ‘audit committee’, ‘audit committee 
objectives’, ‘audit committee effectiveness’  
 
An overall conclusion on the insight of ‘What gives rise 
to an effective audit committee?’ 
 
Assessment on the effectiveness of an audit committee 
 
Audit committee members’ descriptive and explanatory 
accounts 
Determinants of audit committee effectiveness 
 













framework.  Adopting such a theoretical roadmap shapes this thesis in the following 
ways: it maps the scope of the research, develops the research questions, designs the 
interview questions, and assists in the data analysis. 
3.5. Methodology 
Theory is highly related to research methodology (Henstrand, 2006).  According 
to Corry (1997), the philosophical stance of theory informs the methodology and provides 
a context for the process and for grounding its ‘logic and criteria’ (p. 3).    The perceptual 
and explanatory notions of theory, along with the preceding research questions, determine 
the research methodology.  This research argues that it is particularly important to 
understand audit committee members’ perceptions of audit committee effectiveness 
through the lenses of phenomenology.    As the fundamental doctrine of phenomenology, 
the central structure of an experience is its intentionality.  ‘Intentionality’ refers to the 
conscious relationship one has to an object (Sokolowski, 2000).   An experience is 
directed towards an object by virtue of its content or meaning (which represents the 
object), together with appropriate enabling conditions (Embree, 2007).   It is because 
audit committee effectiveness is not only performed by people, but also in a public 
setting.  By discussing the intentionality embedded in audit committee everyday life, this 
research facilitates and reclaims a public sense of thinking and reasoning, which has been 
missing in the existing body of knowledge about audit committee effectiveness.       
3.5.1 Constructionist responsive interviewing  
The responsive interviewing technique developed by Rubin and Rubin (2005) is 
adopted as the model for the research design.  The responsive interviewing model has its 
roots in interpretive constructionism (Rubin & Rubin, 2005).  Constructionism 
researchers focus on meaning and power because their epistemological position dictates 
that meaning and power are all that one can really claim to know about.   Constructionism 
research is aimed at accounting for the ways in which phenomena are socially constructed 
(Burr, 1995).    Burr (1995) identifies several basic assumptions of the social 
constructionist position: firstly, one should observe taken-for-granted knowledge through 
critical lenses; the ‘truth’ is only known through human experience.  Secondly, any given 
phenomenon is embedded in its historical and cultural specificity which emerges from the 
social interaction within a group of people at a particular time and in a particular 
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environment. Categories of understanding, then, are situational.  Finally, knowledge and 
social action go together - reality is socially constructed by interconnected patterns of 
communication behaviour. Within a social group or culture, reality is defined not so much 
by individual acts, but by complex and organised patterns of ongoing actions. 
According to Rubin and Rubin (2005), the responsive interview model is based on 
the fact that both the interviewer and interviewee are people, with feelings, personalities, 
interests, and experiences.  It emphasises the ‘presence’ (p. 31) of the interviewer in the 
interviewing process, rather than the ‘subjective’ recording of a question and answer type 
of conversation.  Without professing to be entirely ‘neutral’ or an ‘automaton’, the 
researcher asks the interviewees - the audit committee members - to tell stories they 
experienced in performing their duties in their particular audit committee.  The researcher 
then, based on a particular description or explanation, may probe for further clarification.  
Therefore, the interviewee is virtually taking the interviewer though his/her particular 
experience.   
Essential to the responsive interviewing model is that the interviewer and 
interviewee are in a relationship in which there is mutual influence in both directions.  
The initial interview questions are expressed in a broad way to give the interviewees the 
opportunity to answer from their own experience (Rubin and Rubin, 2005).  The 
interviewee’s answers then direct the researcher as to what to pursue further.  The 
openness revealed after the interviewees start to describe their experience makes it 
possible - even natural - for the interviewer and interviewee to become conversational 
partners to suggest topics, concerns, and meanings that are important to the themes under 
exploration.   
The responsive interviewing model proved to be highly effective during the 
research.  Starting with stories about, or even anecdotes in their lives, audit committee 
members were relaxed and focused on the topics they believe highly important and 
relevant to the effectiveness of their audit committees.  At the same time, the interview 
data are contextual, logical, and vivid with emotions and subjectivity.  The researcher 
kept probing important statements captured during the interviews, as accounts of the 
determinants of audit committee effectiveness emerged.  The analysis and discussion of 
the research results are detailed in Chapter Six, Research Results and Discussion.     
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3.5.2 The role of positive and normative accounting theories 
Although heading in different directions, both positive and normative theories try 
to explain the behaviour of financial reporting.  Audit committees as a corporate 
governance mechanism bear the responsibility and expectation for oversight of the 
financial reporting process (Beasley, Carcello, Hermanson, & Neal, 2009).  Therefore, the 
role of positive and normative accounting theories cannot be ignored in the theoretical 
framework of this research study.   Given that qualitative research on audit committees 
has failed to provide consistent and conclusive results of all of the factors identified as 
associated with audit committee effectiveness, no single positive and normative 
accounting theory can be relied on to guide this qualitative research.    However, both 
positive and normative theories play important roles in designing the initial interview 
questions of the research.   
Positive accounting theories, as represented by Watts and Zimmerman (1979), are 
often cited as the theoretical basis for disclosure and discretionary management behaviour 
studies.  A literature review by Milne (2001) shows that Watts’ and Zimmerman’s theory 
is largely concerned with the predictors of lobbying behaviour and disclosure behaviour 
based on the assumption of self-interested managers’ wealth maximising.  Following this 
line of reasoning, one can predict that one of the audit committee’s roles should be 
providing another layer of assurance of preventing financial reporting from being utilised 
in pursuing management self-interest.    However, as discussed in Chapter Two, there is 
no concrete evidence that the audit committee has achieved this responsibility.  This 
research does not predict audit committees’ responsibilities, but offers a chance for the 
audit committee members to describe and explain their responsibilities.  There are also 
interview questions initially set out to ask about the audit committee members’ 
experience during the interaction with the management, the directors, and other internal 
or external auditors, who directly interact with the audit committee members during their 
daily lives. 
The major contribution of the research from a normative accounting theory 
perspective lies in debating the pros and cons of various ways of improving the quality of 
financial reporting.   According to Kabir (2005) there are two dominant strands of 
qualitative accounting research which follow normative accounting theory.  These are 
stock market-based research in accounting and research in earnings management.   The 
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first category of research investigated stock market reactions to releases of earnings’ 
information to stock markets.  The decision-usefulness notion claims that the value in 
financial reporting lies in its facilitation of various economic decisions, especially 
investment and credit decisions.  The earnings management studies investigated 
managers’ motivations to manage reported earnings and found that managers were 
exposed to various incentives to manage reported income (Bergstresser & Philippon, 
2006).  Accountants have traditionally emphasised the objectivity of accounting 
measurement (Deegan & Samkin &, 2008).  Ijiri (1975) goes a step further and 
emphasises the linkage between accountability and accounting practices.  Normative 
accounting research has also failed to prove concretely that the existence and identified 
characteristics of audit committees are associated with more reliable financial reporting. 
As mentioned above, oversight of the financial reporting process is merely one of 
the major responsibilities of the audit committee.   Without taking into account the 
dominant notions about the quality of financial reporting, for example, conservatism or 
reliability, the interview questions of this research investigate what is regarded as good or 
acceptable performance of audit committees and to whom an audit committee is 
responsible.   
In summary, previous qualitative research, either normative or positive, plays a 
vital role in scoping the initial themes of the research questions.  Such initial themes, 
namely interacting with directors, management, and auditors, the assessment of 
acceptable performance, and the accountability of  audit committees, are also familiar to 
all corporate directors, especially to audit committee members.  These initial themes are 
also important for approaching and recruiting the interviewees, for, with a familiar initial 
theme set for the semi structured interviews, the interviewees are more likely to be 
focused, rather than seeking topics from their memories, as suggested by completely 
unstructured interviews.  Further description and discussion of each individual interview 
question is provided in Chapter Four, Research Design.  
3.5.3 Reflective analysis  
Qualitative research tends to document the participant’s personal perceptions, but 
one can only get close to that personal perception, because the personal perception 
embedded in the interview data is complicated by the researcher’s own conceptions.  
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Thus; a two-stage interpretation was involved: stage one: the interviewees are trying to 
make sense of their life in their audit committees in answering the interview questions; 
and stage two the researcher is then making sense of the participants’ responses.   
The interview data analysis is largely based on Embree’s (2007) reflective 
analysis.   According to Embree (2007), one’s encountering includes components of 
‘experiencing’, ‘believing’, ‘valuing’, and ‘willing’ in broad categories. To facilitate the 
data analysis, the interview data that are of an ‘experiencing’ nature are coded as 
‘descriptive accounts’ because they describe what happens.  The data that are of an 
‘intentionality’ nature are coded as ‘explanatory accounts?’ because they describe the 
participants’ reasons.  The descriptive accounts are classified into ‘pictorial’17 and 
‘perceptional’18.  Pictorial accounts are either the descriptions of the procedural settings 
of the audit committee, or contextual information about the particular organisation or a 
particular incident.  Perceptional accounts are represented by ‘expecting’, a perception of 
future encountering, ‘remembering’, a perception of past experience, and ‘perceiving’, a 
perception of current encountering or experience.    
The intentional factors are filtered out from the explanatory accounts and further 
classified into willing, valuing, and believing.   Cognitions (or the intentionality) are 
always value laden, including the basic components of ‘willing’, ‘valuing’, and 
‘believing’ (Embree; 2007).  The key difference between the explanatory account 
‘believing’,  and ‘valuing’ or  ‘willing’, is that believing (something to be true) more 
likely ‘comes from what others have communicated to us’ (Embree 2007, p. 183).  
Whereas ‘valuing’ (something to be either right or wrong) is comparatively closer to a 
deduction of past experience; and willing (to do or not to do something) can be regarded 
as an intended realisation of ‘believing’ and ‘valuing’ in the future.   If audit committee 
effectiveness is intended by the committee members, the participants’ value loaded 
accounts are of great interest to this research.  The interview data that are coded into these 
three broad nodes usually have a deductive form.  In this research, the data analysis of 
explanatory accounts tended to draw distinctions between the three categories in order to 
understand the reasoning of the participants, but not to argue for or against.   
 
                                                     
17
 The reflection of an indirect experience.  
18
 The reflection of a direct experience. 
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The tree structure demonstrated in Figure 3-5 cannot fully display the 
determinants of audit committee effectiveness. It is necessary to further abstract the 
determinants of audit committee effectiveness into identities and attitudes.  These 
identities and attitudes are embedded in a number of grounds, namely, culture (the 
behaviour pattern), gender, power position (for example, being an audit committee 
chairman), or a particular incident or environment (for example, the adoption of IFRS in 
New Zealand).     These determinants are interwoven into each other as illustrated in 
Figure 3-5. 
Embree (2007)’s reflective analysis is a complex data analysis framework proposed 
for the social psychology research within the broad paradigm of phenomenology.  
However, the objective of the current research is not to analyse the audit committee 
members’ behaviours from the psychological perspective, but to investigate their basic 
intentionally or the reasoning for their perceptions of audit committee effectiveness.    
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Figure 3-5: Reflective analysis adopted in this research 
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3.5.4   Reflectivity 
Subsequent to the data analysis, several conclusions are drawn in answering the 
research questions.  Once the qualitative determinants of audit committee effectiveness 
have been abstracted and summarised, the researcher’s reflectivity is discussed in 
evaluating the results.  Reflectivity refers to an awareness of the researcher's contribution 
to the construction of meanings throughout the research process and acknowledges the 
reality that it is extremely difficult for the researcher to remain neutral, i.e. 'outside' the 
subject matter, while conducting research. Reflectivity requires the researcher "to explore 
the ways in which a researcher's involvement with a particular study influences, acts upon 
and informs such research" (Nightingale & Cromby, 1999, p. 228). 
 
 In Chapter Seven, reflectivity is considered and discussed in two respects: the 
researcher’s personal reflectivity and methodological reflectivity. ‘Personal reflectivity’ 
involves reflecting upon the ways in which one’s own values, experiences, interests, and 
social identities have shaped the research. It also involves thinking about how the 
researcher may have affected and possibly changed the way in which audit committee 
effectiveness is understood.  
 
The discussion of ‘methodological reflectivity’ aims at answering questions such 
as: how has the research question defined and limited what can be found.   How could the 
research question have been investigated differently?  To what extent would this have 
given rise to a different understanding of the phenomenon under investigation (Willig, 
2001)?   The discussion of methodological reflectivity enables the researcher to reflect 
upon the assumptions (about the world and about knowledge) of the audit committees that 
have been made in the course of the research.  Following on the reflective analysis, the 
limitations of the study are discussed and opportunities for future research are identified.  
3.6. Summary  
The theoretical framework of the research mirrors Henstrand’s (2006) building 
blocks of theory.    Under the qualitative research paradigm, the research problem of this 
study is defined as ‘what substantially gives rise to an effective audit committee?’   The 
methodology of the research is determined by this theoretical foundation.   Qualitative 
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data is obtained through Rubin’s and Rubin’s (2005) responsive interviewing technique.  
The data analysis is drawn from the model of Embree’s (2007) reflective analysis.   
Positive and normative accounting theories are strongly related to the content of 
audit committee responsibilities and are therefore relevant in formulating the interview 
questions.  These theories are mirrored in the discussion of the research results.   
Finally, the researcher’s personal reflectivity and the methodological reflectivity 
are discussed in evaluating the research results.    The relationship between the building 
blocks of theory, research roadmap, and the theoretical framework adopted by this 
research is illustrated in Figure 3-6.
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Chapter Four: Research Design and Data Collection 
4.1 Introduction  
This chapter describes and explains the following: 
 the research design and interview questions  
 the pilot interview 
 the research sample and population, and  
 the procedural stages of data collection.    
4.2 The research design and interview questions  
4.2.1 The relationship between interview questions and research questions 
In this section, the relationship between interview questions and research questions is 
discussed in order to explain the research design.   The general research question of this thesis is 
‘what gives rise to an effective audit committee?’   Based on the inconclusive results of the audit 
committee literature discussed in Chapter Two, the research question is answered by addressing 
and answering four interrelated, specific research questions, namely:  (1) what do audit committee 
members perceive the desired objectives of an audit committee to be? (2) what do the members bring to 
an audit committee in order to achieve its desired objectives?  (3) how do members help attain the desired 
audit committee objectives?  (4) how do members assess the extent to which the audit committee 
objectives have been achieved?  Twenty-one (21) interview questions were prepared to cover these 
four research questions.  The questions were organised into four topics, namely:  
(1) perceptions of responsibilities of the audit committee   
(2) operation of the audit committee  
(3) relationships with audit committee stakeholders, and  
(4) perceptions of the environment around the audit committee.  
The full questionnaire can be found in Appendix B. 
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The interview questions are semi-structured, allowing a certain level of scope limitation, 
as well as a certain degree of openness for responses by the interviewees (Wengraf, 2001).    The 
interview questions are subject to a certain level of scope limitation because they are supposed to 
act as informants aimed at obtaining qualitative data that is relevant to the research questions.    
According to Rubin and Rubin (2005), to explore the shared values or norms of the 
interviewees, the interviewer often asks the interviewee to describe a typical event or ordinary 
occurrence.   Such interviews should give the interviewees the opportunity to describe what is 
important to them.   In the interview questionnaire, eleven (11) out of twenty one (21) questions 
ask the interviewees, i.e. the audit committee members, to describe typical occurrences in 
performing their audit committee tasks.  These 11 questions proved to be effective, as the audit 
committee members who participated in the interviews told stories and made anecdotal 
comments about events which they believed to be typical in performing their audit committee 
roles.  As it is not possible to observe the real board meetings, including audit committee 
meetings
19
, stories within an organisational context are substitutes to observed incidents.  The 
data collected via these questions are contextual and demonstrate a sense-making process by 
interviewees in perceiving what had happened, why those events happened and the intentional 
factors which justified their behaviour during those events.    The interview responses obtained 
from those questions thus also serve as informants for all four of the research questions.    The 
relationship between the interview questions (IQ) and research questions (RQ) is illustrated in 
Figure 4-1.  Each of the twenty-one interview questions is designed to be an informant for one or 
more of the research questions.   
4.2.2 Interview question design 
In this section, each of the interview questions is explained with regard to its relevance to 
the gap in the existing body of knowledge and how it serves as an informant of one or more 
particular research questions. As mentioned previously, the interview questionnaire has four 
main themes or topics.  The first topic investigates audit committee members’ perceptions of 
audit committee responsibilities.   
 
 
                                                     
19
 Such meetings usually discuss share price sensitive information, therefore participation from outside parties is 
prohibited by the law. 
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IQ*: interview questions that invite story-telling and are relevant to all of the research 
questions. 
The very first interview question is: ‘what motivated you to become an audit committee 
member?’   The qualitative research shows that audit committee members possess certain 
characteristics, for example, they are either an independent director or they have the financial or 
accounting expertise required to fulfil the duty of overseeing the financial reporting and auditing 
processes (Abbott et al, 2003a;  Baxter & Cotter, 2008).   As discussed in Chapter Two, the 
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qualitative research has not been able to consistently prove that such characteristics are 
positively associated with high quality financial reporting and auditing.  It is also unknown how 
certain attributes link to particular audit committee duties that are consciously intended to
20
.   
This interview question is designed to obtain information about how audit committee members 
justify their presence in the audit committee, i.e. what are the intended objectives of the audit 
committee and what type of attributes do members possess that can contribute to those intended 
objectives?   This interview question therefore acts as an informant for research question one, 
‘what do audit committee members perceive the desired objectives of an audit committee to be?’ 
and research question two, ‘what do the members bring to an audit committee in order to achieve 
its desired objectives?’. 
Interview question 1.2 is: ‘Are you assigned any specific responsibility by the audit 
committee?  Why are you assigned with this responsibility?’  This question develops the 
preceding discussion further:  if certain audit committee members’ attributes (or characteristics) 
are associated with certain audit committee objectives, are members assigned with specific 
duties to utilise those attributes?  In answering this interview question, the audit committee 
members are given another chance to make sense of the link between their presence and the 
intended audit committee objectives.   In contrast to research question 1.1, which emphases the 
audit committee members’ intention, this question is aimed at the audit committee members’ 
perception of performing audit committee duties.  This question therefore acts as an informant 
for research question two, ‘what do the members bring to an audit committee in order to achieve 
its desired objectives?’ and research question three ‘how do members help attain the desired 
audit committee objectives?’  
Interview questions 1.1 and 1.2 lead to interview question 1.3, which is: ‘what do you 
think helps you most in achieving your assigned responsibility?  Please describe how this helped 
you in a specific situation.  Was this typical?’  This question is asking for a description of a 
situation or an occurrence when the audit committee member perceived that his or her attribute 
or effort specifically resulted in an intended outcome.  In answering this question, audit 
committee members are given an opportunity to demonstrate a complete sense making process 
of what was intended to happen, what did happen, how certain attributes or efforts took effect, 
and to evaluate what happened in comparison to what was intended.   Therefore, this research 
question is acting as an informant for all four research questions.  In answering this research 
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 According to Sokolowski (2000), ‘intending to’ means the conscious process of relating an experience to an 
object, in other words, ‘intending to’ is a process of making sense of experience.   
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question, it was evident that the interviewees usually selected an event that was important to 
them.  By asking ‘was it typical?’, the events referred to in the responses were classified further 
into either an anecdotal event of significance, or alternatively, an event of frequent occurrence.   
Interview question 1.4: ‘Have you encountered any difficulties or conflicts in achieving 
your assigned responsibility?  If so, please specify.’  This question is intended to complete the 
circle for the audit committee members to explain the efforts and attributes that have contributed 
to them performing their duties.  Compared with the previous question, it is more focused, 
targeting any difficulties and conflicts experienced by the audit committee members.  At the 
same time, the question is aimed at obtaining an account of a specific situation or event that may 
not necessarily be intended by the audit committee member.  Such difficulties and conflicts 
could be ad hoc, or even imposed on the members, and they could be either external or internal.    
As discussed in Chapter Two, qualitative research has been trying to establish that audit 
committee performance is associated with members’ independence.    The rationale for such an 
hypothesis is that having independent directors (audit committee members) can prevent agency 
problems.  This research question is also related to the studies that associate audit committee 
existence and composition with a firm’s industrial context or level of litigious risks.  Without 
specifying the issues of ‘independence’ or ‘risks’ in this interview question, it is expected that 
interviewees would give examples of difficulties or stand-offs between different parties caused 
by, for example, conflicts of interest, or the pressure of increased regulatory requirements.    This 
research question also acts as an informant for all four research questions.  
The last interview question in topic one is: ‘On a scale of 1 to 10, with 10 being the best, 
how well do you believe you achieved your assigned responsibility?  Please explain why you 
chose this score.’  This question provides an opportunity for the interviewee to evaluate his/her 
performance as an audit committee member.  The rating is not intended to measure the 
member’s performance, but rather as an initiator of further conversation.  The key intention of 
the question is to identify how interviewees justify the evaluation of their performance.  As 
discussed previously in Chapter Two, an audit committee bears the responsibility for overseeing 
the financial reporting and auditing processes and the practices of internal control and risk 
management (DeZoort et al,2002).  Such responsibilities, however, reflect public expectations 
rather than being a matter of fact (Beasley, Branson, & Hancock, 2008).  This interview question 
is designed to obtain an insight into how audit committee members perceive their duties and to 
what extent they believe they have fulfilled their duties.  It emphasises interviewees’ self-
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evaluations.   In other words, this interview question is interested in:  a) what has been used as a 
benchmark against which the audit committee members can evaluate their performance; b) why 
they choose such benchmarks; and most importantly, c) the sense making process of audit 
committee members’ evaluations. 
Topic two of the interview questionnaire focuses on audit committee meetings.  The 
qualitative research has adopted meeting frequency as a measure of audit committee diligence 
(Raghunandan & Rama, 2007).  This is because it is common practice for the board of directors, 
as well as its sub-committees, to carry out their duties in the form of meetings and the outcome 
of their work is represented by meeting minutes and resolutions.  According to Spira (2002), 
audit committee meetings are ceremonial; she described such meetings as a ‘private performance 
for (a) public audience’ (p. 45 and p. 221).     
Cohen and Holder-Webber (2006) argue that research on boardroom behaviours is 
extremely rare, and that little insight has been documented about what exactly happens during 
board meetings.   Interview question 2.1 ‘Please describe the process for discussing and 
resolving issues in your audit committee”, and interview question 2.5, which asks the 
interviewee to describe either a regular or the most recent audit committee meeting he/she 
attended, are aimed at eliciting an account of a specific occurrence or situation.   Based on the 
description given, the researcher further probed the reasoning and ordinariness of such an 
occurrence by asking ‘why?’ or ‘how typical is this?’    
As discussed in Chapter Three, the intentionality of audit committee members’ 
performances is an underlying assumption of this research.    When interviewees describe audit 
committee meetings as seen through their eyes, the factual accuracy is of less importance than 
the completeness of the sense-making process (Rubin & Rubin, 2005).   This is because such 
accounts reflect the interviewees’ assessments of what is true and significant to them. 
 Interview questions 2.2, 2.3, 2.4, and their sub-questions are aimed at obtaining an 
insight into audit committee performance outside audit committee meetings.  Exploratory data 
shows that on average, the audit committee in New Zealand listed companies met four times 
during the financial year ending 31 March, 2007
21
.    Little evidence shows that audit committees 
accomplished all of their duties either during formal committee meetings, or vice versa.  Both 
Gendron and Bédard (2005) and Turley and Zaman (2007) reported that there were informal 
                                                     
21
 For details see Chapter Five, Research Findings and Discussion. 
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audit committee activities outside the formal committee meetings of firms investigated.  
Research questions 2.2, 2.3, and 2.4 have the following aims:  
 To identify the activities that are performed outside audit committee meetings; the 
nature of such activities, and who is involved.  
 To understand the magnitude of the audit committee activities both during and 
outside audit committee meetings; whether the audit committee meetings outweigh 
the performance outside the meetings, or vice versa.  
These questions are not intended to measure the time that audit committee members have 
spent either attending meetings, or working outside the meetings, but rather to reveal the 
diversification of audit committee activities.  The responses to these interview questions also 
indirectly reflect the objectives of various audit committees.  The questions also investigate the 
sense-making process and intentionality of interviewees, i.e. why they perform those activities, 
what has happened, and what is important to them regarding their audit committee’s role.   
Therefore the factual accuracy of the interview responses is again of less importance than the 
logical deductions flowing from the story-telling. 
Topic three of the interview questionnaire investigates the relationship between audit 
committee members and other parties who work with them, namely the management, the 
internal auditors, external auditors, and the board of directors.  In contrast to topic two which 
focuses on the audit committee meetings as routine activities of audit committees, topic three 
aims to obtain an account of specific occurrences which involve stand-offs, conflicts, or 
difficulties in performing the audit committee’s role.  Question 3.1 asks the interviewee to 
describe a specific occasion when the audit committee needed to work between the management 
and the external auditors to resolve an issue or conflict.    
According to DeZoort et al (2002), an audit committee has the responsibility for 
overseeing the internal control process of an organisation.   As per principle 5 of the OECD 
(2004) Principles of Internal Control, having a formal internal audit function is regarded as one 
of the best practices of internal control.    According to the professional pronouncement issued 
by the Institute of Internal Auditors, the internal audit function should report to the audit 
committee (the Institute of Internal Auditors, 2010).    Question 3.2 asks the interviewee to 
describe a situation of working between the internal auditor and management, especially when 
there is a particular issue that needs to be resolved by the audit committee.   
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In criticising the inconsistency and lack of conclusiveness of the qualitative research, 
Turley and Zaman (2004) and Spira (2002) point out that qualitative research on audit 
committees largely borrowed the theoretical framework (or hypotheses) used in qualitative 
research on the board of directors.  For example, the argument that the independence of an audit 
committee is associated with financial reporting quality derives from the proposition that the 
independence of the board of directors is associated with financial reporting quality.   Since the 
audit committee is a subcommittee of the board of directors, it is unknown whether the 
composition characteristics of the audit committee or the composition characteristics of the 
board influence the performance of the audit committee.   Audit committees assume their 
delegated responsibilities according to the audit committee charter filed with the board of 
directors (Guthrie & Turnbull, 2006).  Question 3.3 offers an opportunity for the audit 
committee members to describe the interactions between the audit committee and the board of 
directors.    Such interactions are described along with a specific occasion when the audit 
committee reports to the board, especially when there is an outstanding issue that needs to be 
resolved. 
  Topic three also aims to reveal the diversification of audit committee activities.  The 
questions request the interviewee to describe a complete occurrence, with sufficient contextual 
information.  Because of the assumption that all behaviours are intentional, the interviewee’s 
response should contain the sense-making process of how an audit committee member perceived 
what had happened on those occasions, the reason(s) for what had happened, and why they did 
certain things to resolve the issue.  The three interview questions act as informants for all four of 
the research questions.   
Topic four of the interview questionnaire is titled: ‘perceptions of the environment 
around the audit committee’.   This topic investigates the audit committee members’ perceptions 
of events or changes associated with audit committees, but not necessarily the committee duties 
per se.   This topic is associated with all four research questions.  
Question 4.1: ‘has your relationship with other executives changed since you were 
nominated as an audit committee member?  Please give an example.  What do you think might 
be the reason?’   One of the common hypotheses tested by the qualitative research is that an 
independent audit committee is positively associated with better financial reporting and auditing 
quality (Klein, 2002).  As previously discussed in interview question 1.4, this research intends to 
capture a justification of whether the independence or objectivity of audit committee members 
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can reduce the agency problem.   Without specifying the issues of ‘independence’ or 
‘objectivity’, question 1.4 investigates the conflicts or difficulties encountered by audit 
committee members when performing their audit committee duties.  Question 1.4, however, may 
or may not lead to interviewee responses that contain issues or stand-offs between audit 
committee members and management.  Interviewees may identify and describe other difficulties 
or conflicts.  To overcome this possibility, question 4.1 specifies the scope of the discussion.  
Interviewees are requested to comment on their relationships with the management prior to and 
after they served on the audit committee.    If any changes in the relationships are identified, the 
interviewees are invited to relate an account of how they sensed that the relationships had 
changed and explain the reasons that they believe triggered such changes.      
Cohen and Holder-Webber (2006) argue that audit committee performance should be 
motivated by both reward and punishment.   According to Adams and Ferreira (2008), audit 
committee members with higher fees attend board meetings more frequently.  Adams and 
Ferreira (2008) is thus far the only qualitative research study investigating the remuneration of 
audit committee members and their diligence, providing some evidence of the impact of 
motivation.   The investigation of audit committee members’ motivation is very limited.  
Interview question 4.2: ‘do you believe your remuneration for serving on the audit committee is 
reasonable?’  is not only aimed at an evaluation of remuneration reasonableness but, when the 
interviewees justify their evaluation, an account of their perception of the magnitude of their 
audit committee duties and the achievement of audit committee objectives may also be revealed.   
According to another commonly tested hypothesis in the qualitative research, the 
determinants of audit committee establishment and composition are associated with litigious 
risks exposure (Carcello, Hollingsworth & Neal, 2006).  Given the inconsistent results of the 
research, many commentators criticise the practice of the audit committee as box ticking 
(Turnbull, 2005).  Interview question 4.3 is: ‘how have the increasing regulations and guidelines 
governing audit committees affected your work on the audit committee?  Please give an 
example.’   In answering this question, interviewees are given an opportunity to discuss the 
impact of the regulations on the performance of their audit committee duties.   They are also 
requested to justify their reaction to such impact.   Their discussion is expected to be supported 




The last interview question is ‘if you are nominated to serve on the audit committee 
again, will you accept it? Why, or why not?’.  This question is designed to encourage 
interviewees to reflect on the first interview question in the questionnaire, which asks what 
motivated them to become audit committee members.    In closing the interview process, 
interviewees are provided with an opportunity to re-examine their experience of serving on an 
audit committee.  It is believed that after answering the previous 20 interview questions, the 
interviewees will have taken the interviewer through all the important issues relating to 
performing the role of audit committee members.  This process is intended not only to obtain a 
description of their actual, perceived experience of various incidents, but also to invite the 
interviewees to explain why those incidents happened and, most importantly, to justify how they 
reacted to those incidents.      As a final contribution to the interview, it was expected  that 
interviewees could reflect on what they have said before, and complete the picture of their lived 
experience as audit committee members in reaching a conclusion.    This conclusion goes 
beyond particular incidents, and is justified by their vision of their own futures as audit 
committee members. 
In summary, the four topics of the audit committee members’ interview questionnaire are 
addressed by using Rubin’s and Rubin’s (2005) responsive interview model, whereby the 
researcher asks the interviewees, the audit committee members, to tell stories about their 
experiences in performing their duties in their particular audit committee.  The researcher then, 
based on a particular description or explanation, may probe for further clarification.  Therefore, 
the interviewee is taking the interviewer though his/her particular experiences.    
4.3 The pilot interview 
To test the interview questionnaire, a pilot interview was conducted on 23 August, 2007.  
The pilot interviewee was an academic staff member of Lincoln University, who had had 
professional experience as a chartered accountant and auditor, and had worked with audit 
committee members of New Zealand listed companies. The pilot interviewee confirmed that, 
with minor exceptions, the length of the interview questionnaire was appropriate.  
The pilot interviewee further confirmed that:  
 the interview questions were clear and unambiguous  
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 the interview questions were focused and those questions designed for inviting 
story-telling about particular incidents flowed naturally.    
Based on his experience, the pilot interviewee suggested that the word ‘conflict’ in 
question 1.4 might be better expressed as ‘stand-off’.  This is because, at the board room level, 
any tension between auditors, management, and the board of directors was usually associated 
with technical accounting issues, therefore it was primarily an argument about which accounting 
treatment was more appropriate, rather than a ‘conflict’.   
Although the actual interview question was not amended, the pilot interviewee’s opinion 
was taken into account when analysing the research results.    As discussed in Chapter Three, 
positive accounting theory predicts that one of the audit committee’s roles should be to prevent 
financial reporting from being utilised in pursuing management self-interest (Milne, 2001).    
Therefore, investigating how audit committee members interpret ‘conflicts’ associated with their 
duties is critical.   It is noteworthy that similar views to the pilot interviewee were reflected by 
the actual interview responses of audit committee members, namely, that most of the ‘conflicts’ 
arising in the course of their duties involved technical accounting issues, with some exceptions. 
A detailed discussion of this issue can be found in Chapter Six. 
  
4.4 The research sample and population  
According to the current NZX listing rules, all listed companies are required to establish 
an audit committee with a majority of independent members.   At least one member of the audit 
committee should be a chartered accountant.  The names of audit committee members shall be 
publicly disclosed.   
The sample selection was based on a systematic study of the annual report disclosures of 
the companies listed on the New Zealand Stock Exchange (NZX) for the 2005/2006 and 
2006/2007 financial years respectively.    One hundred and seventy two companies’ annual 
reports were obtained from the NZX for the 2005/2006 financial year, while 164 companies’ 
annual reports were obtained for the 2006/2007 financial year.   
By examining the annual reports and/or by tracking the investors’ relationship sections of 
the above-mentioned listed companies’ websites, a database of 152 companies’ audit 
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committees, involving 482 current members, was created.  Listed companies that are not 
currently operating in New Zealand at the time of the study were excluded from the database.  
Of the 482 directors serving on the audit committees of listed companies, 334 members were 
currently based in New Zealand.   Although the amount of information available regarding audit 
committees varies greatly, all of the 152 companies contained in the database publicly disclose 
the names of their audit committee members.   Furthermore, all of the 152 companies claimed 
that they have created formal audit committee charters, but only 89 companies’ charters were 
publicly available to be downloaded.   
One hundred and fifty companies had at least one current New Zealand Chartered 
Accountant serving on their audit committee, while the other two companies explained in their 
annual reports that their entire boards only included three directors who were not chartered 
accountants and their audit committees were deemed to include the entire board.  Two 
companies disclosed that their audit committee chairpersons were also the chairman of the 
company, which was a departure from the Security Commission’s guidelines (2004). 
During the 2005/2006 and 2006/2007 financial years, the available information indicated 
that the frequency of audit committee meetings ranged from twice to nine times a year, with a 
mean of four times a year.   One particular company, which experienced financial stress, 
receivership, and de-listing during 2005/2006, reported  nine audit committee meetings.  The 
average annual income of audit committee members was between $40,000 and $45,000.  It was 
common practice to remunerate audit committee chairpersons more than members.  
Of the 334 New Zealand audit committee members, 41 served on two or more audit 
committees.  This reduced the numbers of directors that were potential interviewees to 293.  
Between August and October 2007, invitations were sent to those 293 potential interviewees.  
Fourteen rewritten refusals were obtained, either by mail or by email.  Twenty nine favourable 
responses were received by post.   As a result of following up on the favourable responses during 
2008, 21 interviews were arranged and conducted.   The reasons for eight favourable responses 
not resulting in interviews were as follows:  
 One audit committee member wrote very brief answers on the original interview 
questionnaire posted to him.  During the follow-up telephone conversation, he 
explained that he could not conduct a face-to-face interview.  
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 Two audit committee members who had originally accepted the interview invitation, 
subsequently decided not to accept a face-to-face interview.  Those two audit committee 
members were from the same organisation.  
 One audit committee member, who had recently resigned from the board of a listed 
company, also declined the interview invitation during the follow-up telephone 
conversation.  
 One audit committee member was in the process of relocating to Australia, while 
another was already living in Australia.  
 One audit committee member could not be contacted via the email address provided. 
 One audit committee member, due to family reasons, could not arrange an appropriate 
time to conduct the interview within the timeframe of the data collection period.  
The 21 interviews lasted from 34 to 77 minutes.   Seven of the interviews were carried 
out in Auckland, eight in Wellington, three in Christchurch, and the rest in Dunedin, Kapiti, and 
Ashburton.  Of the 21 interviewees, one was female and was also the only interviewee who had 
relocated to New Zealand from overseas.  Five of the participants were not qualified 
accountants.  Three of the participants, one of whom was the chairman of the company, were not 
currently acting as the audit committee chairman.   Of the 21 interviewees, 19 were serving on 
two or more audit committees, resulting in 33 different organisations being referred to during the 
interviews.  
 
4.5 The procedural stages of data collection 
Between August and October 2007, invitations were sent to the 293 potential 
interviewees.   The invitation package included: 
 a covering letter  
 a copy of the interview questionnaire   




 a consent form with a stamped, addressed envelope.  
These documents are included in appendices A, B, C, and D of this thesis.   
The covering letter introduced the background information of the research project and the 
objective of the research, the invitation for participation in the interviews and the procedure for 
acceptance if the potential interviewee wished to participate.   
The standard research project information sheet served two purposes; firstly, it explained, 
in detail, the research objectives, possible contributions and rationale for the research design.  
Secondly, it detailed the interview and follow-up procedures, as well as those for ensuring the 
confidentiality of the interviewees and their organisations.   
All data gathered in the study were strictly confidential and all of the participants were 
assured of complete anonymity in any publication of the research results.  The identity of the 
participants would not under any circumstances be made public, or revealed to any parties other 
than the researcher and her supervisors.  These principles were incorporated in the following 
detailed data collection procedures: 
 Each interview was taped and transcribed.   
 Pseudonyms were assigned to each interviewee and organisation in the interview 
transcripts and in any text content quoted or discussed in any publication.   
 The interview transcript was reviewed and edited by the interviewee. Shortly after 
each interview had been completed, the interviewee received a copy of the transcript 
to confirm the accuracy of the conversation and to add to or clarify any points. 
 During the interview, the interviewee was permitted to decline answering any of the 
interview questions.   
 The interviewee could withdraw from the interview at any time by advising the 
researcher in person, by telephone, or in writing.   
The above interview procedures were strictly followed during the data collection process.    
The recorded interview clips  were transcribed word-by-word by the researcher and fully 
reviewed by her supervisor.    As stated previously, after the interview transcripts were edited, 
83 
 
they were posted back to the interviewees, who were asked to review the transcripts of the 
interview and confirm, or amend them.  Of the twenty one interviewees, thirteen replied to 
acknowledge the receipt of the transcripts and four interviewees replied with detailed notes.   
There were, however, no material amendments to the interview transcripts.   Both the confirmed 
and unconfirmed interview transcripts were considered during the data analysis.  
To further guarantee the confidentiality of the research data, the researcher and her 
supervisors are the only people having access to the tapes (or other storage devices) recorded 
during the interviews.  The tapes (or other storage devices) and the transcripts will be kept for 
six (6) years from 2007.   After six years, the tapes (or other storage devices) and the transcripts 
will be destroyed under the supervision of the researcher, or any person authorised by the 
researcher, or her supervisors.  
4.6 Summary  
Drawing on the gaps in the existing body of knowledge about the effectiveness of audit 
committees (Chapter Two) and the theoretical framework established for the research (Chapter 
Three), the research design largely follows Rubin’s and Rubin’s (2005) responsive interviewing 
methodology.  Chapter Four has explained and discussed the design of the interview 
questionnaire, the sample and the population, and the procedural stages of the interview data 
collection.   
An interview questionnaire consisting of four topics and 21 questions was designed.  
Drawing on Rubin’s & Rubin’s (2005) responsive interview model, the researcher asked the 
interviewees - the audit committee members - to tell stories they experienced in performing their 
duties in their particular audit committee.  The interviewee then, based on a particular 
description or explanation may be probed for further clarification.  Therefore, the interviewee is 
thus virtually taking the interviewer though his/her particular experience.   All of the 21 
interview questions are developed from the qualitative research areas supported by both positive 
and normative accounting theories.   
The sample selection was based on a review of the annual report disclosures from 
companies listed on the New Zealand Exchange (NZX) for the 2005/2006 and 2006/2007 
financial years.    During 2008, 21 interviews were conducted, which were transcribed word-by-
word. The transcripts were initially processed in Microsoft Word and then transferred into 
NVivo 8 and 9 for coding.  Of the twenty one interviews, seven were carried out in Auckland, 
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eight in Wellington,  three in Christchurch, and the rest in Dunedin, Kapiti, and Ashburton.     Of 
the 21 interviewees, one was female, with the rest male.  Five of the participants were not 
qualified accountants.  Three of the participants were not currently acting as the audit committee 
chairman; one of these was the chairman of the company.   Several interviewees were serving on 
two or more audit committees.  Therefore during the interviews, 33 different firms were referred 
to.  




Chapter Five: Data Analysis  
5.1 Introduction  
The aim of this qualitative data analysis is to explore in detail how audit committee 
members were making sense of the meanings of particular experiences and events in performing 
their roles.    As discussed in Chapter Three, the data analysis depends on, and is complicated by, 
the researcher’s own conceptions.   Thus; a two-stage interpretation is involved: the interviewees 
are trying to make sense of their life in their audit committees during the process of 
interviewing; the researcher is then trying to make sense of the participants’ logic (Smith & 
Osborn, 2007). This two-stage interpretation was performed by the three-round coding data 
analysis approach explained in this chapter.      
The data analysis was processed by NVivo 8 and then NVivo 9.  The 21 recorded 
interviews were transcribed word-by-word, initially in Microsoft Word, resulting in a transcript 
master file of 426 pages.  The transcripts were then confirmed and entered into NVivo 8 as 21 
‘sources’, according to the chronological sequence of the 21 interviews.  The interviewees were 
numbered from 01 to 21.   The data coding processes were repeated for three rounds.  In each 
round the interview transcripts were read through and coded into different sets of codes or nodes 
(hereafter used interchangeably).  Different sets of codes were developed and built upon each 
other.  Eventually different queries were made in order to organise the subsequent writing-up of 
the research results.    
The rest of this chapter discusses and explains the three round coding approach.   
5.2 Overview  
Qualitative research tends to document the participants’ personal perceptions, but one 
can only get close to that personal perception, because the personal perception embedded in the 
interview data is complicated by the researcher’s own conceptions.  Thus; a two-stage 
interpretation was involved: the interviewees are trying to make sense of their life in their audit 
committees in answering the interview questions; the researcher is then making sense of the 
participants’ responses.  The interview data were analysed by three rounds of coding, which 
reflects the two-stage interpretation.  The first round coding involves assigning passages to 
categories.  The researcher went through all transcripts and collected numerous illustrative 
quotes to categories based on the structure of the interview questionnaire.    The second round 
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coding involves refining and restructuring coded interview text from the first round.  Most 
importantly, the interview data coded in the first round were re-defined according to their 
properties based on Embree’s (2007) reflective analysis.  Several themes were identified and 
clustered during the second round coding.  The first and second round coding documents the first 
stage interpretation.  Subsequently, the third round coding (the second stage interpretation) 
reflects the researcher’s sense making of the interviewees’ logic.   In this round of data analysis, 
interview data were further summarised into core categories.   Figure 5-1 illustrates the 
relationship between the two-stage interpretation and the three rounds of coding.    
Figure 5-1: The three round coding approach 
Stage one interpretation: the 
participants' sense making of their 
life in audit committees 
 
First round coding: interview data were coded according to 
the answers to the interview questions.  In this round, key 
experiences and events were identified as important by the 
participants.  Data analysis is discussed to the extent of 
categorising themes of responses provided by the 
interviewees. 
 
 Second round coding: interview data were coded according 
to Embree's reflective analysis to understand how 
participants explain and evaluate the experiences and events 
they identified.  Themes were identified and clustered to 
facilitate the discussions of the sense-making process (i.e. 
the reasoning) of the interviewees.  
 
Stage two interpretation: the 
researcher’s sense making of the 
participants’ responses  
 
Third round coding:  themes were further clustered into 
broad categories based on the researcher’s reflection.  The 
intended orientations are discussed and the interview 
questions answered. 
 
5.3 The first round of coding – responses to the interview questions 
In this round the transcripts were coded according to the researcher’s judgement on the 
relationship of the interview data to the themes of each of the interview questions.  There were 
17 nodes designed based on the four general topics and 21 interview questions (see the interview 
questionnaire in Appendix B).   Some interview questions were designed to funnel the 
subsequent question, therefore did not transform into a node.  An example of such questions is: 
‘Do you need to do additional work by yourself in addition to attending the scheduled audit 
committee meetings in order to achieving your assigned responsibility?’  The expected response 
to this question can be either ‘yes’ or ‘no’,  then if the response was ‘yes’, the interviewer was 
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then led to ask the interviewee to describe a particular example of what he/she does outside the 
audit committee meetings.     
All the nodes were arranged into tree structure (see the screen print displayed in Figure 
5-2.)    
Figure 5-2: Nodes in the tree structure – first round coding  
 
In this round of coding, nodes were numbered for the convenience of matching them to 
the actual sequence of the questions asked during the interviews.  As illustrated in Figure 5-2, 
the tree-structured nodes were developed based on the interview questionnaire.  After each 
transcript was coded, the researcher viewed the transcripts by the density of coding, to see 
whether any interview responses remained uncoded.  The uncoded texts were mainly questions 
asked by the researcher including her clarification with the interviewees.  Table 5-1 below 
summarises the tree nodes created in the first round coding.  
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Table 5-1: Tree nodes created in the first round coding 
Tree Nodes (codes)  
No. of 




    
1 Perceived audit committee (AC) responsibilities  
    
 

























1.5 Assessing AC performance  21 
 
96     1,307  
      2. AC operation 
    
 















2.3 Outside AC meetings working with others 21 
 
80        519  
      3. Relationships with AC stakeholders  
    
 










3.3 Mediating internal auditors and management  19 
 
83        276  
      4. Perceptions of AC environment 
    
 















4.4 Recapitulation of motivations for serving on the AC  21 
 




         2,344  
 
            
 
During the process of coding and data analysis, sub-themes emerged.  Therefore, more 
codes were developed in order to manage the interview data, for example, ‘agenda of audit 
committee meetings’, ‘internal control’, and ‘external reporting’.  Table 5-2 summarises the free 
nodes
23
 created during first round coding.  These further developed nodes were not incorporated 
                                                     
22
 ‘Reference’ was the term used in NVivo 8 and 9 referring to the cluster (sentences or paragraphs) of interview 
text data that have been coded under a particular node. 
 
23
 A free node is the container of coded text that does not fit in the tree node structure in Table 5-1 
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into the tree-node systems, because usually they were relevant to the answers for several 
interview questions.    
Table 5-2: Free nodes created in the first round coding 
Free Nodes (codes)  





 Auditing matters 21 163 
 Agenda (audit committee meeting agenda)   21 153 
 Experience (previous professional experience) 19 132 
 Financial reporting 19 91 
 Background (interviewees’ professional background) 19 76 
 IFRS transition 17 108 
 Consensus 14 32 
 Risk management 13 88 
 Debate 12 43 
 Internal control 12 37 
 Compliance 11 50 
 Vote  10 19 
 Charter 9 35 
 Dividends  (AC recommending dividends to the board) 8 18 
 Independence 4 6 
 Recruiting auditors 3 42 
The identification of free nodes was performed by the ‘text search’ query function of 
NVivo 9.  The results of ‘text search’ were checked and modified by the researcher to include 
synonyms, for example, the text search for ‘risk management’ expanded to ‘risk appetite’ and 
‘risk register’.  It was noteworthy that most of these free nodes (key words) were directly 
mentioned in the interview responses, except for auditing matters.  In Table 5-2, the free nodes 
were ranked according to their coding frequency.  Nodes (key words) that were shared by a 
number of interviewees and were of high frequencies indicate the common themes that emerged 
from the interview data.    It indicates that although the interviewees were from different 
organisations and had different backgrounds, they have developed a shared language in 
performing their audit committees’ tasks. 
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Some significant findings which can be highlighted when interpreting the data in Table 
5-2 are:  
 The event of the IFRS transition taking place between 2005 and 2007 was of great 
importance to audit committee members in New Zealand listed companies.  This theme was 
shared by 17 out of 21 interviewees.   
 Professional experience and background were of great importance to the interviewees, most 
of the (19 out of 21) interviewees linked their professional experience and background to 
their role as audit committee members.   
 Audit committee meetings were perceived to be dominated by the themes of ‘agenda’, 
‘debate’, ‘consensus’, and ‘vote’.   These themes reflected the findings of previous 
qualitative audit committee research findings that audit committee meetings were of a 
ceremonial nature (Spira, 1998; 2005).   
 Recruiting auditors is regarded as one of responsibilities of the audit committee (DeZoort et 
al, 2002).  Although only three interviewees discussed such experience, it was mentioned all 
together 42 times in the interview data.  This may be interpreted as interviewees perceived 
such experience as of great importance to their audit committees.   
 Eight interviewees discussed their audit committees’ involvement in recommending 
dividends to the board of the directors.   Recommending level of dividend has not been 
evidenced by the existing literature of audit committees.  
 The existing audit committee literature, as well as regulatory corporate governance 
requirements, emphasise that audit committees should consist of independent directors.  The 
interview data show that the theme of directors’ designated independent status was 
mentioned only by four interviewees, six times in total.   
  The above represent key findings based on themes identified through analysis of the 
frequency of shared key words by interviewees.  In Chapter Six, the research findings of the first 
round of coding will be discussed in detail.   
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5.4 The second round of coding – reflective analysis 
Figure 5-3 shows the screen cuts from NVivo 9 for the structure and nodes of the second 
round of coding.        
Figure 5-3: Nodes in the tree structure – second round of coding24 
 
The second round of coding and data analysis is based largely on the model of reflective 
analysis developed by Embree (2007), which was illustrated in Figure 3-4 in Chapter Three.   
The essential theme of reflective analysis lies in the ‘intentionality’ of people, i.e. all experiences 
are regarded as ‘intentive processes’.  By deeming the performance of audit committee members 
to be intentional, the second round of coding, i.e. the reflective analysis, will discuss and analyse 
the reasons for the participants’ responses, which were identified in the first round of coding.   
According to Embree (2007), one’s encounters include broad categories of ‘experiencing’, 
‘believing’, ‘valuing’, and ‘willing’. To facilitate the data analysis, the interview data that are of 
                                                     
24
 The coding structure depicted in Figure 5-3 is more of a roadmap of data analysis than a concrete theoretical foundation.   
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an ‘experiencing’ nature are coded as ‘descriptive accounts’, because they describe what 
happens.  The descriptive accounts are classified further into ‘perceptional’ and ‘pictorial’.   
Perceptional accounts were represented by ‘expecting’, a perception of future encounters; 
‘perceiving’, a perception of current encounters; and ‘remembering’, a perception of a past 
experience.  ‘Remembering’ accounts are the closest description to a factual incident, whereas 
‘perceiving’ accounts usually represent the interviewee’s general perception of ‘how things 
should be’.  Perceptional accounts may or may not indicate a factual incident.  The ‘expecting’ 
accounts however, represent an anticipated outcome rather than a factual incident.   Using the 
participant’s description of audit committee meetings as an example, a typical ‘remembering’ 
account is represented by interviewee 05 referring to his audit committee meeting papers and 
describing the audit committee meeting as: ‘…that meeting was as a result of a review by the 
incoming chief executive of aspects of the loan book.  A recommendation was that we 
required… the company required additional provisioning on a particular loan book…’    
Interviewee 01 provided a ‘perceiving’ account about the audit committee meetings in his 
company, saying: ‘Right, this is where we are probably a wee bit weak.  (smiling) As I said, we 
don’t say “Hey, next Tuesday morning is the audit committee meeting”.  We just say, “oh, okay 
we will discuss it in our general meeting”.  I will probably say, “Okay, I will take note of that 
and talk to the accountant”, because, we know our compliance rules.’  An ‘expecting’ account 
was identified in the transcript of interviewee 03, (who, when discussing the possible outcome of 
a particular audit committee meeting,  said: ‘If, for instance, the Securities Commission thought 
that the other finance companies had transactions that looked different in general, and our one 
looks out of line, I have got no doubt that, either with or without a request from the shareholders 
to have a look at that, they will come and want some information of how that transaction was 
arrived at, and certainly will be looking at the auditors and the auditors’ comfort around it.’        
Pictorial accounts were originally designed to capture either descriptions of the contextual 
information about the particular organisation or a particular incident, coded either under the node 
‘organisational context’, or, coded under the node ‘procedural’ describing the procedural settings 
of the audit committee.   Interviewee 10 provided a typical ‘organisational context’ account, 
saying: ‘we don’t have internal audit.  It’s only a small company.  Hum… we are probably close 
enough… well… yeah… close enough to know the accounting and control very well.’  An 
example of a procedural account described by interviewee 09 is: ‘what I always did was when I 
received my audit committee papers; I always flicked them through very quickly to see what was 
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coming up.’  As shown in Figure 5-3, an additional node ‘anecdotal’ was created for the pictorial 
accounts. This is because when the tree structure in Figure 3-5 (in Chapter Three) was 
established, it was expected that participants would describe only the usual settings of their audit 
committees, as documented by the existing audit committee literature.  During the interviews, 
participants revealed several incidents which were significantly different to the ‘expected’ 
incidents.  A typical example of such an anecdotal account is when interviewee 04 described 
how one of his fellow directors negligently sold shares which was prohibited by the insider 
trading regulations, so his audit committee quickly became involved in dealing with immediate 
remedial procedures and in liaising with the regulatory body to make sure that the company 
would not suffer any adverse impacts from this incident.      
  The interview data of an ‘intentionality’ nature that are coded as ‘explanatory accounts’ 
describe the participants’ reasons for their responses.  The intentional factors are filtered out 
from the explanatory accounts and classified further into ‘willing’, ‘valuing’, and ‘believing’.   
The key difference between ‘believing’, ‘valuing’, and ‘willing’ is that ‘believing’ (something to 
be true) more likely ‘comes from what others have communicated to us’ (Embree 2007, p. 183), 
whereas ‘valuing’ something to be either right or wrong is closer to a deduction from past 
experience; ‘willing’ to do or not to do something can be regarded as an intended realisation of 
‘believing’ and ‘valuing’ in the future.   If audit committee effectiveness is intended by the 
committee members, the participants’ value laden accounts are therefore relevant to this 
research.   
5.5 The third round of coding - the researcher’s reflection  
The first round of coding and data analysis documented the interviewees’ responses to the 
interview questions, i.e. it revealed ‘what they said’. The second round of coding and data 
analysis discussed the interviewees’ intentive justification of their responses, i.e. it explained 
‘why they said what they said’.  The third round of coding and data analysis focuses on the 
researcher’s reflection on the differences between interviewees i.e. it discusses the intentionality 
of the interviewees from an outsider’s perspective.   In this round of data coding, themes were 
clustered further into broad categories based on the researcher’s reflection.  The intended 
orientations of the interviewees are discussed through the lenses of the researcher.  
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5.6 Summary  
This chapter has presented the data analysis approach used in the study, explaining each 
of the three round coding used and the rationale for each.   The approach involves a detailed 
examination of the interviewees’ real-world experiences of serving on audit committees.  It is 
concerned primarily with the individual’s personal perception or account of being an audit 
committee member, but also incorporates an active role by the researcher in that process.  The 
research findings and discussion thereof will be presented in Chapter Six. 
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Chapter Six: Research Findings and Discussion 
6.1 Introduction  
      The chapter is organised into four sections: an analysis of participants’ responses to 
the interview questions (the first round of coding); a reflective analysis (the second round of 
coding); the researcher’s reflection (the third round of coding); and a summary of the research 
findings. 
6.2 Responses to the interview questions (the first round of coding)  
6.2.1 Perceived audit committee responsibilities    
(1) Motivation for serving on the audit committee25 
In answering the interview question: ‘what motivated you to become an audit committee 
member?’, participants were given the opportunity to express their opinion of why and how they 
became audit committee members. In answering these interview questions, participants reflect 
on their experiences during the process of interviewing.  They also reflect on how they 
understand the audit committee’s role before and after they serve on it and their justification for 
why or why not they act as a member.  Based on the first round coding, 130 references 
(sentences or paragraphs) from 21 interviewees were coded under the category of ‘motivation 
for serving on the audit committee’. 
From the 130 references identified, three main themes can be identified; firstly, most of 
the interviewees (12 out of 21) relate their role in audit committees to the regulatory requirement 
of having an audit committee in all listed companies in New Zealand.  For example, interviewee 
04 said: ‘Well, about ten years ago or so, (Corporate Governance) Best Practice demanded 
companies… public companies… listed companies to have an audit committee.  I was the 
accountant on the board of company E.  So it was logical for me to be in charge of putting an 
audit committee together, doing an audit (committee) charter and then I became the chairman.’ 
Secondly, 18 out of 21 interviewees suggested that it was their background; particularly 
an accounting, finance, or legal background, that made them most suitable for being an audit 
committee member.   For example, interviewee 02 explained: ‘…when I became a board 
                                                     
25
 Node No.1.0 on the tree node structure displayed in Table 5-1. 
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member of this company, I was the only board member with a finance degree.  So I was invited 
to chair the audit committee because you need at least one accounting expert. That’s why.  
Basically I just agreed to because I was the most appropriate person.’    
Thirdly, 11 of the interviewees believe that taking on a sub-committee’s role, especially 
the audit committee’s role, was a part of their directorship.  They do not regard their position as 
a choice they take, but a director’s responsibility they cannot avoid.  A typical example is as 
suggested by interviewee 08: ‘I was asked (laugh)… you know, in most companies, it was not 
something that people necessarily seek.  You know?  What normally happens was (that) the 
board look around the composition of the board members and say, ‘well, who was best suited? ’ 
It was obviously (laughing)… not what I am willing to do it.  But was just a part of the function 
of the board, taking on the sub-committee’s responsibilities.’    
It was noteworthy that these three themes were not independent or mutually exclusive.   
It was common that an interviewee would discuss two or more factors that contributed to their 
decision to serve on the audit committee.  Table 6-1 summarises the interviewees’ responses to 
what motivated them to serve on the audit committee.   
Table 6-1: Motivation for serving on the audit committee 
 
Motivation No. of interviewees 
(frequency) 
1. Reacting to regulatory requirement to have an audit 
committee 
12 
2. Having suitable background, which makes him/her the 
most suitable person 
18 
3. As a part of directorship 11 
Mentioned one motivation 4 
Mentioned two motivations 13 
Mentioned all three motivations 4 
 
Interviewees  03, 07, 16, and 20 suggested that the independent director status was one of 
the reasons for them to serve on the audit committees, in order to fulfil the regulatory 
requirements for listed companies in New Zealand.  For example, interviewee 16 described his 
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situation as: ‘Company N didn’t form an audit committee until it became a public company.  
(When the company was listed), I was the only independent director who was a qualified 
accountant.   So I became the audit committee chairman.’   Interviewee 07 described his audit 
committee chairman as an independent director; he said: ‘We have the expertise, particularly the 
chairman, who is a partner of an auditing firm.  He is an independent director.  So that ticks all 
the boxes.’  It is noteworthy that directors’ independence as an important attribute of audit 
committee members was only mentioned by these four interviewees in answer to this particular 
interview question.  This theme never appeared elsewhere in the entire interview data. 
(2) Perceived audit committee objectives for being an audit committee 
member
26
   
During the process of coding the interview data, the researcher realised that the 
interviewees frequently referred to audit committees’ general objectives27 when discussing their 
motivations for being a member as well as the specific tasks they performed
28
.  For instance, 
interviewee 04 said: ‘… what is the primary role of an audit committee?  It is to ensure the 
integrity of the financial statements, both the internal management report and the external 
financial statements.  So in the end, an accountant is really necessary (to any audit committee).’ 
According to DeZoort et al (2002), an audit committee oversees firms’ financial 
reporting, internal control and risk management.  It is also expected that an audit committee will 
contribute to enhancing the quality of auditing (Abbott et al, 2003a; 2003b).   Based on the 
existing body of knowledge on the expected outcomes of audit committees, four sub-nodes were 
initially created to categorise interviewees’ comments on the general objectives of audit 
committees, namely: ‘financial reporting’, ‘internal control’, ‘risk management’, and ‘auditing 
matters’.    As the coding process progressed, a new node ‘compliance’ was created to capture 
the general objectives of audit committees. Table 6-2 displays the results of coding.  
Complementary to the existing qualitative research discussed in Chapter Two, this research 
revealed that dealing with compliance issues is perceived as a common responsibility of audit 
committees.   This finding reflects the impact of growing regulatory requirements faced by 
firms.   
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“In my case, I am the chairman of the audit 
committee.  It is because my background is a 
chartered accountant.  The board actually 
asked me to look very closely at all the aspects 
of the financial statements, and to make sure 
that they do satisfy the requirements of 
financial reporting.” 
 Internal control 12 37 
Interviewee 11: 
“The audit committee is in charge of 
monitoring the internal control.”   
 Risk management 13 88 
Interviewee 06: 
“Because that (my audit committee’s 
responsibility) covers that area, and the other 
thing, other areas that after Sarbanes-Oxley, 
that a lot of audit committees have got into this 
what is called wider risk management. Okay?” 







“I (an audit committee chairman) have sort of 
taken on those responsibilities of keeping 
liaison with auditors, and to make sure to 
comply with their recommendation and so on.” 
 Compliance 11 50 
Interviewee 01: 
“…the audit committee actually should be 
helping them to make sure that the business... 
what is doing is... and what is happening is 
compliance to the Act (the Companies Act).” 
  
It is apparent that when interviewees were discussing the general objectives, the above 
themes were usually overlapping.  Interviewee 05 suggested that: ‘Huh… I mean an audit 
committee… if you define it, it is ‘auditing’.  I mean it is auditing risk (the risk management 
practice, according to the context)… it is auditing compliance… Compliance with the IFRS, if 
you like… that is a reasonable expectation from the shareholder.’  In some cases, the 
interviewees were aware of such overlaps and were not able to draw a clear boundary between 
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different objectives. A typical example is interviewee 21: “well…the financial reporting is 
probably a part of compliance… well rather than calling it ‘compliance’… haha… sorry we 
mentioned it several times, but in a different sense now.  It is the routine side of the business, 
such as reviewing financial performance, improving assets, and making sensible decisions of 
capital expenditure… you know… making sure the systems are in place to making sure 
things
29… I mean… when I use the word ‘compliance’ here, probably the ‘mechanical things’ 
are a better word rather than ‘compliance’… just to differ it from the compliance in terms of the 
regulations.” As represented by the interview data quoted from interviewee 21 above, there was 
a diverse range of specific tasks performed by the participants in regard to their audit 
committee’s role.  These specific tasks are discussed in the next section.       
(3) Specific tasks performed as an audit committee member30   
When interviewees were asked whether they were assigned any specific responsibilities 
and why, the responses had a common theme of either referring to the delegated duties from the 
board of directors or referring to the audit committee charter (evidenced in 15 interviews with 56 
references).  A typical example was suggested by interviewee 05:  ‘I thought of a particular 
responsibility that I was assigned. … in general terms, most companies’ [audit committees] have 
a charter.  So it is usually in terms of your responsibilities, you know…it’s the responsibility you 
assume as a result of agreeing to the charter...’  
The list displayed in Table 6-3 consists of a diverse range of activities performed by audit 
committee members.  The primary expectation placed on an audit committee is to oversee the 
company’s financial reporting (DeZoort et al, 2002).    Hines (1988) described the role of 
financial reporting as ‘communicating’ a firm’s economic ‘reality’ (p. 251).   Such economic 
reality covers every transaction - every event that has an economic impact on a firm.  It is 
difficult, however, to draw a clear-cut boundary between financial reporting and factors 
contributing to financial reporting, such as auditing, internal control, and risk management, as 
well as the firm’s strategic visions.   
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Table 6-3: Specific tasks performed by the interviewees as audit committee members 






Mediating management and auditors’ relationships  21 206 
Reviewing financial reports for both internal and 
external use 
18 57 
Reviewing and making recommendations on issues 
related to the transition from NZ GAAP to NZ IFRS 
17 108 
Liaising with the external auditors 17 92 
Verifying auditors’ recommendations  12 43 
Monitoring internal control   12 37 
Researching and reporting on accounting and auditing 
issues 
8 10 
Leading and monitoring the internal audit function  6 25 
Reviewing fund raising documents, such as 
prospectuses 
5 14 
Making recommendations on accounting treatment of 
transactions  
4 29 
Reviewing publicly disclosed information  4 10 
Meeting compliance requirements of financing and 
investing activities  
4 8 
Recruiting auditors 3 42 
Seeking external independent advice  3 14 
Implementing and supervising internal control practices 
in certain areas 
2 31 
Recruiting and supervising the CFO 2 11 
Monitoring financial performance indicators   1 1 
Establishing formal internal audit functions  1 1 
Participating in strategic settings and reviews  1 1 
Developing the business model according to the 
corporate strategy 
1 1 






Preparing for audit committee meetings  21 272 
Contributing to the audit committee meeting agenda 19 66 
Chairing the audit committee 17 231 
Confirming and following up issues on meeting minutes 17 33 
Initiating and finalising the audit (committee) charter   5 15 
Participating in formal audit committee performance 




When describing these tasks, it was evident that some interviewees blurred the 
boundaries between acting as an audit committee member and acting as the only financial or 
accounting expert on the board.  For example, developing the business strategy model, or 
recruiting and supervising the CFO, were not regarded as the duties of the audit committee 
(DeZoort et al, 2002).   Furthermore, carrying out these tasks may undermine the objectivity of 
audit committee members, who were being held accountable for these tasks and for overseeing 
the financial reporting simultaneously.   As discussed previously, the interviewees constructed 
the meaning of the audit committees’ general objectives as a function of ‘overseeing’ or 
‘watching over’ either management or auditors.  But in discussing their specific tasks, some 
interviewees seem to be not only overseeing, but also getting directly involved in performing the 
tasks.  The researcher argues that all audit committee members are wearing two hats: (1) 
primarily they are corporate directors, responsible for the overall wellbeing of their firms, 
whereas (2) they are audit committee members delegated by the board to oversee management or 
auditors.  These two roles are not mutually exclusive.  Some interviewees were struggling to 
adjust between these two roles.  Interviewee 16 suggested:  “One of the difficulties with some of 
our directors is that I don’t think they realise the purpose of an audit committee.   Yes?  And that 
is… (long pause) so because of that reason, I have to be quite strong in some situations to say, 
‘This is an audit committee meeting, this is not a meeting for the board!’”   
A different way of viewing the audit committee members’ activities is to divide the list in 
Table 6-3 into two groups, the first of which contains tasks that may be regarded as duties 
delegated by the board of directors.  The second group of activities comprises audit committee 
formalities.  It can be argued that the board-delegated tasks are duties of the board with or 
without an audit committee, whereas the committee formalities merely formalise the 
performance of the delegated tasks, or make the performance of the delegated tasks more visible 
by documenting them in an audit committee meeting agenda and/or minutes.    
(4) Factors that help most in performing audit committee tasks31 
A common theme emerged when the interviewees were asked to describe what had 
helped them the most in achieving the desired audit committee objectives.  Nineteen of the 
twenty-one interviewees stated that either their background or their experience helped them the 
most.  ‘Experience’ and ‘background’ was perceived in different ways by the interviewees, 
however, they all reflected a general theme that what happened before in their lives, helped 
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them most in performing their audit committees’ tasks.  In many cases, the meanings of 
‘experience’ and ‘background’ are the same.   Table 6-4 summarises the coding of experiences 
and background.    
Table 6-4: Backgrounds and experience that helped the interviewees the most in 
performing their audit committee tasks 











“I’ve been a company director since 
1976… I found that because of the 
experience, you are very alert of… what 
needs to be done.  You pick up issues very 
quickly.” 
Being a chartered 
accountant  
17 36 
Interviewee 08:  
“I guess it is part of my professional 
background.  And not that I was there for 
an audit practitioner, but nonetheless, 
having been in the public practice for a 
long time and having gone practising in a 
whole wide range of industries, that 
coupled with my board experience, which 
is now twenty plus years 
probably…yeah… with various 
companies.  I think it is just the 
experience.” 
Being a corporate 
director  
14 33 
Interviewee 11:  
“The fact is that I had quite a lot of 
experience in the practicality of the 
company directorships.  So perhaps I 
understand the director’s responsibility 
probably a little bit more fully than some 
of the newer directors.” 





“…because I chair six audit committees. 
You might find, for example, there is a 
new piece of legislation out that could 
cause a risk for you.  You get briefed in 
one audit committee for this particular 
thing, and then what you do is, you make 
sure it gets on every others’ agendas.” 
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“The experience with other companies.  
So the fact that I had been on the audit 
committee of company C and D.  I had 
gone through the IFRS transition. And I 
was chairman of a power company that 
they also had gone through the IFRS 
transition…”    




Interviewee 16:  
“From my experience I also know… how 
I would like it to happen within company 
U.   I had good and bad experiences with 
other audit committees so I have been 
trying to make use of that experience to 
make sure that we do things better.” 
Background and 




“I guess it is because… when I was an 
executive, it was vitally important, in my 
view, that we had a very high standard of 
offer documents, for example, the 
prospectus…and that’s what I had as a 
priority, or a focus, when I was the chief 
executive.  And therefore I built up a fair 
amount of expertise in it.”   
 
Being CEO or CFO 2 5 
Interviewee 10:  
“It’s the knowledge and the experience 
that build up the confidence.  Because I 
have been the financial controller and the 
CEO, I know how management think! ” 
  
Being a law 
practitioner  
2 6 
Interviewee 20:  
“Well, I think the legal background helps 
you, because you have an understanding 
of the issues… huh… that are likely to 
arise that will be covered by the audit 
committees… as such, environmental, 
health and safety, human resources… you 
know, the employment practices… that 
sort of things. ” 
Being auditors  2 4 
Interviewee: 05 
“I think the auditing… the understanding 
of numbers and I think the experience 
over years as an auditor, gives you a feel 
of that the auditors are right, or 
(sometimes) the management is right, 
because auditors can be too conservative.”   
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According to the interview data quoted in Table 6-4, interviewees tend to link their past 
experience to their enhanced confidence in making judgements on audit committee related tasks.    
It is noteworthy that 17 out of 21 interviewees discussed their past or current chartered 
accountant status believing that their accounting expertise contributed to their judgement ability 
with respect to audit committee agenda items.  The typical example identified was the transition 
from New Zealand GAAP to IFRS.  
It is noteworthy that the transition from New Zealand GAAP to IFRS was a significant 
one-off incident that took place in New Zealand.  Very little evidence was provided on how the 
accounting expertise had assisted the interviewees in other situations.  This study argues that 
having a chartered accountant on the audit committee merely in compliance with the principles 
of corporate governance best practice, may make only a limited contribution to the effectiveness 
of the audit committee, in contrast to the predictions of many of the qualitative research studies.   
In addition to their experience as qualified accountants, other experiences and 
background, for instance, the experiences of being executives, and the experience with a specific 
industry, were also perceived as contributing to the audit committee’s responsibilities.  This may 
be related to the previous discussion on the diverse range of tasks performed by the participants.  
Furthermore, several interviewees suggested that it is the confidence in making judgements they 
built up over their experiences, rather than the experience or the background per se that assisted 
their performance.  As suggested by interviewee 06: ‘because what you need to know is… all 
information has (a) been correctly recorded; and (b) that there is as little possible avenue for 
making losses whether it is from fraud or incompetence whatever.   Unless you have experience 
in keeping an eye on what is going on from a financial point of view, you just wouldn’t be able 
to satisfy yourself.’ 
The above findings may contribute to the existing body of knowledge on audit 
committees in two ways.   Firstly, it is possible that it is the confidence built up on experience 
that has contributed to the effectiveness of audit committees.  Secondly, the existing audit 
committee literature focuses on measuring members’ level of expertise as holding the certified 
accountant status or equivalent.  This measure might be expanded into the areas of experience of 
general directorship, industry specific experience, or experience of being corporate executives.   
105 
 
(5) Difficulties encountered in performing the audit committee’s tasks32 
Interview question 1.4 is: ‘Have you encountered any difficulties or conflicts in 
achieving your assigned responsibility?  If so, please specify’.   The question is designed to 
obtain an insight into specific situations or events that are important to the interviewees.  As 
discussed in Chapter Two, qualitative research has been trying to establish that audit committee 
performance is associated with members’ independence. This interview question is also related 
to the studies that associate audit committee existence and composition with a firm’s industrial 
context or level of litigious risks.  Without spelling out the issues of ‘independence’ or ‘risks’ in 
this interview question, it is expected that interviewees would give examples of difficulties or 
stand-offs between different parties caused by, for example, conflicts of interest, or the pressure 
of increased regulatory requirements.     
The interview data revealed several themes relating to the difficulties perceived by the 
audit committee members.  See Table 6-5. 
Table 6-5: Difficulties perceived by the interviewees  










“No I haven’t.  I always have the fullest co-
operation from everybody, including our 






“Haha… Difficulties? (pause)  There are 
always difficulties! (Strongly emphasising)  
You know, the matters you are dealing with 
are normally quite complex.  Ah… well… It 
took a lot more understanding than debates.  
You know we partially got it by legal 
advice… and also the auditors’ (advice) as 
well.  But you know… it’s just… you need 
to make sure that what we are doing is 
right.”   
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“… there were some treatments of 
provisions or accruals in our business that 
are always very messy.  For instance, what 
the current status of our harbour is and how 
much work needs to be done, how much 
needs to be taken into account, and what the 
appropriate treatment, etc.  And those 
changed during the last few years as well as 
the accounting standards have changed, in 
particular the IFRS.”   
 
Interviewee 14:  
“Yes! I think some of the… what is the 
number… I think IAS41, accounting for 
forest or growing crops.  It is nonsense!  I 
think it is silly.  And we have to comply 
with it.   And if you comply, I don’t think it 
gives a true and fair view.   So that is a 
difficulty.”   
Not being supported 
by management 
3 51 
Interviewee 03:  
“The CEO and the CFO were promoting 
aggressively a particular outcome, a 
particular proposal that they believed the 
(IFRS) transition number needed to be.  And 
I felt that information in relation to the 
transition number and the methodology that 
we were getting from the management was 
incomplete in terms of the total information.  
And there was bias to reflect the outcome 
that they were looking for.”  
Finding an external 
auditor 
1 6 
Interviewee 01:  
“Actually, I tell you one thing that was 
difficult was actually getting an auditor.  
People are so scared of auditing now.  The 
medium sized companies (audit firms) do 
not want to do it.  The big companies have a 
rating system, and we are not ranked on it.  
We didn’t come out.  So it is quite hard to 
get, or to find the external auditors.”   
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Lack of experience in 




“I don’t know whether we are an efficient 
audit committee or not, because I don’t have 
the visibility of another one.   You know… 
from that point of view… it would be really 
good to have a benchmark… you know what 
I mean?   I’ve always been having this 
question in my mind, are we doing the right 
thing?  Are we effective?   I think we are 
doing our best, but I also think with the right 





“Well…. I’ve got two different examples to 
compare.  And it is the ability of the CFO.   
One of the CFOs that I am working with 
hasn’t really had much experience as a CFO, 
so he is relying on me an awful lot ...”  
Balancing the role of 
audit committee 
chairman and a normal 
director 
1 3 
Interviewee 16:  
“Because what you get together, we 
always… well everybody joins in by 
phone… if they are not here in Wellington at 
the time.  Hum… and sometimes the 
boundary of what the audit committee 
should be dealing with and discussing, and 
what the full board should be dealing was… 
huh… a little bit blurred. I think it shoots 
home more to me than to other directors, 
because of my role as the chair of the audit 
committee.  I take it quite seriously.” 
 
Based on the research findings of the quantitative audit committee literature, it was 
expected that interviewees would discuss their difficulties in dealing with management and/or 
the pressure caused by increased regulatory requirements.  The examples provided in Table 6-5, 
interviewee data obtained from this research, not only provided qualitative empirical evidence 
on the previous research findings, but also revealed new insight on how audit committee 
members perceived certain situations and events where they experienced significant difficulties.   
Firstly, the interview data supported the expectations that interviewees were likely to 
encounter stand-offs with the management if they are acting ‘independently’.  This has been 
reflected by the example quoted from interviewee 03 in Table 6-5.   The incident discussed by 
interviewee 03 is of a significant nature.  The interviewee continued to describe the situation in 
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great detail.  As a result, altogether 14 references (clusters of text) in this particular interview 
were coded under the node of ‘difficulties encountered when serving on the audit committee’.   
Even when the situation was eventually resolved at the board level, the interviewee still felt 
pressure from the management, he said: ‘And they (management) almost, I think, convinced him 
(chairman of the board) that their position was defensible and correct, and so it made it quite a 
(huh)… more difficult process for the audit committee recommendation to be approved at the 
board level, especially with, you know, the management sitting around the board table saying 
that ‘we don’t agree with that!’.  From this perspective, the existence of an audit committee as a 
mechanism independent to the management, and by function separated from the entire board 
plays an important role in assuring financial reporting integrity.  In addition to this particular 
incident, interviewee 06 discussed his experience of recommending the board to establish a 
formal internal audit function in the company which was opposed by the managing director.  
Interviewee 18 revealed an incident that the internal auditor brought up an issue on an audit 
committee meeting without discussing it with management prior to the meeting.  Therefore 
management were ‘offended’.  Immediate mediation was required by the audit committee.   
Secondly, the perceived difficulties of audit committees’ tasks are related to the litigious 
environment of the industries in which their firms operate.   Firms with high litigious risk tended 
to emphasise more formal corporate governance settings, including audit committees 
(Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins & LaFond, 2006b).  This is also reflected in the interview data of this 
research discussing the audit committee’s difficulties as ‘understanding the complex business 
activities’ or ‘resolving the complex technical accounting issues’ in Table 6-5.  Under these 
circumstances, regulatory requirements or the accounting standards are perceived by the 
interviewees as difficult or in conflict.  
Thirdly, in relation to the increased litigious pressure associated with listed companies, 
audit committee members face new challenges which have not been discussed by the existing 
audit committee research studies.  Interviewee 01 described his difficulties in finding an auditor 
after the company experienced financial difficulties accompanied by the increased regulatory 
requirement for listed companies.  Interviewee 09 discussed that inexperienced executives 
became a burden to the audit committee.   Interviewees 12 and 16 both served on newly listed 
companies, and they both faced the challenges of managing newly formed audit committees.   
In summary, although the difficulties experienced by the audit committee members to a 
certain extent fulfilled the expectation that they would confront the management if necessary, the 
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litigious environment also played an important role in the challenges faced by the audit 
committee members as predicted.  However, the difficulties, conflicts, or challenges were most 
importantly related to their specific firms.  The nature of the incidences perceived as difficult by 
the interviewees were of a diverse range.  Given the above, coupled with a broad range of 
activities performed by the audit committees, assessing the audit committees’ performance is not 
simple.     
(6) Assessing audit committee performance33  
During the interview, participants were asked to score their performance and explain why 
they chose a specific score.  The rating is not intended to measure the member’s performance, 
but as an initiator of further conversation.  The key intention of the question is to identify how 
interviewees justify the evaluation of their performance.  Existing audit committee research 
studies suggested that an audit committee oversees firms’ financial reporting and auditing 
processes, as well as the practices of internal control and risk management (DeZoort et al, 2002).  
Such responsibilities, however, reflect public expectations rather than being a matter of fact 
(Beasley, Branson, & Hancock, 2008).  This interview question is designed to obtain an insight 
into how audit committee members perceive their duties and to what extent they believe they 
have fulfilled their duties.   
The interview data obtained from the research revealed that participants adopted three 
benchmarks to assess their performance: (1) providing assurance to the board; (2) improving 
their firms’ practices; and (3) comparing to other companies.  Most participants also suggested 
that there is room to improve in their audit committees.  A summary of the interview data is 
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to the board 
13 25 
Interviewee 10: 
“There is no issue that we are not able to sell 
to the board.  You know…we have no 
authority to make any decision except for at 
the board level.  We make good 
recommendations to the board.   And I cannot 
think of any recommendation from the audit 
committee that has been overturned by the 
full board.  And although there are some 
minor issues with the external auditors, the 
relationship is good.  There are healthy 




Interviewee 02:  
“So we changed all those since I came in and 
there were a number of problems at the start, 
which we worked hard to get them fixed 
within a very short space of time, employing 
the current chief financial officer and getting 
it done.  Then we had no more problems in 
the most recent five years.  The pilfering and 
the write-offs (of the retail store inventories) 
that we used to do was many millions of 
dollars with staff ripping us off, and burglars 
or thieves coming in and stealing things.  
That percentage is tiny now.”   




Interviewee 09:  
“But what actually worries me and scares me 
is that we do have some audit committees 
who are chaired by people that don’t have the 
same sort of background that I’ve got…you 
know… in terms of the difficulty; because it 
is an onerous job.  It really is and it is so 
important.  So I think that because of me… I 
think I’ve done well, but also I’ve done … 
they (the responsibilities) have been achieved 
because of the focus of the agendas, the 
support, again of both the other directors and 
the management team.”  
Room to improve 14 23 
Interviewee 17: 
“We are competent.  But we must keep 
continuing to improve in each round of the 
business cycle… to make it better.”   
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The evaluation of their audit committee performance by members was of a more 
qualitative than quantitative nature.  The audit committee outcomes suggested by the existing 
audit committee research studies, for instance, ‘financial reporting quality’ and ‘audit quality’ 
are not directly reflected by the interview data.   As discussed in (1) motivation for serving on 
the audit committee, participants perceived serving on audit committees as either reacting to 
compliance requirements or as a part of their directorship.  They then subsequently assessed 
their performance as providing an assurance to the board on their compliance responsibilities.   
This research study argues that an effective audit committee is influential, rather than 
independent.  Many interviewees described concrete improvements in their organisations that 
they believed their audit committee played a part in achieving.   It was through these 
improvements that the interviewees tended to assess the effectiveness of their audit committees.    
Furthermore, six interviewees benchmarked the performance of audit committees against 
their experience or observations of the audit committees of other organisations.  This reflected 
their perception that their past experience contributed to enhancing their confidence in audit 
committee related judgement.   
In summarising the first interview category, participants perceived their motivation for 
serving on the audit committees as a satisfaction to regulatory requirements and a fulfilment of 
their directors’ duties.  An audit committee was perceived as, on behalf of the board, overseeing 
firms’ financial reporting, internal control, risk management, auditing related matters, and 
compliance.  A diverse range of activities was identified as audit committee tasks by the 
interviewees.  However when discussing these tasks, interviewees blurred the boundary between 
acting as an audit committee member or acting as a director.  Past experience or background was 
perceived as a dominant factor that helped the interviewees in performing their audit committee 
responsibilities, because the experience enhanced their confidence in making significant 
judgements.   A firm’s compliance and litigious environment posed significant challenges for 
interviewees.  Finally, interviewees tended to assess their performance by evaluating the 
assurance they provided to the board, the improvement they made and benchmarking their 
performance to other audit committees.   In the next section, interview data on audit committee 
operations are discussed to interpret the processes of audit committee meetings as well as outside 
audit committee meetings.   
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6.2.2 Perceived audit committee operations 
In this section, an insight into audit committee meetings is discussed, focussing on the 
features of audit committee meetings perceived by the participants, the process of resolving 
issues in audit committee meetings, and the tasks performed by members outside audit 
committees’ meetings. 
(1) Features of audit committee meetings34  
Node 2.0 ‘General sense of audit committee meetings’ in Table 5-1 was created during 
the process of analysing the interview responses to summarise the following themes relating to 
some general features of audit committee meetings described by the interviewees.  These themes 
are illustrated in Table 6-7.  
Table 6-7: Features of audit committee (AC) meetings  






AC meetings are 
driven by the agenda  
21 153 
Interview 04: 
“The agenda… is very clear.  We set it.  I agree 
on the agenda as chair.  The agenda has a very 
set format.  And all of the committees I am on, 
the formats are the same.”     
AC meetings have 
formal settings 
17 90 
Interviewee 20:  
“The process is like most of the formal… 
committee meetings.  The issues are tabled in 
the agenda. We discuss them and debate them.  
And then we resolve them by consensus… 
yeah… all by consensus.  We also keep the 
minutes.”   
All participants of 
the AC meetings are 
well-informed 
before the meetings, 
so there is no 
surprise during the 
meeting 
16 74 
Interviewee 02:  
“Okay, the resolving of the issues doesn’t start 
at the audit committee meeting.  It is inevitably 
starting before that.  The topics that are going 
to be discussed or issues that are going to be 
resolved were well known, or reasonably well 
known in advance.” 
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AC meetings are 
usually scheduled 




“We hold our audit committee meetings 
completely separate to our board meetings. 
Hum… four times a year generally.  Often on 
the day before our board meetings.  There is a 
formal agenda to go through, and the formal 
minute from the previous meeting.”    
The interview data summarised in Table 6-7 demonstrate that the participants perceive 
the formal features of audit committee meetings as being important to them.  The audit 
committee meetings were perceived as a formal channel to document the committees’ works 
which were subsequently reported to the board.  This finding is in line with the existing audit 
committee studies that the audit committee meeting is a long standing institutionalised practice 
(Turley & Zaman, 2007).   
Although 12 interviewees on 43 occasions (see Table 5-2) mentioned debating issues 
during the audit committee meetings, it is noteworthy that several interviewees emphasised that 
it was important that all issues to be discussed during the meeting must be well circulated to all 
participants before the meeting.  In addition to the transcript quoted from Interview 02 in Table 
6-7, two other examples are worth mentioning.  
Interviewee 15, an audit committee chairman suggested: ‘I will always let them (the 
participants) know the issues that I am going to raise.  So they know what is coming, and they 
can prepare for it, rather than ambush the meeting… when you want to achieve anything, 
alright?’      
Interviewee 18 mentioned a specific incident when the internal auditors brought to the 
audit committee meeting an issue which had not been well circulated before the meeting.  He 
said: ‘the other day, the internal auditor looked at a new computer system that we have been 
putting in.  …he made a comment about it during the meeting, but that caused an eruption 
because it wasn’t discussed with the executives but brought it straight to the audit committee 
(meeting).  You know… I had several phone calls after the meeting.   I’m not sure how much 
time I spent just to find out and to follow up about where it got to.  Well they (the management) 
got offended because he (the internal auditor) didn’t consult their opinion first.’ 
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Interview evidence suggests that the audit committee meetings per se are not intended by 
the participants for ‘debating’ and ‘resolving’ issues, but to document (formally finalise) the 
resolution which then is recommended to the board.  The true process of debating and resolving 
happened outside the meetings.  Furthermore, it is noteworthy that interviewees described the 
general atmosphere differently.  Several interviewees emphasised that the meetings were formal 
and there were ‘robust debates’ during the meeting, but three interviewees specifically described 
the atmosphere of audit committee meetings as relaxed.  Interviewee 10 said: ‘It’s only three of 
us you know… it’s very amicable.  In fact it’s almost… probably because of that. It’s almost 
light-hearted.  Huh… not to say that it is not serious, but the way we go about it is… you know... 
there are jokes on the meetings… yeah… it’s a sort of fun meeting.’  It seemed that the sense of 
seriousness and the relaxed atmosphere of the audit committee meetings are contradictory.  But 
both of them reflected the level of comfort in attending the audit committee meetings.  
Nevertheless, the participants had already prepared and anticipated the outcome of the meeting.  
The meeting process would finalise their work, either in a sense of seriousness or in a relaxed 
atmosphere that they felt comfortable with.   In the next section, how issues are ‘resolved’ during 
the audit committee meetings is discussed.  
(2) Processes of resolving issues in the audit committee meetings35  
Based on the interpretation of interview data in the previous section, although the 
participants mentioned that debate took place during the audit committee meetings, the issues 
that were debated had been well circulated and well prepared before the meetings.  Therefore the 
formal meetings’ process is to formalise and document the resolutions.   How are those 
resolutions finalised?  
Firstly, the interviewees, in several instances, explained their role as providing an 
opportunity for different parties to voice their opinions.  Furthermore, it is perceived as 
important for the meetings to achieve a balanced and unanimous view.   An example of this, that 
was described by interviewee 03, related to a finance company which was involved in providing 
for the impairment of an investment, with the management taking a very different stance from 
the external auditor: ‘… you have the auditors, you have the management, of course, and you 
have the shareholders… (shaking his head) so it was interesting.’  A number of interviewees 
strongly rejected a show-of-hands (voting) approach for resolving issues during audit committee 
meetings. Obtaining unanimous agreement on specific issues was of great importance to 
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 Node No.2.1 in Table 5-1. 
115 
 
interviewees. If there was disagreement, the only acceptable solution was to seek more 
information and to keep the issue on the committee meeting agenda, until a consensus-based 
agreement could be reached
36. A chairman explained: ‘Because we are all sensible people, if we 
all understand the same set of facts, and we apply the same logic to those facts, we come up with 
(the) same answer.’    
Secondly, interview evidence suggested that issues resolved during audit committee 
meetings are usually related to public disclosure.  In other words, audit committee meetings are 
utilised by the directors to assure the information that is to be disclosed to the public.  The 
participants of this research were asked to describe an audit committee meeting, either the last 
one they attended or an unscheduled meeting.  20 out of 21 interviewees chose to describe a 
common scheduled meeting.   Several interviewees described the scheduled meetings as 
‘routine’,  having an agenda with a ‘set format’.   Seven suggested that audit committee meetings 
were related to information to be publicly disclosed rather than to focus on auditing and 
accounting issues. 
 Interviewee 02 said: ‘There were two scheduled meetings we have every year.  Sometimes 
we had two, three, four or five.  Probably five would be the most of the scheduled meetings.  
There are always two scheduled meetings before the release of the half year and annual 
results.’   He then specifically clarified that it was before the release of the results, rather than 
before the approval of the audited accounts. 
 Interviewee 10 shared with the researcher the agenda of the last audit committee meeting he 
attended, saying: ‘we edited those (pointing at the agenda item ‘press release and 
announcement’)… you know.  As you can see the last item in this section was about the 
‘insiders trading’… the Securities Exchange’s new insider trading law.  We were 
acknowledging it and dealing with the press release at the end of the year on this issue.’  
 Interviewee 20 said: ‘the key audit committee meeting papers include the details of the 
provisions and accruals… those accounts sort of stuff… the press release draft, and the NZX 
release in terms of all the financials, dividends recommendation that we…huh… that was 
proposed by the management but for us to approve.’      
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 14 out of 21 interviewees discussed the process of achieving consensus during the audit committee meetings. 
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Interviewee 04 described a special unscheduled audit committee meeting, because he 
believed that that meeting was ‘interesting’.   The event that triggered this unscheduled meeting 
is that one of his fellow directors sold shares under circumstances that were prohibited under the 
insider trading regulations.  He said, ‘The director sold some shares when he shouldn’t have.  
We had a significant risk… a risk around the fact that there was insider trading and it is in 
breach of the Securities Act for that sort of stuff.  So the audit committee acted very quickly 
when they found out that the director sold the shares.  We called the audit committee meeting, 
smacked the director over the hand for being a naughty boy, and wrote to the Stock Exchange 
and the Securities Commission clearing what happened.  It was a mistake, da-la-da-la… so that 
was it.  Well, a lot of discussions about what the director has done and why. … what happened 
was we needed to deal with the Stock Exchange and the Securities Commission immediately.  
So we did.  They (the authorities) both came back.  They said that’s fine.  There was no 
problem.’   
The evidence suggested that audit committee meetings played an important role in the 
information presented by the firm to the public including the related authorities.  Prior to the 
information being released to the public, directors utilise the audit committee to achieve a 
common agreement and a level of comfort on the quality of information.  
Thirdly, eight interviewees specifically suggested that their audit committees had a 
private meeting with the auditors.  For instance, interviewee 16 described: ‘The second part of 
the meeting was the auditors talked through their process, at that stage, it was established that 
they are going to give us an unqualified opinion.  Then we talked about that.  Then we asked the 
executive directors and the finance staff to leave.  Then we had a session of independent 
directors and the audit partner on his own.  There were a couple of points he raised in that forum, 
but nothing new really.  Then we sent the auditor, he left.’  The other six interviewees were of a 
similar impression.  Although a formal session was set aside for the audit committee and 
auditors to meet privately without the management present, very few suggested that any specific 
issues raised in these sessions were remarkable.  Such private meeting sessions, as a gesture to 
the public or to the management, are perceived as important for the participants, but audit 
committee members do not utilise it as a channel of communication.   
In summary, the interview evidence from this research supported the claim by Spira 
(1998; 2005) that audit committee meetings are of a ceremonial nature.  They are to finalise and 
formalise resolutions during the meetings, but the process of assessing the situation and reaching 
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an agreement on the issues is usually achieved before the meetings.  Audit committee meetings 
are utilised as an important mechanism for members to reach a level of assurance on the quality 
of information externally disclosed.   Given the above, processes outside the audit committee 
meetings assume importance.  These informal processes will be discussed in the next section.  
(3) The tasks performed by members outside audit committee meetings 37  
As discussed previously, it is expected that a large amount of audit committee tasks are 
performed outside formal audit committee meetings.  The interview data confirmed this 
expectation.  All interviewees claimed that the time they spent on working outside audit 
committee meetings outweighed the time they spent attending the audit committee meetings.  
However, the workload outside the audit committees was perceived as unevenly divided 
between audit committee chairpersons and the ordinary audit committee members.   Both the 
tasks performed by the audit committee chairpersons and the time they spent on those tasks are 
significantly more that the tasks performed by the ordinary audit committee members.   
Interviewee 10 chaired two audit committees, and served on another audit committee but not as 
the chairperson.  She described the uneven difference in the amount of work between the 
chairperson and an ordinary member as: ‘varies enormously!  As I said, this audit committee 
(where she is just a member) is the simplest one.  I’ve got one that I am the chair of, and I would 
spend… because we have so many issues, shareholders’ issues, IFRS issues, and God knows 
what.  I would spend… at least 200 hours a year on it!’  Interviewee 03 suggested that the 
workload for chairpersons working outside meetings was four or five times that of a normal 
member.  
The tasks performed by ordinary audit committee members outside audit committee 
meetings were perceived as focusing on two areas: (1) reading audit committee meeting papers, 
and (2) research or study on issues to be discussed during the audit committee meetings.  For 
instance, interviewee 13 said: “there is always reading and reviewing the minutes and stuff 
before we are going to the meeting… Huh… just refreshing your memory and knowledge.”  The 
interviewees also suggested that an ordinary audit committee member did not work with other 
people.  All the liaisons fell on the shoulders of the audit committee chairperson.      
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Among the 21 interviewees, there were 17 audit committee chairpersons and  four 
ordinary audit committee members.   The following discussion focuses on the interview 
responses given by the 17 audit committee chairpersons.     
On one hand, audit committee chairpersons are in charge of feeding the information to 
the committee meetings.  Two interviewees suggested that they personally prepare the meeting 
agenda and the other interviewees had assistant personnel physically preparing the meeting 
agenda and supporting papers.  But all of the audit committee chairpersons agreed that they were 
responsible for the meeting agendas and supporting papers.   Such responsibilities involve 
studying or researching, and sometimes even seeking independent opinions on specific issues.  
As described by interviewee 03: ‘The expectation is that the information that is going to be 
required by the audit committee is driven by the chairman to achieve, to make sure that the 
information is to come through, and it is the appropriate information.  And the follow-ups… If 
there are concerns or there is further information that a particular member wants, and also, 
queries from the board to the audit committee, will go through the chairman.’ 
All of the audit committee chairpersons interviewed believed that they were relied upon 
by the other audit committee members.   Therefore, they perceived that the preparation before 
the audit committee meetings was very important for them in order to fulfil this expectation.  
Interviewee 10 said: ‘Because you’ve got to go into the meeting prepared.  I mean, that’s the key 
expectation.  There is no… absolutely no point of being a director or an audit committee 
member that does not go to the meetings prepared!  I take the responsibility both as chair, either 
I am a chairman or simply because of my (accounting) background… Yes, I know it is a joint 
responsibility, but I know the others are looking to me… ’ 
One may challenge that if the audit committee chairperson is in charge of feeding the 
information into committee meetings, the chairperson may dominantly decide on the scope and 
the content of the information.  In this regard, two interviewees specifically suggested that the 
preparation of audit committee meetings by the chairman should be only up to an appropriate 
extent.  No ‘decisions’ should be made outside audit committee meetings, but all the resolutions 
should be done within the formal meeting.  Interviewee 16 emphasised that: ‘This is a key issue!  
The chairman should approve the agenda.  But I don’t think the chairman should read the 
(supporting) papers before it is sent out.  I think the chairman should get the papers at the same 
time as everyone else.’  The meeting would be perceived as: ‘the discussion about if the 
information (in the supporting paper) is satisfactory, do we agree with it?  If not, why not?  Then 
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the discussion should be documented in the minutes’.   Interviewee 14 supported such an idea 
and believed that it would be ‘dangerous’ for the audit committee chairman to make decisions on 
agenda items outside the audit committee meetings.   
Given the above, the interview evidence suggested that a large amount of audit 
committee meeting preparation work falls on the shoulders of audit committee chairpersons.  
Interviewees perceived that the chairpersons assumed the expectation of driving the meeting 
agenda and collecting the supporting information.   Agenda items were perceived as well 
circulated prior to the meeting. Then when members arrived at the meeting, there would be no 
surprising new information raised.  The debate, consensus and meeting documentations were 
also perceived to be important to audit committee members. Because the meeting agenda and 
information were well read by the audit committee meeting attendees, the debates which took 
place during the audit committee meetings were substantially assessing the quality of the 
information, based on which the consensus opinion would be formed.  Audit committee 
members sought a level of assurance through the consensus opinions agreed and documented in 
meetings.   
  Audit committees are not expected to assume executive power, but rather to oversee 
management and auditors.  In the next section, the relationships between audit committees and 
the board of directors, the auditors, and the management will be discussed.  
6.2.3 Relationships with audit committee stakeholders  
Topic three of the interview questionnaire investigates the relationship between audit 
committee members and other parties who work with them, namely the management, the 
internal auditors, external auditors, and the board of directors.  In contrast to topic two, which 
focuses on the audit committee meetings as routine activities, topic three aims to obtain an 
account of specific occurrences, which involve stand-offs, conflicts, or difficulties in performing 
the audit committee’s role.     
Topic three also aims to provide an insight into audit committee activities.  The questions 
request the interviewee to describe a complete occurrence of interacting with the aforementioned 
parties, with sufficient contextual information.  The interviewee’s responses are expected to 
reveal how an audit committee member perceived what had happened on those occasions, the 
reason(s) for what had happened and why they did certain things to resolve the issue.   
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(1) Reporting to the board of directors38 
Research participants were asked to describe the process of their audit committees 
reporting to the board of directors.   Interviewee 10 claimed that she believed the board of 
directors is the only stakeholder of audit committees.  This suggests that reporting to the board is 
perceived as an important process of audit committees. 
Twenty out of twenty-one interviewees firmly stated that all the recommendations made 
by their audit committees were accepted by the board.  The process of reporting was described in 
detail by interviewee 02: “When we finalised it (the audit committee meeting), we passed a 
resolution that we would recommend to the board that they proceed to adopt the accounts and to 
proceed with the release, and approve the dividend of whatever rate we approved.  And then we 
concluded the meeting and we signed off the minutes of the previous meeting…then the 
recommendations were accepted totally and the key recommendations are that they (the board of 
directors) sign the financial statements, they make a release to the stock exchange, and they 
agree to pay dividends at a certain rate, those sorts of things.”   As mentioned previously, audit 
committee meetings were perceived to be commonly scheduled immediately prior to the board 
meetings.  Interviewee 15 also suggested that the minutes of audit committee meetings usually 
formed an agenda item of the subsequent board meetings.  Based on the above, audit 
committees’ reporting to the board forms another ceremonial formal setting of corporate 
governance.   Such evidence is also reflected in the description provided by interviewee 18, he 
said: “Only at the next board meeting.  So it goes from the audit committee to the next board 
meeting.   And in the next board meeting, there is a time set aside for the audit committee report.   
And it takes as long as it takes, you know?  It is treated seriously.  You know?  It was given 
whatever time is required to work through the issues.  So it is done thoroughly at the subsequent 
board meeting.”   Interview evidence suggested that audit committee members assumed their 
responsibilities based on the delegation from the board, and then the members perceived 
reporting to the board as the conclusion of their delegated responsibilities.  
Interviewee 17 described a particular incident when the recommendation made by his 
audit committee was overturned by the board.   He said: ‘look, I’m not all comfortable with this.  
But in that company, they asked the audit committee to have a look at the year end result, and 
make a recommendation on what the dividend should be.   And twice now, the board has 
rejected our recommendations on dividend, which is quite important you know.   We just had 
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to… huh… it is a little bit frustrating for me when that happens, because if that is the case, they 
really shouldn’t ask us to recommend.   This happened the last two times that after we 
recommended the dividend, they changed it in the board meeting.  So that’s the example.   It 
frustrates me if they do that, because they do that less than the objective reasons of the company, 
in my point of view, but for the perceptions of the company… you know… all those sort of 
things.    I think that you should set your dividends to distribute your profit, for goodness sake.  
You should have a good firm base for why you should do that, you know.   It is really about 
what is projection in the future, what do you need to retain in the firm to go where you want to 
go.   It is not about how we should keep this group of shareholders wonderfully happy right now.   
But the board had drawn on the second thing, you know.  So they all felt good.    They changed 
the recommendations twice, once for the interim dividend, and once for the final dividend.    So 
last year it happened twice.”   During the process of interviewing, the researcher sensed that the 
interviewee became emotional as his description continued.  He finally concluded that: “I don’t 
think it is the audit committee’s responsibility.  The dividend should be a board decision!”   
The preceding interview evidence suggests that recommendations made by the audit 
committees were expected without exception to be accepted by the board.  As emphasised by 
interviewee 20: “We make recommendations all the time.  That was basically what the audit 
committee was doing… so the recommendations we make are all accepted by the board.” It 
seemed to him that all recommendations should be naturally accepted by the board.   
Several interviewees explained their confidence in this regard.  Firstly, five interviewees 
suggested that the board of directors were well informed on the audit committee matters and 
when they report to the board, there was no surprise, Interviewee 03 said: “They (the board 
members) are likely, even though they haven’t been on the audit committee, to be kept 
reasonably well informed and their views were well thought of by the chairman of the audit 
committee to be taken into account in case they have a particular stance or particular concern 
about it.  That can be addressed in the audit committee meeting, rather than waiting until the 
recommendation comes up to the board.”  Once again, the theme of ‘no surprise’ and ‘well 
informed beforehand’ appeared.  Interview evidence implies that the substantial content-based 
debate has taken place behind the scenes, during the board meetings, the reporting from the audit 
committee chairperson is of a ceremonial nature.  Such a reporting process was perceived as 
finalisation or documentation rather than solving issues.   
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 Secondly, audit committee members perceived their positions on the board to represent a 
certain level of authority, interviewee 04 claimed that: “There is discussion (when the audit 
committee is reporting to the board), but they (the board) always accept it (the 
recommendations).  And the reason for that is very simple.   That is three or four of the older and 
more experienced board members sit on the audit committee.  So when they sit on the board, we 
got three or four out of six saying we should do this, the others are not going to argue.”  Such 
evidence suggested that having competent members serving on the audit committee not only 
provided a level of confidence for the board to rely on their judgement, but also demonstrated to 
the board meeting attendees, especially the management, a level of authority of the audit 
committees.    
The interview data obtained from this research for the first time revealed an insight into 
how audit committees report to the board.  Several findings can be discussed here.  Firstly, audit 
committees report to the board on their delegated duties.  The recommendations made by the 
audit committees were perceived to be naturally accepted by the board without any exception 
because of the competence and the authority demonstrated by the audit committee members.  
Furthermore, the audit committee members were not prepared to accept any responsibility if the 
board turned down their recommendations.  The authority demonstrated by the audit committees 
to the other parties was perceived to be important to the participants.  In the next section, the 
audit committee’s mediating of the management-external audit relationship will be discussed in 
detail.   
(2) Mediating between the external auditors and management39 
Qualitative research has hypothesised that the presence, independence, financial 
expertise, and diligence of audit committees are associated with higher quality financial 
reporting or auditing (Turley & Zaman, 2004).  Question 3.2 asks the interviewee to describe a 
specific occasion when the audit committee needed to work between the management and the 
external auditors to resolve an issue or conflict.   The interview data suggested that the 
participants perceived that in very rare cases the external auditors’ opinion was not followed by 
the management.  The interview data are summarised in Table 6-8. 
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Table 6-8: Mediating the relationship between the external auditors and the management  
Have the 
recommendations by the 
external auditors been 








“Yes, we are very conservative.” 
Interviewee 06:  
“In particular, our current auditors from (name 
suppressed), they are very, very good.  They almost 
invariably iron the things out with the chief financial 
officer well before the audit committee meeting even 
so yeah, I’m pretty happy with that.”  
Yes, but robust debates took 
place during the audit 
committee meeting 
4 
Interviewee 07:  
“I think the answer to that is “Yes.”   The external 
auditors, I guess, carried more weight than internal 
auditor did in the management’s views.  That is not to 
say they won’t have any vigorous debate with them 
when they are suggesting things.  But there is a very 
good relationship between the external auditors and the 
finance people, CFOs and so on.   They all attempt to 
resolve the different views and they always did.”  
Interviewee 12:  
“We had some debates, as I recall. It is really to test the 
validity of the recommendations that the auditors are 
making.  And you’ve got to make sure that the 
recommendations they made actually make sense.    So 
it is testing and validating what they are 
recommending.  Generally, if they recommend 
something, they have a good reason to recommend it.”    
Yes, but some immaterial 
recommendations on the 
management letter (internal 
control related) required 




“I actually had to go back to them and say that, “Look, 
I appreciate your recommendation.  We can only have 
one accounts person working here.  We have a wee bit 
of a problem…” So we actually resolve it with them 
rather than internally.  We wrote a procedure and say, 
“Will this meet your requirement?” And they say 
“that’s fine, that’s good as gold.”” 
Yes, the audit committee 
required the management to 
form an action plan in 
responding to the auditors’ 
management letter 
2 
Interviewee 08:  
“Goes a little bit further than that, we actually require 
any recommendations that come from the external 
auditor to be put into a bit of an action plan.  You 
know? And the CFO reports on a regular basis as to the 
progress of putting into place those recommendations. 
That actually goes to the main board; (a) the auditors 
recommended it; (b) the management says that they 




recommendations by the 
external auditors been 




The audit committee rules, 
and management must 
follow 
2 
Interviewee 10:  
“We have different views about provisions and 
accruals.  And they… well… the management were 
saying one thing, and the external auditors were saying 
another.  And we (the audit committee) were going to 
make this call and that’s it.   And we recommend it to 
the board and the board then signed it.   It has not 
always been exactly what the external auditors wanted.  
But the management must do whatever the audit 
committee ruled, that’s what happens.” 
 
Interviewee 19: 
“Hum… what happened is I always ask if the 
management’s response (emphasising by tapping the 
desk) has been written after the subjects (raised from 
the management letter).   In other words, we can 
compare the recommendations from the external 
auditor with the response from the management.   But 
the decision of how much will be done or what will be 
done is the audit committee’s decision, not the 
management.  Well… it (the dispute) is possible.  But 
I’m not aware of any….”  
The audit committee urged 
the external auditors to 




“The external auditor says something; technically it is 
correct.  It’s what you’ve got to do.  So the audit 
committee will generally agree with the external 
auditor.  But every now and then, the external auditor 
will want something that is so… huh… what would I 
describe it as?  It is, well, technically correct, but 
makes absolutely no sense at all.    
 
All you’ve got to do is to look at any set of accounts 
for an electricity company.  And look at the eight 
pages of notes that it has around “derivatives” … So I 
went back to the auditor and say here is the eight pages 
of notes, ‘Explain what they mean?  Because I don’t 
understand; nobody else understands them; nobody 
who reads the accounts understands them!’ And I got 
those eight pages of notes down to about two pages of 





recommendations by the 
external auditors been 




Yes, but the audit 
committee member had 
doubts about the 
competence of the external 
auditors  
1 
Interviewee 05:  
“Being in a company that has no comparable industry 
in this country, means that you are often teaching the 
auditors.  That is very frustrating.  The turn-over of 
external auditors is very frustrating, because next year 
you get some audit staff, particularly the junior audit 
staff, who have never seen the way we handle our 
inventories.  You have to teach them about the 
business.  But that would be one of questions… every 
year we have the planning meeting with external 
auditors: “Are we going to have the same people as we 
have last year?”  Meaning: “or are we going to have to 
teach them about our business?””   
As a dominant theme identified in the interview data, most (15 out of 21) audit 
committee members perceived that the external auditors’ recommendations were debated, well 
understood, and followed by the management.  In addition, two interviewees specifically 
discussed that their audit committees exercised the power to urge management to form an action 
plan to follow the auditors’ recommendations.  This can be interpreted that the practices of 
debating recommendations, forming a resolution, and documenting the follow ups have been 
institutionalised as an important process perceived by the audit committee members.  
It is noteworthy that there were two examples quoted in Table 6-8 where the interviewees 
emphasised the audit committee’s authority in mediating the relationship between the 
management and the auditors.  It seems that the interviewees were discussing their general 
principles in approaching this issue.  For them, it did matter whose opinion was valid.  The 
management were expected to respect the audit committee’s authority and follow its ruling.  
Interviewee 10 spelt out that the audit committee’s authority was conferred and supported by the 
board, whereas interviewee 20 did not refer to any real example, but discussed the general 
expectation on the management to obey the audit committees’ decisions.  
Interview responses quoted from participants 04 and 05 are of particular interest to this 
research.  Both interviewees were experienced audit committee members and chartered 
accountants.  They demonstrated a higher level of confidence in dealing with the external 
auditors.  They seemed confident to challenge the competence or validity of the auditors’ stance.  
On one hand, this may be interpreted as a competent audit committee member acting 
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aggressively against the auditor to promote an outcome which he/she believes is for the best 
quality of auditing or financial reporting.  On the other hand, in both cases, the audit committee 
members can be so influential in either making the auditor compromise or ‘teaching’ the 
auditors, it may actually undermine their independent position to oversee the audit function.  
Both incidents were perceived as important by the participants and they regarded their 
behaviours and opinions as justified.  
The audit committees’ mediation between the management and the internal auditors will 
be discussed in the next section. 
(3) Mediating between the internal auditors and management40 
Evidence from this research suggests that many listed companies in New Zealand had not 
formed any formal internal audit function by the time the interviews took place.  In contrast to 
the dominant theme in mediating between the external auditors and the management, where the 
majority of the participants perceived that it was important to respect the external auditors’ 
stance, many interviewees suggested that it was ‘impossible’ to follow all the recommendations 
made by the internal auditors.  Interview responses are summarised in Table 6-9.   
There are several important findings, which can be discussed.  
Among the eight interviewees who suggested there was no formal internal auditing in 
their organisations, three perceived the internal auditing as ‘unnecessary’ due to the scale of the 
business.  The other five interviewees who suggested that there was no internal auditing function 
in their organisation, seemed fully aware that internal auditing as a best practice had been 
promoted by the authorities.  So they continued to describe how their audit committees were 
directly involved in risk management practices and overseeing the management’s internal 
control practices.  It is noteworthy that these five interviewees emphasised that when the internal 
audit function was absent, all the recommendations given by the audit committees were carried 




                                                     
40
 Node No.3.3 in Table 5-1. 
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Table 6-9:  Mediating the relationship between the internal auditors and the management  
Have the recommendations 
by the internal auditors 




The internal auditors 
recommendations are not 100 
percent followed, 
compromises are needed from 




“No, (not always).  The reason is simple.  Internal 
auditors in the companies where we have internal 
auditors, they are coming from a very pure perspective.  
They are saying, “If you follow this, this should 
happen.  This person should sign this.  Then this 
should happen.” Okay?  And they recommend on that 
basis.  Sometimes the management said, “if we do this, 
we will never get anything done.”  It takes far too long 
and it is a far too convoluted process.  We do this 
instead, we think it is sufficient.  And the internal 
auditors usually accept that.”  
No formal internal auditing 
function, but the audit 
committee directly oversees 
the internal control and risk 
management 
5 
Interviewee 08:  
“Well… it’s not… when I talk about internal audit, 
there are some exercises undertaken that an internal 
audit might otherwise do as a part of the check and 
balance system.   But now they (the CEO and staff) are 
doing it themselves.  It is not those external party came 
in with recommendations that need to be followed.  I 
am not aware of anything that has been found that 
hasn’t been actioned.”  
Interviewee 11:  
“At this stage it doesn’t have a specific internal audit 
function.  But the chief financial officer is charged 
with… I suppose… some of things that normally an 
internal auditor will do, but generally those were 
merged with his general duties.  I mean that… any 
recommendations that the CFO made, the audit 
committee endorsed them at the meetings.  There 
would be a very high expectation that the management 
would follow those.”    
Interviewee 16:  
“We don’t have internal audit, but we have something 
like a high level of risk assessment of the business.  
Huh… I wouldn’t call it a process.  That’s being a little 
bit generous… We put a lot of work into that.  We 
spelt that out with quite some detail… in our 
prospectus.  Then we have an action on our CFO to 
update on that.  But at year end, we actually reviewed 
all of that as well.   So that seems fine.” 
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Have the recommendations 
by the internal auditors 




No formal internal auditing 
function, and it does not seem 
necessary  
3 
Interviewee 10:  
“No, we don’t have internal audit.  It’s only a small 
company.  Hum… we are probably close enough… 
well… yeah… close enough to know the accounting 
and control very well…” 
The company is in the 
process of setting up an 
internal audit function as a 




“There’s been a long drawn-out battle to put in place a 
formal internal audit structure, and we are just getting 
there.   Agreements in principle have been reached, and 
it is waiting for the final acceptance by the 
management and implementation.   And that will be 
happening pretty soon.” 
Yes, but I have to make sure 
that the issues are serious 
enough to be raised at audit 
committee level 
1 
Interviewee 15:  
“Sometimes, particularly for internal auditors, big 
things can drift on.  So part of my responsibility would 
be to make sure that things are serious enough to raise 
an issue.  The job of the internal auditors, since they 
have no power within the company… they rely on the 
audit committee… they rely on us to make sure that the 
management team own the problem.   Okay so that’s 
part of the role you have.”  
Yes, but the internal auditors’ 
work is unsatisfactory 
1 
Interviewee 12:  
“Yes. Hahaha… (shaking his head and laughing 
loudly, then long pause and thinking)  The 
recommendations as agreed by the audit committee are 
implemented.  (long pause) I think it is the internal 
auditor’s crap!  Well… I can prove it!  The internal 
auditors have done limited scope of work.  Hum… 
therefore whatever recommendations that have come 
through, have been …you know… have been agreed 
and followed through, but we could have done a whole 
lot more in the internal audit.”  
In contrast, the 10 interviewees who had experience in working with their internal audit 
departments all suggested that both the internal auditors and the management had to compromise 
to reach an agreement, because it was not possible to follow the internal auditors’ 
recommendations ‘100 per cent’.   This evidence is particularly interesting when compared to 
the situation when the internal auditing function is absent in the organisation.  It seemed that 
when there is an internal audit function in the firm, the audit committee’s role is perceived as an 
‘arbitrator’ and its function is mediating between internal auditors and the management.  
Especially as quoted from interviewee 15, the audit committee chairperson tended to assess the 
validity of the internal auditors’ recommendations first.  But when there is no internal audit 
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function, the audit committee’s role is perceived as an ‘authority’ and its function is 
‘supervising” the management.      
 Interviewee 12 was the audit committee chairman of a failed financial company.  During 
the interview, he became sarcastic and angry when talking about the internal auditing in his 
company.  Rather than trying to blame the poor internal auditing on the difficulties faced by his 
company, he referred to the lack of experience of all of the audit committee members.  His 
disappointment in the audit committee itself, the management, and the internal auditors was 
apparent.   He continued: ‘Internal audit for us is actually a hard one, in my point of view.  You 
know… we are a small company.  Having a single person assigned in that area is a cost that the 
company really cannot afford to bear.  So we also had a lot of debate over that area.   We’ve 
been debating having another part time person or something.  But, (emphasising) remember this 
is only a company of fifteen people!”  This evidence is also interesting when compared to the 
quote from interviewee 10 in Table 6-9.  Logically, whether to establish a formal internal 
auditing function is subject to the cost-benefit constraints of a company.  However, being a 
‘small’ company may not be a strong argument from interviewee 12’s point of view, when 
considering the ‘closeness’ emphasised by interviewee 10.   When the audit committee members 
are close to the operation of the company, they seemed comfortable having a hands-on approach 
rather than put reliance on the internal auditing function.  In contrast, in the case of interviewee 
12, who was an independent director, a chartered accountant, and was not intensively involved 
in the company’s operation, his insight into the company could be very limited.  He seemed to 
be putting a certain reliance on the internal auditors to provide the assurance on management 
conduct.    However, the resource constraint faced by his internal auditors, coupled with his own 
lack of confidence in judgement due to lack of audit committee experience, was a source of 
regret to him.  
In summary, audit committee members assumed their delegated responsibilities from the 
board of directors, and they reported to the board as a conclusion to their delegated 
responsibilities.  The reporting process was perceived to be formal and important.  All the 
recommendations from the audit committees to the board of directors were expected to be 
accepted without any exception.   Otherwise the audit committee members would not accept the 
responsibility.  In mediating external auditor and management relationships, the audit committee 
members demonstrated a high level of authority to the management.  In certain circumstances, 
audit committee members with a high level of financial or accounting competence may 
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deliberately influence the external auditors’ practices, contravening the expectation on their 
independent status.  In mediating internal auditor and management relationships, the perceived 
roles of audit committees were different, depending on whether or not there was an internal 
auditing function.   The special case reported for a failed finance company indicates that the 
distance between the independent directors and the daily operations of the company may decide 
the level of reliance the audit committee members place on the internal audit function.   
6.2.4 Perceptions of the audit committee environment  
Topic four of the interview questionnaire is titled ‘perceptions of the audit committee 
environment’.   This topic investigates the audit committee members’ perceptions of events or 
changes associated with audit committees, but not necessarily the committee duties per se.    
(1) The relationship between audit committee members and the management41 
Question 4.1, is: ‘has your relationship with other executives changed since you were 
nominated as an audit committee member?  Please give an example.  What do you think might 
be the reason?’  Interviewees were requested to comment on their relationships with the 
management prior to and after they served on the audit committee.    If any changes in the 
relationships were identified, the interviewees were invited to relate an account of how they 
sensed that the relationships had changed and explain the reasons that they believed triggered 
such changes.    Furthermore, the expected findings from this interview question are not the 
change in relationship per se, but how the participants perceived it, and how they explained such 
changes.   
Only two interviewees claimed that they sensed substantial changes in their relationship 
with the management since they served on the audit committee, or became audit committee 
chairperson.   
Interviewee 03 said: ‘my general comment would be that there isn’t usually a change in 
the relationship with the executive, where a director is nominated or joins the audit committee.  
But there is a noticeable change (smiling) experienced when someone was appointed as the 
chairman of the audit committee.  The relationship, my experience, anyway tends to formalise a 
little bit more and perhaps, it is seen that the audit committee chairman was perceived perhaps a 
                                                     
41
 Node No.4.1 in Table 5-1. 
131 
 
bit more in line with the external auditors… they (management) are not against you, but they are 
not inside the same wagon.’   
Interviewee 03 described the change in relationship as a process of formalisation.  He 
explained it as the management gradually regarded audit committee members as on the opposite 
side.  What is noteworthy is the process of formalisation.   The audit committee as an overseeing 
mechanism was not regarded as ‘outsiders’ straightaway, but there had been incidents or events 
that gradually changed management’s perception.  In the case of interviewee 03, he had to stand 
strongly against the management proposal on a provision during the NZ IFRS transition.  As a 
result of this incident, the relationship between the executive and the interviewee changed.   This 
idea is shared by interviewee 16, who said: “I think what has changed though was the other 
directors
42
 are getting… slowly… a better understanding of why we have an audit committee.  It 
is a change in the relationship, because now they would defer to me as the chairman of the audit 
committee on issues. But a year ago, they wouldn’t.”   It is noteworthy that interviewee 16 was 
an audit committee chairman of a start-up company, which had been listed on the stock 
exchange only one year when the interview was conducted. 
The other nineteen interviewees all indicated that their relationships with the 
management had not changed since they served on the audit committee.  Using the response 
from interviewee 02 as an example: ‘The main relationships with the executives of the company 
are with the managing director, the deputy managing director, the chief financial officer, and the 
internal auditor, and I was already the board chairman before the internal auditor and chief 
financial officer were appointed, so our relationship has always been identical.  It’s been the 
same.  It wasn’t affected by my appointment [to the audit committee].”  
The researcher posits that the relationship between the management and audit committee 
members may be determined by individual organisations’ contexts.   Individual incidents or the 
environment, for instance, a different view on issues to be resolved, or publicly raising funds, 
may change the relationship.   
(2) Assessing the level of remuneration43 
Interviewees were given an opportunity to evaluate the reasonableness of their 
remuneration.  When the interviewees explained their evaluation, an account of their perception 
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 In this case, most of whom are executive directors. 
43
 Node No.4.2 in Table 5-1. 
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of the magnitude of their audit committee duties and the achievement of audit committee 
objectives are also expected to be revealed.  Thirteen interviewees claimed that they believed 
their remuneration was reasonable, while eight interviewees claimed that they were not 
remunerated reasonably.   As designed, the interview question brought up the question of how 
interviewees assess, that is the benchmark they adopted to measure their remuneration.  The 
interview data revealed several different ways of assessing the level of remuneration. Some 
interviewees adopted two or more benchmarks in discussing the level of remuneration. The 
classification and examples are displayed in Table 6-10. 
Table 6-10:  Assessing the level of audit committee remuneration 
Theme (benchmark) No. of 
interviewees 
Examples 
The remuneration should 
reflect the workload  
6 Interviewee 01: 
 
“The remuneration should be a complement 
to the job, not the person.  In other words, it 
should be related to the amount of duty 
involved and so on.”  
 
There should be additional 
compensation for serving on 
the audit committee 
3 Interviewee 11: 
 
“It is reasonable in terms of the 
remuneration you receive as a director.  I 
think the ratio between the extra you get for 
the audit committee… if you proportion it 
to what you get for being the director… that 
ratio was fine.”  
 
Interviewee 16:  
 
“Ha! (long unhappy pause)  We don’t pay 
extra for sitting on the committees.  We 
don’t pay extra.”  
There should be additional 
compensation for chairing 
the audit committee 
5 Interviewee 19:  
 
“It is determined that the audit committee 
chairman should, in addition to that sum… 
get ten thousand dollars more a year.  
Because the audit committee chairman does 




Theme (benchmark) No. of 
interviewees 
Examples 
Comparing to overseas 
companies’ directors fees 
2 Interviewee 05: 
  
“Yeah, workload is time… Hum… I think 
directors’ fees are low in this country.  If 
they were higher, and if the role of directors 
was more remunerated, directors will do 
more.” 
The remuneration should 
reflect the value brought 
into the audit committee by 
a particular audit committee 
member 
2 Interviewee 15: 
 
“Well…I think…   Let me put it in this 
way, as far as I am aware, I am the highest 
paid audit committee chairman in New 
Zealand.   I think!  I don’t know for sure, 
but I think.  If I am not the highest, I am the 
second highest. (laugh) It’s okay, you get 
what you are paying for.   But you do get 
different schemes in the game, you know 
what I mean.”   
It is not a matter of high or 
low.  It is about the 
responsibility of being a 
director 
2 Interview 09: 
 
“My answer will be “yes, (my remuneration 
is reasonable)” for all of them (the 
companies he serves on), although all of 
them are actually different.  Hum… I guess 
I don’t necessarily do what I do for the 
remuneration.   Once I am a director of the 
company, I assume that I have a 
responsibility in that company.  And I do 
not think about the level (emphasising) of 
the remuneration.” 
 
The audit committee 
remuneration is only a 
portion of an overall 
package 
2 Interview 02: 
 
“I get remunerated partly through my 
investment in the company, and partly, to a 
lesser extent, by my directors’ fees.  I look 
at it all as a big package.  I give and I assist.  
And I am contributing and I get some 
remuneration back.  But I don’t assign it to 
the audit committee, the board or investor 
whatever.”   
  
The above interview data can be linked to the theory in several ways.   According to 
Adams & Ferreira (2008), audit committee members with higher fees attend board meetings 
more frequently.   In other words, remuneration may have motivated audit committee members 
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to work harder to spend more time on audit committee related issues.  As quoted in Table 6-10, 
audit committee members tended to justify their remuneration against their perceived level of 
work load they take on, either as a member or as a chairman.  Proponents of equity theory 
(Miller, 1995) also argued that remuneration receivers tended to compare the level of their inputs 
(the work load) to their outputs (how much the remuneration was) and then compared that 
proportion to a referent, for example, in this research, the directors’ pay in another country.  The 
equity theory predicts that if the remuneration receivers perceive their remuneration as ‘unfair’ 
in comparison to the referent, they would adjust their efforts to re-establish the ‘fairness’.  
However, as indicated by interviewees 09 and 02, they were not concerned about the level of 
remuneration in relation to the audit committee’s role as such.   
It also revealed that a ‘labour market’ of available audit committee members may have 
formed as a result of increased expectations on forming corporate audit committees.    Gomez-
Mejia and Wiseman (1997) suggested that directors’ pay was explained in terms of the supply 
and demand of the labour market.  There are interviewees who justify their remuneration by 
referring to their expertise or reputation (see the quotation from interviewee 15).  It is 
noteworthy that none of the interviewees related the level of remuneration to the effectiveness or 
performance of their audit committees.    
(3) Assessing the regulatory environment of audit committees44 
Interview question 4.3 is: ‘how have the increasing regulations and guidelines governing 
audit committees affected your work on the audit committee?  Please give an example.’   In 
answering this question, interviewees were given an opportunity to discuss the impact of the 
regulations on the performance of their audit committee duties.  Although the interview question 
per se does not specifically refer to any particular regulation or guidance, the interviewees 
tended to comment on the transition from NZ GAAP to the IFRS, and the compliance 
requirements.  The stances held by the interviewees varied greatly from strongly against the 
increasing regulations to praising the guidelines for being specific and helpful.   The interview 
data are summarised in Table 6-11. 
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 Node No.4.3 in Table 5-1. 
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Table 6-11: Assessing the regulatory environment of audit committees 








6 Interviewee 15: 
“We had the IFRS, which is absolutely… well… you 
know… I just don’t think IFRS is all that cranked up 
as it should be.   There are too many problems… the 
real issue with IFRS is it is continuously changing… 
even in some fundamentals.  Every single standard is 
up to a continuous review… so you will have to keep 
on top of them.” 
 
Interviewee 04: 
“Sarbanes-Oxley comes in.  In my view, it is as a 
pendulum swing, right oh??  What happened was we 
were doing too little before, but we are now doing far 
too much.  Eventually it will come back to a sensible 
position in the middle.  Under the new IFRS, we are 
producing a lot of information in a set of statutory 











4 Interviewee 01:  
“So the requirements are actually pulling people out of 
the audit rather than make the audit better.   I think 
that can actually happen.  I just worry about you 
scaring people off rather than bringing out the changes 
you are trying to achieve.  But I might be wrong.  Just 
my opinion.” 
 
Interviewee 11:  
“I mean my life as director or even sitting on board as 
an executive started probably 25 or 30 years ago at 
what stage the complexity of the requirements was a 
lot simpler, and I think… although at times it did 
mean that people could side step.   I think for the 
genuine hard working director, they aimed more to 
focus on the nucleus of the business, rather than on the 
compliance issues which related to ticking the boxes 







2 Interviewee 05 
“The problem was the increased regulations and 
guidelines… (pause) don’t make allowances for small, 
medium or large companies.  I talked about 
compliance here.  It’s very different for compliance 
when you’ve got a firm that is just a bit bigger but it’s 
got branch offices.   Huh…   for a large firm very, 
very different.  It’s much easier to keep an eye on 
















4 Interviewee 19: 
“We are actually adding enormous complexity which 
implies a lot of cost in the areas where my perception 
would be…that the risk in that area where you apply a 
lot of money and effort to is minus or even non-
existent.   So in other words, we have slavishly taken 
on US implied standards because… all the major 
firms are there.   And this is probably time consuming 
and unnecessary.  And from time to time, I think of 
people doing that when there would be more 
potentially productive areas that they could have been 
working on.”     
 
Interviewee 21: 
“I actually think we are far too over governed.   I 
mean… if you look at all those rules… the securities 
rules… the Companies Office rules… plus before 
that… in the last fifteen years.  Tell me how they 
helped to stop all the failings of those finance 
companies?  Nothing!  Nothing they can help.  Purely 






3 Interviewee 16:  
“You know…helpful, I mean…huh… in some 
respects, the more guidelines there are around the 
audit committee and how it should operate imposed 
from the outside, the easier it is to actually establish it 
internally.    So for me… it is certainly not a negative.  
No… it is as much… it created a lot of work, but it is 












2 Interviewee 07:  
“Certainly there are a lot more in terms of… (pause) I 
am just thinking… the finance companies in through 
the stock exchange, the securities commission, they 
are requiring a lot more by way of regulation, and 
what is required in terms of reporting and so on.  So 
that’s added work.  But it doesn’t raise any issues that 
were not there before.   We would be… same sort of 
things they now want us to report on ourselves 
anyway.  So to that extent, it hasn’t changed.” 
 
Interviewee 02:  
“The stock exchange reporting requirements have 
changed it a bit.  So each time there is a change, we 
have to review and make sure we are on top of the 
changes.  But overall, in terms of substance, it hasn’t 
changed it that much, because we are not minimal 
disclosers.  We try to be informative.  So we have just 
about got it covered before the regulations come in.” 
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Although not expected at the time of designing the questionnaire, the results provided 
three particular insights.    Firstly, the increasing compliance regulations have had an impact on 
audit committee composition and conduct.   As quoted in  Table 6-11, several interviewees 
suggested that although ‘well-intended’ and ‘understandable’, the incremental compliance based 
regulations distracted them from dealing with issues of the ordinary operation of the business.  
The regulatory requirements were perceived as stringent with a lack of flexibility.  The audit 
committee members had to take on additional workload, as a result of which, the firm’s 
compliance costs increased.   However, there were also three interviewees who argued that the 
increased regulations and guidelines were ‘helpful’.  For example, interviewee 16, who chaired 
an audit committee of a newly-listed company, stated that as the guidelines were of sufficient 
detail, he benefited from following the guidelines to establish and arrange the audit committee-
related matters.  Two interviewees specifically emphasised that the regulatory requirements 
made it difficult to appoint suitable auditors and competent fellow audit committee members.  
Secondly, the impact of adopting IFRS in New Zealand on the duties of audit committees 
was perceived as negative by the interviewees.    This theme is reflecting some of the difficulties 
they had encountered identified by the interviewees.  It is noteworthy that all except one 
criticism of the IFRS were from the experienced and CA qualified audit committee members.  
This can be interpreted that on the one hand the regulatory requirements increase the complexity 
of the audit committee’s tasks, on the other hand, although the members posted a negative stance, 
they did not suggest that the IFRS transition was indeed beyond their capacity.  Four out of five 
interviewees also used examples to represent the complex technical accounting issues caused by 
the IFRS transition, including financial instrument disclosure for forward energy provision 
contracts and accounting issues for heritage assets and the agricultural industry.         
Thirdly, several interviewees discussed the importance of achieving a balance between 
the compliance and performance aspects of corporate governance.   As quoted in Table 6-11, 
interviewees believed that in substance, the increased regulations and requirements did not 
substantially change what a director was expected to do.  Meanwhile, they suggested that 
compliance is not the nucleus of a business entity.  This may be interpreted as meaning that 
whether they  carried out their duties as an audit committee member or as a corporate director, 
they were concerned about the balance between compliance and the performance of the business.   
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(4) Recapitulation of motivation for serving on the audit committee45 
The last interview question is: ‘if you are nominated to serve on the audit committee 
again, will you accept it? Why or why not?’.  This question is designed to encourage 
interviewees to reflect on the first interview question in the questionnaire, which asks what 
motivated them to become audit committee members.    In closing the interview process, 
interviewees are provided with an opportunity to re-examine their experience of serving on an 
audit committee.  Except for interviewee 06, who indicated firmly that he was going to retire 
from all directorships, all the other interviewees did not object to the idea of serving on the audit 
committee again, but their justifications are different.  See Table 6-12. 
   Table 6-12: Recapitulation of the motivation for serving on the audit committee 
If nominated again, 
will you accept to 
serve on the audit 




Yes, definitely, because 
this is where my 
expertise lies 
6 Interviewee 10: 
 
“Yep! Because I almost think this is my 
obligation to do so because of the background 
I’ve got.  And I quite enjoy it.”   
 
Yes, because it is the 
request from the board 
6 Interviewee 13:  
 
“I would probably accept, because the 
chairman would think that is the best decision 
for the company.   If the chairman asked me to 
do something, I would almost always do it, 
because he is responsible for leading the board, 
and I am just a member of the board.  Having 
made the decision to go on the board, I think it 
creates an obligation to follow the leadership 
of the chairman.” 
 
Not seeking this role, 
but will do it as it is the 
board’s request 
5 Interviewee 20:  
 
“Well, I wouldn’t necessarily prefer to be on it, 
to be honest.  But if I am required, I will accept 
it and do it, because as a director you’ve got to 
do the job.   It wouldn’t be necessarily my first 
choice, actually.  If you have an accounting 
rather than a legal background you might be 
better suited to chair an audit committee.” 
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If nominated again, 
will you accept to 
serve on the audit 




Yes, it is a chance to 
learn more 
1 Interviewee 12:  
 
“It’s probably interesting to… you know… this 
is my personal point of view… is to see 
another more developed audit committee 
functioning.  It’s back to the initial comment I 
made of … you know… I don’t know whether 
we are an efficient audit committee or not, 
because I don’t have the visibility of another 
one.” 
 
Yes, as I have 










Interviewee 02:  
 
“In this company, I guess I will just stay here 
until someone more suitable is available.  
(smiling)  Or we have a bit of a shift-around in 
jobs and responsibilities.  So I would accept it 
if I thought I was the best person for the job 
and available to do it.” 
Yes, I would rather do it 
myself 
1 Interviewee 01: 
 
“Yes.  I’d rather see what is happening, rather 
than wondering.  Actually you are responsible 
for what is happening all the time.  If you take 
it seriously, it is not an extra job.  You also get 
a certain amount of money for doing it.  That’s 
all.  I don’t think many people treat it like that 
anyway.” 
As quoted in Table 6-12, the audit participants tended to serve on the audit committee for 
various reasons.  Six interviewees suggested that they were the most suitable personnel for the 
audit committee, thus they almost took it for granted that they would serve on the audit 
committee again.  The majority of interviewees (11 out of 21) believed that audit committee 
membership was not a choice or option, but a task they would perform as long as they were 
requested; irrespective of whether they would personally prefer it or not.  There were also three 
interviewees who would take on the position for more personal reasons.   Interviewee 12 tended 
to learn more from serving on a more developed audit committee.  Interviewee 02 had a long 
tenure with and had a deep tie with his company, so he would stay in the position until he was 
replaced.  Interviewee 01 seemed not able to trust the other directors to perform the audit 
committee’s role.  It is also noteworthy that interviewee 14, although he indicated that he would 
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take on the position as long it was requested by the board, also indicated that he would be 
selective and only be willing to serve on more ‘organised’ audit committees.   
6.2.5 Summary  
 The interviewee data have revealed a diverse range of qualitative information of how the 
interviewees perceive the effectiveness of audit committees.  
Firstly, some interviewees related the existence of the audit committee and their 
contribution to it through compliance with the requirements for, or a fulfilment of public 
expectations of, formal audit committee settings.  These interviewees explained the way in 
which they perceived the audit committee objectives through: (1) presenting their independent 
status and financial expertise as required by rules and regulations regarding audit committee 
composition; (2) the recognition of their independent status and financial expertise by their 
organisations; and (3) emphasising the development and disclosure of audit committee charters. 
In contrast to this, some interviewees tended to justify the duties of audit committees as a part of 
performing their directorship duties.  This research has documented a diverse range of activities 
identified by audit committee members as comprising their daily lives in audit committees.  By 
classifying these activities into board-delegated tasks and committee formalities, it can be asked 
whether an audit committee can exist in substance without the committee formalities. The board-
delegated tasks are duties of the board, with or without an audit committee.  The committee 
formalities merely formalise the performance of the delegated tasks, or make the performance of 
the delegated tasks more visible, by documenting them in an audit committee meeting agenda 
and/or minutes.  This view reflected interviewees’ accounts in situations when the boundary 
between the audit committee and the board of directors was blurred.   It was  noticeable that 
some interviewees deliberately blurred such boundaries, in order to justify their belief that 
substantive audit committee activities were within the scope of, rather than in addition to, their 
perceived general directorship roles.  Interviewees also provided evidence that ‘experience’ 
helped them the most in performing their audit committee roles.   
Secondly, Turley and Zaman (2007) suggest that audit committee members emphasise 
the informal processes outside formal audit committee meetings, in order to avoid ‘surprises’ in 
the audit committee meetings.     On the one hand, this research found that the hours worked by 
interviewees in addition to attending the audit committee meetings, far outweighed the hours of 
attending the meetings, especially for audit committee chairpersons.   On the other hand, 
141 
 
interviewees recognised that the meeting formalities, such as the agenda and minutes, were 
essential to document and formalise the processes and conclusions.  Audit committee meetings 
are possible contributors to its effectiveness through the consensus of decision making, and 
publicly manifest its influence on the management.    
Thirdly, the relationship between the audit committee members and other parties who 
work with audit committees are perceived differently by the interviewees.  Audit committees are 
perceived to conclude their performance of their duties by reporting or recommending to the 
board of directors.  It is perceived that the board of directors usually accepts the audit 
committee’s recommendations.  Audit committees were expected to mediate the relationship 
between the management and external auditors.  However, the relationship between the 
management and external auditors was perceived to be straight forward.  Although most 
interviewees suggested that they met with auditors privately, there were few incidents identified 
as requiring resolution.  However, the relationship between the management and internal 
auditors was regarded by the interviewees as requiring more supervision as, for most of the time, 
compromise between the two parties was required.   
 Finally, the data analysis provided evidence that interviewees did not tend to evaluate 
their performance against the remuneration they received nor the compliance requirement 
specified by regulations or guidelines.   Interviewees had wide-ranging views about the 
increased corporate governance regulations and guidelines.  Some interviewees commented 
specifically on the increased workload that this had created and questioned whether the 
increased regulations and guidelines had in fact changed the nature of a director’s role.  If audit 
committee members were motivated through the fear of litigation, it would be logical for 
members to evaluate their performance according to the requirements of corporate governance 
regulations.  The interview data obtained in this research do not, however, support this argument. 
The evaluation of their audit committee performance by members is of a qualitative nature, with 
interviewees tending to explain the extent to which they believed they had accomplished their 
roles from a personal perspective.   Most of the interviewees would agree to serve on the audit 
committee again for various reasons, but a majority of them would do so if required by the 
board.   




6.3 The second round of coding – reflective analysis 
This section focusses primarily on the analysis of the explanatory accounts provided by 
the participants.  The relevant descriptive accounts will be referred to as supporting evidence in 
the discussion of the explanatory accounts.   
6.3.1 Believing 
As described in Chapter Five, ‘believing’ accounts represent ‘what the others have 
communicated to us’, i.e. the believing accounts come from a source.   It may be argued that 
such believing may have formed a foundation for the interviewees on which to perceive the 
effectiveness of their audit committees.   Figure 6-1 shows the screen cuts from NVivo 9 for the 
structure and nodes of the explanatory accounts.   





Table 6-13 categorises the believing accounts captured and analysed in the order of 
frequency.    It is noteworthy that the believing accounts sometimes overlap between different 
sub-categories. 
Table 6-13: Believing accounts 





According to the audit 
committee charter or other 
documents 
18 
Interviewee 03:  
“I thought of a particular responsibility that I 
was assigned.  So I will talk about that.  But just 
before I do that, in general terms, both of most 
companies’ [audit committees] have a charter.  
So it is usually in terms of your responsibilities, 
you know, it’s responsibilities you assume as a 
result of agreeing to the charter, and agreeing to 
the company or to the audit committee.”   





“Huh… I mean an audit committee… if you 
define it, it is ‘auditing’...  I mean it is auditing… 
risk… it is auditing compliance… compliance 
with the IFRS, if you like… that is a reasonable 
expectation from the shareholder…”   





“That’s all about the learning and understand the 
law, then be able to challenge the management 
around it.  It’s getting more and more 
complicated.  The thing is (pause) this is the 
problem.  A lot of regulations apply to the non-
listed companies as well.  So you get smaller 
companies with all of this rate of regulation and 
you still haven’t understood it all.”   
Referring to the director’s 
duties to justify the audit 
committee’s responsibilities 
13 
Interviewee 11:  
 
“I think the function of the board… the 
directors… the totality is three things.  One is to 
hire and fire the chief executive.  Two is to guide 
the company’s strategy… And three is to look 
after the compliance of the business.   To me I 
would argue that in terms of a successful 
business, all three are equal.  And certainly 









Referring to personal 
background or experience 
12 
Interviewee 10:  
 
“So what motivated me?  I didn’t actually put 
my hand up, I got conscripted because of my 
accounting background.  That always happened.  
As soon as, someone says, “oh, good!  You are a 
finance person, and you are on the audit 
committee.”” 
 
Referring to the power or 
authority of audit committees 
7 
Interviewee 19:  
 
“… recommendations from the external auditors.  
Huh… I think it is a wrong question.  I don’t 
think it is the management’s decision.   It is not 
theirs… they don’t have the authority to decide 
if they will follow a recommendation from the 
external auditor, it is the audit committee’s 
decision.”   





“But I am aware of some other boards I’ve been 
in.   They have been required to pay the 
directors; rather than a flat fee, they pay for the 
hours they work.  And it works for some people.  
To get certain people on board, you just do have 
to do that.  If you want that type of person, you 
must pay for it and then it’s a good thing for the 
company.  Otherwise you wouldn’t have them.” 
Consulting an external 
organisation or expert 
3 
Interviewee 06:  
 
“Now if I find that I am having a problem on an 
issue.  I can always fall back and give a paper to 
the audit committee, and to the board, you know, 
based on what the Securities Commission, or the 
ASX, or the New Zealand Exchange expects - 
drawn from their best practice guideline which is 
all available publicly, or from my experiences at 
the IOD (Institute of Directors) or Society of 
Accountants’ continuing education courses.” 
 
 
As mentioned previously, ‘believing’ accounts are communicated to the participants from 
a source and can be regarded as the foundation upon which the interviewees perceive the 
effectiveness of their audit committees.  The eight sources revealed from the interviews can be 
further classified as in Table 6-14. 
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In those cases where the believing accounts had a perceptional component, they were 
often supported by perceptional accounts. For example, interviewee 03 said: ‘I thought of a 
particular responsibility that I was assigned.  So I will talk about that.  But just before I do that, 
in general terms, both of most companies’ [audit committees] have a charter (coded as 
‘referring to the audit committee charter or other documents’).  So it is usually in terms of your 
responsibilities, you know, it’s responsibilities you assume as a result of agreeing to the charter 
and agreeing to the company or to the audit committee’ (coded as perceptional account 
‘perceiving’).   
Table 6-14: Classification of believing accounts 
Referring to an 
authoritative doctrine 
 According to the audit committee charter or other 
documents 
 Referring to the regulatory requirements 
 Referring to the power or authority of audit committees 
 
Referring to a set of 
well accepted 
principles 
 Referring to perceived public expectations 
 According to the director’s duties 
 
Benchmarking 
 Referring to personal background or experience 
 Comparing to other organisations 
 Consulting an external organisation or expert 
 
 
As perceptional accounts reflect one’s indirect experiences; they may or may not be 
factual encounters of the participants.  The participants intentively justify how they believe an 
effective audit committee should or should not do by referring to a source rather than what they 
have personally experienced as true.   In other words, there are doctrines, principles, or 
benchmarks that are believed to be true by the participants, and they have described these 
doctrines, principles, or benchmarks in making sense of their experience in audit committees, 
without always identifying any significant direct experience to support what they believed really 
took place.    Turley and Zaman (2004) and Spira (1998; 2005) suggested that the audit 
committee formation was an institutionalised phenomenon in the significant securities market of 
the world.  The current research provided further evidence to support such a claim.  The practice 
of having an audit committee, what it should do and what it is expected to achieve, has been 
institutionalised by the audit committee members in reality.   
A question which can be asked at this point is: ‘why do some interviewees intentively 
conform to doctrines or principles, whereas others benchmark against other organisations?’   In 
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section 6.4, the third round of coding, the analysis of these differences between interviewees will 
be discussed further.    
6.3.2 Valuing 
This research argues that cognition is value laden.  ‘Valuing’ something to be either right 
or wrong is relatively closer to a deduction from past experience.  Valuing accounts have two 
components - the value - ranging from positive, to neutral, and then to negative, and the objects 
that are being valued, i.e. the experience.   Table 6-15 below categorises the valuing accounts 
captured and analysed in this research.     
 











Interviewee 13:  
“Most people regard this as way over the top.  Hum… there is 
no other more comprehensive… charter that I’ve ever seen in 
New Zealand.   But another reality is everyone is using it as a 
model.   And the auditors themselves will… I know because 
they told me… when their clients are asking… when they are 










“It’s only three of us (in the last audit committee meeting).  
It’s very amicable.  In fact it’s almost… probably because of 
that, it’s almost light-hearted.  Not to say that it is not serious, 
but the way we go about it is… you know…it was quite easy 
going, minimal tension. There were some discussions 
between the management and the auditors.  But everything 






Interviewee 01:  
 
“They (the accountant and the bookkeeper) actually dealt 
with them (the auditors) most of the time.  So it is important, 
as I don’t have to do much.  I just met with them a couple of 
times and then did the reviews.  I think the biggest thing is 














Interviewee 04:  
 
“When Sarbanes-Oxley came with all the new requirements… 
all that sort of thing, they became very clear very quickly.  
(So) that the auditors and the audit committee members would 
need to come to speed what those requirements were.  That 
meant a lot of personal time studying and understanding and 
learning what they mean.  Then you can ask the right question 
to management.”   




Interviewee 19:  
 
“Well… I’m not complaining about it.  We don’t pay huge 
fees, and for the audit committee… for the standard 
committee fees is a thousand dollars a half day.   I’d probably 
get two thousand dollars if I went to the meetings from 
Wellington and back.  Those locals are getting one thousand 





Interviewee 17:  
 
“He (the internal auditor) made a comment about it during 
the meeting, but that caused an eruption because he hadn’t 
discussed it with the executive but brought it straight to the 
audit committee.  You know… I had several phone calls after 
the meeting…  I am the chairman of that one.  Well I’m not 
sure how much time I spent just to find out and to follow up 
about where it got to.  Well, they (the management) got 
offended because he didn’t consult their opinion first.”  




Interviewee 21:  
 
“Huh… I mean an audit committee… if you define it, it is for 
auditing.  I mean it is auditing risk… it is auditing 
compliance… compliance with the IFRS, if you like… that is 
a reasonable expectation from the shareholder.  So they are 
audited honestly.  But… but… you know… some audit 
committees start taking on the role of God!  They think they 
are the company, I think that’s wrong.   So I think there needs 
to be a balance…”  
 
Interviewee 18:  
 
“Look, I’m not at all comfortable with this.  But in that 
company, they asked the audit committee to have a look at the 
year end result, and make a recommendation on what the 
dividend should be.   And twice now, the board has rejected 
our recommendations on dividend, which is quite important 
you know.   We just had to… huh… it is a little bit frustrating 
for me when that happens, because if that is the case, they 
really shouldn’t ask us to recommend.”   
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In contrast to the believing accounts discussed in the previous section, which were 
commonly supported by indirect experiences, the valuing accounts were usually supported by 
remembering accounts (i.e. the real encounters of the interviewees, or something that factually 
took place in their audit committees).  In other words, believing accounts revealed that the 
interviewees intentively justified their audit committee effectiveness through what they believed 
acceptable, whereas valuing accounts represented their own acceptance or rejection of what they 
had personally experienced.   This is particularly noticeable when some of the anecdotal 
accounts by interviewees are considered in terms of their ‘value’.  This is illustrated in Table 6-
16.  
Table 6-16: Anecdotes 
Interviewee Anecdote ‘Valuing’ interpretation 
 01 
Not being able to find an auditor after 
the corporate governance and auditing 
regulations tightened.  
The regulations are not being helpful, 
but scared the auditors away, which 
was frustrating to him. 
02 
Implementing an advanced retail store’s 
internal control and audit mechanism 
greatly improved the company’s 
performance. 
The audit committee had made a 
positive and significant improvement 
to his organisation. 
03 
During the IFRS transition, the 
management and the audit committee, 
who were supported by the auditors, had 
a stand-off about some accounting 
treatments.  It was resolved by the 
management reluctantly following the 
audit committee’s ruling. 
It is important to be distant and 
persistent when dealing with the 
management. 
 04  
A fellow director sold shares under 
conditions prohibited by the insider 
trading regulations.  The audit 
committee resolved the situation with 
the authority and the company avoided 
sanction. 
The audit committee played an 
important role in mitigating litigious 
risks for the company. 
05  
The company operated in a unique 
industry.  The auditors’ high turnover 
made the audit committee members 
become the ‘trainers’ of new audit staff.  
The financial accounting expertise is 
important to his audit committee for a 
‘frustrating’ reason. 
06 
He, as an audit committee chairperson, 
successfully persuaded his managing 
director to establish a formal internal 
audit function. 
The audit committee member’s (or 
chairperson’s) persistence had 
improved the company’s operation.  
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Interviewee Anecdote ‘Valuing’ interpretation 
09 
The CFO’s capability affected her 
workload as an audit committee 
chairperson.  She was relied on (‘an 
awful lot’ in terms of arranging internal 
auditing related matters. 
Financial accounting expertise is 
important to his audit committee for a 
‘frustrating’ reason. 
13 
The newly implemented IFRS created 
difficulties in his judgement.  He had to 
‘pioneer’ an approach for accounting 
disclosures which he believed to be true 
and fair.  The auditors only reluctantly 
accepted this treatment. 
Financial accounting expertise is 
important to his audit committee in a 
‘pioneer’ fashion.  
18 
The board of directors did not accept but 
revised the audit committee’s proposal 
on the level of dividends that should be 
distributed. 
Recommending dividends should not 
be regarded as a duty of audit 
committees if the board is not 
prepared to accept the level of 
dividends proposed by the audit 
committee.  
 
The anecdotal accounts displayed in Table 6-16 were not documented in the existing audit 
committee literature.  On the one hand, these extend the body of knowledge of what was actually 
carried out in audit committees. Furthermore, these types of activities could not be resolved only 
with audit committee meetings.  On the other hand, most of these anecdotes to some extent 
interfered with the operation of the organisations, although they are supposed to remain 
independent and do not have executive power.  In contrast to Turley and Zaman (2007), who 
suggested that audit committees were substantially influenced through the power bargaining 
between the management and the auditors, this research provided further evidence on the 
influence of audit committees.   
However, this research argues that instead of the management or the auditors utilising the 
audit committees to exercise influence, it is the other way around – with audit committee 
members actively promoting a certain outcome.  It was the auditors or the management who 
were intentively utilised by audit committee members to execute plans or as a supporting partner 
for their influence.   
In the next section, ‘willing’ accounts will be discussed to explain how interviewees 
transfer their beliefs and values into future actions.  Willing to do or not to do something can be 




The ‘willing’ accounts obtained from this research are all related to the interview 
question: ‘if you are nominated to serve on the audit committee again, will you accept it?’  This 
subject is a real issue for every interviewee, except for interviewee 06 who was retiring from his 
entire directorship portfolio.   Table 6-17 categorises the willing accounts captured and analysed 
in this research.     
Table 6-17: Willing accounts 






Interviewee 10:  
 
“Yep! Because I almost think this is my obligation 
to do so because of the background I’ve got.  And 




“It probably gives you a bit more insight into the 
company than you get just purely as a director.   
The insight comes from the audit side and the 
internal audit side as well… It’s probably 
interesting to… you know… this is my personal 
point of view… is to see another more developed 




Interviewee 08:  
 
“I think… I guess I see it as a… if you like a 
responsibility… I don’t want to use the word 
“responsibility” in a high and mighty way, but I 
guess I see it as a responsibility, if it is the right 
mix to the board that I am on…alright…because 
of the background. So the answer is “yes”.   But it 




“I did not want to be a member.  No… It is not 
very exciting.  (both laughing) So why did I agree?  
Hum… it is a very important role.  And I think I 
can add value and a sense of responsibility that I 
should agree.  You all sit on the board; there are a 
number of board committees.  And you need to go 
on one or more.”  
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The willing accounts are comparatively straight forward.  It is noteworthy that except for 
interviewee 06 who said that he would not serve on the audit committee again due to his 
retirement, all of the other twenty interviewees said that they would accept nomination to serve 
on the audit committee again.  It is almost a tie between actively and passively accepting the 
nomination.   
6.3.4 Summary  
The second round of coding and the reflective analysis investigated the intentive processes 
whereby audit committee members justify the effectiveness of audit committees.  Based on a 
framework adapted from Embree’s (2007) reflective analysis, the research findings suggest that 
firstly, audit committee members refer to an authoritative doctrine or a set of well accepted 
principles or benchmarking with other organisations to justify what they believe an effective 
audit committee should have and should do.   However, such beliefs were commonly supported 
by indirect experience rather than by personal encounters.   Secondly, various values were 
placed by the interviewees on their personal encounters, ranging from strong opposition to 
satisfaction.  These valuations were commonly supported by vivid and detailed descriptions of 
direct experiences, including anecdotes.   Thirdly, although all except one interviewee will agree 
to serve on the audit committee again, their attitudes of such acceptance were equally divided 
between passive and active.  A question can be asked: why is there such a diverse range of 
perceptions and justifications?  The third round of coding, based on the researcher’s reflection is 
discussed in section 6.4, which attempts to address these problems.  
6.4 The third round of coding - the researcher’s reflection  
The first round of coding and data analysis documented the interviewees’ responses to the 
interview questions, i.e. it revealed ‘what they said’. The second round of coding and data 
analysis discussed the interviewees’ intentive justification of their responses, i.e. it explained 
‘why they said what they said’.  The third round of coding and data analysis focuses on the 
researcher’s reflection on the differences between interviewees, i.e. it discusses the intentionality 
of the interviewees from an outsider’s perspective.   
  The interviewees revealed that they performed their audit committee duties through two 
intentional orientations, which are summarised in Table 6-18; some interviewees performed their 
role according to their assessment of what good directorship comprises, classified as 
‘conventional directors’, whereas others tended to perform their role to conform to public 
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expectations of audit committees, classified as ‘professional audit committee members’.  In 
some cases, the two orientations were not mutually-exclusive, but overlapped.   
Table 6-18 illustrates these two intentional orientations. 











1 No No No Yes Conventional director 
2 Yes 
Yes (not 
practising) No Yes Conventional director 
3 Yes Yes Yes (3) No Professional AC member 
4 Yes Yes Yes (6) No Professional AC member 
5 Yes 
Yes (not 
practising) Yes (3) No Professional AC member 
6 Yes Yes No Yes Conventional director 
7 No No No Yes Conventional director 
8 Yes Yes Yes No Professional AC member 
9 Yes Yes Yes (4 or 5) No Professional AC member 
10 No No No Not sure Conventional director 
11 Yes No No Yes Conventional director 
12 Yes Yes No No Professional AC member 
13 No No No Yes Conventional director 
14 Yes No Yes Yes Conventional director 
15 Yes Yes Yes (3) Yes Professional AC member 
16 Yes Yes Yes No Professional AC member 
17 Yes Yes No Yes Professional AC member 
18 No No No Yes Conventional director 
19 No No Yes Yes Conventional director 
20 Yes No No Yes Conventional director 
21 Yes 
Yes (not 
practising) No Yes Conventional director 
 
6.4.1 The intentional orientation as a ‘conventional’ corporate director 
This intentional orientation was found in the interview accounts provided by audit 
committee members who had usually had years of experience as corporate directors, or had been 
involved in their organisations for a long period of time.  Those directors, however, were not 
chartered accountants.  Their experience in business operations, strategic management, and 
dealing with resistance to change by management contributed to their performance of the audit 
committee’s role.  It was also common for those interviewees, in describing their audit 
committee duties, to blur the boundaries between those and their other directors’ duties.  It was 
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also seen in the interview accounts that these directors took a sceptical view of the increased 
emphasis in recent years on audit committees in improving the integrity of corporate 
governance.  On the one hand, they perceived that what had been promoted as the audit 
committee’s responsibility, i.e. enhancing the financial reporting quality and the independent 
audit function, was not a new development, but a traditional part of the duties of directors.  On 
the other hand, they criticised the increased corporate governance regulations for resulting in 
extra time and effort required to comply with those regulations, which was, in fact, perceived by 
them as being outside the scope of a directorship.  In one case, an audit committee member 
expressly criticised the trend towards overemphasising the compliance side of corporate 
governance, at the cost of ignoring its performance side.  In performing their audit committee 
duties, these directors tended to act in a style of ‘seeking the truth, not compliance’.  For 
example, one interviewee emphasised that openness between the audit committee and the 
management was more important than committee members being critical towards and distrustful 
of management. When evaluating their performance in the audit committees, these committee 
members tended to justify it through the changes and influences their efforts produced through 
concrete outcomes, such as, having a better internal audit function within the organisation. For 
these directors, it could be argued that those outcomes still fell within their perceived scope of 
general directorship.  
6.4.2 The intentional orientation as a ‘professional’ audit committee member 
The second intentional orientation was most often found in the interview accounts 
provided by ‘specialist’ audit committee members, who were usually chartered accountants and 
also the chairperson of one or more audit committees.  One interviewee chaired six audit 
committees. During the exploratory investigation of New Zealand listed companies’ disclosures 
in order to identify potential interviewees, it was found one that one particular director was or 
had been on, seventeen audit committees in New Zealand listed companies.  
These directors typically started serving on audit committees after the Cadbury 
Committee (1992) recommendations, which emphasised the audit committee in listed 
companies, became commonly accepted by the public. Therefore, the directors were ‘new’ to the 
organisations, having been elected on to the board of directors and often chairing the audit 
committee, in compliance with corporate governance best practice.  They were equipped with 
years of experience of acting as accountants in different industries, having been in an accounting 
profession that had come under increasing public scrutiny in recent years, due to lost confidence 
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in financial reporting.  They had endured the pressure of changing public expectations regarding 
the role of audit committees in enhancing the integrity of financial reporting.  In describing their 
audit committee’s role, those directors tended to portray themselves as strong ‘believers’ of the 
concept of an audit committee, usually justifying such belief in relation to public expectations to 
enhance financial reporting quality and to mediate between the audit/management relationship.   
In performing their audit committee responsibilities, these directors emphasised formalities, i.e. 
the audit committee charter, audit committee meetings, the agenda, minutes, and other 
supporting documents.   They perceived such formalities as vitally important, not only to 
document the activities of the audit committee, but also to formalise and visualise the process 
whereby important conclusions were reached and unanimously agreed to by all meeting 
participants.    
In evaluating the performance of their audit committee duties, they tended to justify their 
performance through the changes they brought to the audit committees that they served on, for 
example, setting up audit committee formalities for firms which did not have them, spending 
significant time outside audit committee meetings to prepare for the meetings, working 
intensively with management and auditors, seeking significant information to support the 
meeting agenda items and, during meetings, insisting that management accept the auditor’s 
recommendation(s).  This intentional orientation reflected deliberate conformity with the public 
expectations of the role of an audit committee.   
6.4.3 Further discussion 
The difference between these two intentional orientations also reflected the interviewees’ 
perceptions about their future role in audit committees.  The first group of directors stated that if 
they were requested to serve on the audit committee again, they would accept the nomination, as 
this was a part of their directorship, but they would not voluntarily seek this role.  The second 
group, the so-called ‘professional’ audit committee members, usually stated that they would 
accept the role without any reluctance, justifying this perception by saying that it is on audit 
committees where they ‘can contribute’ and where ‘their expertise lies’.   
Multi-directorship, i.e. serving on two or more audit committees of listed companies, is 
common for the second group of interviewees, namely, the ‘professional’ audit committee 
members.  Being ‘independent’ is critical for this category of audit committee members, because 
these directors usually present themselves as candidates for the position of chairperson or for 
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being the required accounting expert for the audit committees of listed companies.  According to 
the NZX listing rules (2003), the majority of listed issuers’ audit committee members should be 
independent.  One of the attributes of the NZX’s definition of an independent director is that he 
or she shall not derive a substantial portion (i.e. 10 percent) of his or her annual revenue from a 
particular listed issuer on which he or she serves as a director.   This partially explains 
‘professional’ audit committee members tending not to evaluate their remuneration for serving 
on the audit committee in relation to their workload, even if it was perceived as important and 
sometimes ‘onerous’.  It could, in any event, be argued that, serving on from six to seventeen 
audit committees, plus practising in consulting- or accounting-related work as a chartered 
accountant, would presumably enable the audit committee member to derive sufficient revenue 
annually.  By contrast, the other group of interviewees, who did not have an accounting 
background, but had worked for the company before becoming audit committee members, 
tended to describe their remuneration for being on the committee as unsatisfactory in relation to 
the workload.   
The practices of listed companies in New Zealand have been affected by the global trend 
towards increased scrutiny of corporate governance and the increased efforts of regulators to re-
establish public confidence in the financial reporting of organisations with public accountability.  
Having an independent and accounting-competent audit committee in each listed company 
became commonly accepted and preferred practice in New Zealand after the issue of the New 
Zealand Securities Commission principles and guidelines on corporate governance in 2003.    
This research provides evidence that, in New Zealand, listed companies’ audit committees have 
been formed to comply with the applicable principles and guidelines.  This inevitably changed 
the composition of companies’ boards of directors, particularly in respect of their expected 
independence and proven financial accounting expertise. It also substantially divided the 
intentional orientations of directors serving on audit committees into two distinctive groups.   
The first group comprises directors who are not chartered accountants, but either have a 
long relationship with the company, or have intensive business management experience.  This 
group of audit committee members did not completely believe in the mechanism of an audit 
committee per se.  They regard the integrity of financial reporting and the compliance aspects of 
corporate governance as falling within the traditional roles of directors, with no difference 
whether or not there is an audit committee.  They therefore tended to justify their performance of 
the audit committee’s role as a part of their directorship. Sometimes, this would mean that the 
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audit committee would need to make sure that the board was not preoccupied with 
overwhelming compliance and formality issues, whilst ignoring the performance aspects of 
corporate governance.  This could be the reason why, when describing their responsibilities, or 
the objectives of serving on audit committees, they sometimes blurred the perceived boundary 
between acting as a director and acting as an audit committee member.  This group of directors 
also questioned the increased emphasis on the role of audit committees. In their opinion, audit 
committee requirements impose a compliance burden and require extra paperwork, but add no 
value to good directorship. Furthermore, the extra workload is also not justifiable from a 
remuneration perspective. They accept the audit committee’s existence as a matter of 
compliance, but their primary motivation for being an audit committee member is to further the 
wellbeing of their particular firms. In their opinions, this is the only way in which the audit 
committee could be perceived as ‘effective’.   
The audit committee members comprising the second group have been developing their 
careers since the audit committee mechanism became publicly accepted in New Zealand in the 
1980s (Bradbury, 1990).  They are chartered accountants, presenting themselves as 
‘independent’ ‘audit committee experts’, who profess to be strong believers of the audit 
committee mechanism per se.  They perform the audit committee’s role to conform to a public 
expectation based on an authoritative doctrine or a set of principles.  The formal audit committee 
settings, meetings, and documentation are of great value to them.  They tend to justify their role 
in audit committees as being to maintain those settings, meeting processes, and documentation.  
Performing the audit committee mechanism - in both a formal and highly visible manner – fulfils 
the public’s expectation of audit committees.  This is how an audit committee is evaluated as 
‘effective’ by them.  
6.4.4 Summary 
 
This study argues that these two groups of directors/audit committees may form an 
intentional, but friendly, rivalry in the board rooms of New Zealand listed companies.   The first 
group of directors performs its corporate governance duties, which includes serving on the audit 
committee. The second group of directors establishes and maintains a professional audit 
committee, which is visible to the public, in order to avoid attracting negative attention.  These 
two groups of directors may not necessarily agree with each other’s intentional orientations, but 
they recognise each other’s value.   It is also noteworthy that neither group tends to accept extra 
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accountability for serving on the audit committee; rather, they both believe that it is the board of 
directors as a whole which should be held accountable for the firm.     The findings from the 
three rounds of coding will be used to answer the research questions of the study in Chapter 7.  
The two groups of audit committee members are illustrated in Figure 6-2. 
Figure 6-2: The intentional orientations of audit committee members 
 
6.5 Summary 
This study, through the analysis of the qualitative data obtained in the interviews, 
identifies at least two intentional orientations for justifying audit committee members’ 
perceptions of their daily lives.  Some interviewees tend to perform their roles according to their 
assessment of what good directorship comprises, whereas others tend to perform their role to 
conform to public expectations of audit committees.  In some cases, these two orientations are 
not mutually-exclusive, but overlap.  These different intentional orientations may provide a 
possible explanation as to why the actual performance of audit committees has not conformed to 
the theoretical framework on which earlier qualitative hypotheses are based.  In the next chapter, 
the conclusions, limitations, and future research possibilities will be discussed.  
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Chapter Seven: Conclusions, Limitations, and Future Research Opportunities 
 
7.1 Introduction 
      This chapter is organised into three sections: conclusions of the research, i.e. 
answering the research questions; contributions of the study; limitations and future research 
opportunities. 
7.2 Conclusions - answering the research questions 
7.2.1 Research question one: what do audit committee members perceive the 
desired objectives of an audit committee to be? 
When analysing the qualitative data obtained from the interview questions relating to this 
research question, it was found that audit committee members perceive the desired objectives of 
an audit committee by referring to the delegation by the board of directors.  The interviewees 
perceived their existence in their audit committees by implying a fulfilment of the ‘expectations’ 
placed on audit committee members.   This is justified by referring to a doctrine (for example, 
the regulatory requirements), a set of principles (for example, corporate governance best 
practice), or benchmarking with other organisations.   It is noteworthy that the 
institutionalisation of the audit committee mechanism is the very result of professional 
institutions lobbying with government bodies in various jurisdictions in order to avoid rigid, 
harsh legislation (Spira, 1998; 2005).  This may provide an explanation as to why some of the 
interviewees intentionally strived to present themselves as being a fulfilment of, or in 
compliance with, those best practice guidelines.  
Several interviewees described the objectives of an audit committee in terms of the 
specific tasks that they had been performing.  When describing these tasks, it was evident that 
some interviewees blurred the boundaries between acting as an audit committee member and 
acting as the only financial or accounting expert on the board.  For example, developing the 
business strategy model, or recruiting and supervising the CFO, which were not typically 
regarded as the duties of the audit committee (DeZoort et al, 2002). Furthermore, carrying out 
these tasks could undermine the objectivity of audit committee members, who were being held 
accountable for these tasks and for overseeing the financial reporting simultaneously.     
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7.2.2 Research question two: what do the members bring to an audit committee in 
order to achieve its desired objectives? 
When the interviewees were asked to describe what had helped them the most in 
achieving the desired audit committee objectives, a common theme emerged.  Nineteen of the 
twenty-one interviewees stated that either their background, or their experience, helped them the 
most.    ‘Experience’ was perceived in several different ways – professional and educational 
background, serving on a number of audit committees, or being an executive of the firm before 
serving on the audit committee.  Furthermore, it was perceived as important for members to have 
experience which fitted into the organisation’s context.   This justification was also typical for 
interviewees who were not chartered accountants, including an experienced, senior lawyer and 
two other company directors who were not accounting experts, but who had worked for the same 
company for a long time and claimed that they had a very good understanding of their firms and 
their industries. Furthermore, three particular interviewees attributed their determination, 
analytical mind-set, and ability to read disclosure documents as if they were investors, to their 
experience.   Their experience in business operations helped audit committee members to remain 
confident.   
According to Turley and Zaman (2007), an audit committee may have a pervasive 
influence on governance-related issues and conflicts.  The interview data obtained in this study 
provide evidence that such an influence does indeed exist.  However, instead of being utilised by 
the management or the auditors, as suggested by Turley and Zaman (2007), this research 
indicates that audit committee members rather utilised the executive power of the management, 
supported by the auditors to exercise their influence.   
Furthermore, this research strongly questions the stance taken by much of the qualitative 
research that audit committee members must be independent to be effective. In their real lives, 
audit committee members’ ‘independent’ status was of no concern to the interviewees; in fact, 
quite the opposite; in sustaining their roles as being authoritative, confident, and dependable, 
audit committee members developed leadership skills that could assist them to intentionally 
influence the behaviour of the management towards an intended outcome. This raises the 
question of whether the independence measures identified in the qualitative audit committee 
studies reveal independence in substance, or merely in form; are these supposedly independent 
directors genuinely concerned about their independent status, or do they wish to be deliberately 
and pervasively influential - through the management - on their firms’ operational issues? This 
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may also have consequences for the oversight objective of audit committees, as effective 
oversight may be hampered by a lack of independence.   
When valuing their personal experience in audit committees, the interviewees’ attitudes 
were diverse, ranging from strong opposition to satisfaction, supported by vivid descriptions of 
anecdotes and encounters. 
7.2.3 Research question three: how do members help attain the desired audit 
committee objectives? 
This research question was included in the survey to enable interviewees to describe a 
typical audit committee event or ordinary occurrence that was important to them (Rubin & 
Rubin, 2005), as well as to cover many aspects of daily audit committee life.   
Turley and Zaman (2007) suggest that audit committee members emphasise the informal 
processes outside formal audit committee meetings to avoid ‘surprises’ in audit committee 
meetings. Interviewees in the current study also suggested that the hours they worked in addition 
to attending audit committee meetings outweighed the hours of attending meetings.   
Several of the interview questions were designed to investigate how audit committee 
members managed their relationship with management and especially to determine if there were 
any changes in this relationship after the interviewee became an audit committee member.  In 
answering these interview questions, the interviewees revealed two different types of 
relationship with management; either an unchanged relationship, if the interviewee joined the 
firm as an audit committee member, or an evolved relationship, if the interviewee joined the firm 
as an executive or a director, before serving on the audit committee.     
When describing audit committee meetings, there were several themes identified in the 
interview data: firstly, well established meeting procedures and documentation provide comfort 
to the audit committee members.  However, interviewee 01 was from an organisation where the 
setting of the audit committee was vague and informal, which he also felt was comfortable and 
appropriate given the scale of the business.  Secondly, a number of interviewees strongly 
rejected a show-of-hands (voting) approach to resolving issues during audit committee meetings. 
Obtaining unanimous agreement on specific issues was of great importance to interviewees. If 
there was disagreement, the only acceptable solution was to seek more information and to keep 
the issue on the committee meeting agenda, until a consensus-based agreement could be reached.  
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Furthermore, because the meeting agenda and minutes are circulated amongst several 
parties, such formalities became an important means by which the committee members 
communicate the seriousness of the audit committee issues to all of the meeting participants. 
Most of the interviewees were therefore able to vividly describe audit committee meeting 
processes. It is debatable, however, whether such a sense of gravity, or ‘heaviness’, of itself, 
leads to a higher level of effectiveness by audit committee meeting participants.  
7.2.4 Research question four: how do members assess the extent to which the audit 
committee objectives have been achieved?   
Audit committee qualitative research studies tend to measure the impact of audit 
committees through companies’ disclosed information, typically in annual reports (Turpin & 
DeZoort, 1998).  Audit committee performance has commonly been measured in terms of their 
success in constraining earnings management and earnings misstatements.
46
 This study argues 
that these measurements reflect public expectations of an audit committee and can only provide 
a limited vision of the conduct and diligence of an audit committee. The interviewees revealed a 
diverse range of audit committee activities and described the various changes that they had 
observed in their firms. When identifying these changes, several different approaches were 
revealed and discussed by the interviewees as to how they assessed the extent to which the audit 
committee had achieved its duties.  
This study contends that the evaluation of an audit committee’s contribution to an 
organisation should be related to the organisation’s specific historical context.  In addition to its 
expected or presumed oversight function, an audit committee, through its members, brings 
knowledge of best corporate governance practice and advanced financial accounting into the 
organisation.  The ‘professional and experienced’ audit committee members discussed in the 
previous section joined their firms bearing an expectation by the shareholders of compliance 
with corporate governance practice guidelines.  In attempting to meet this expectation, such 
‘professional and experienced’ audit committee members emphasised the establishment and 
maintenance of formal committee procedures and documentation. The previously discussed 
‘replication’ of the audit committee process by an experienced audit committee chairman in 
different organisations is an example of this.   
                                                     
46
 Bédard and Gendron (2010) reviewed 85 archival studies that used 24 different criteria to measure audit 
committee performance. These criteria were grouped into four dimensions namely, financial reporting, 
external auditing, internal control, and investors’ perceptions.   
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Having previously documented and discussed audit committee members’ views on the 
pervasive influence of audit committees, this study argues that an effective audit committee is 
influential, rather than independent. Many interviewees described concrete improvements in 
their organisations that they believed their audit committee played a part in achieving. It was 
through these improvements that the interviewees tended to assess the effectiveness of their 
audit committees.  
According to Cohen and Holder-Webb (2006), corporate directors are motivated through 
remuneration (the ‘carrot’) and litigation (the ‘stick’).  The interview data obtained in this 
research study do not support this claim.   
Firstly, if audit committee members were motivated by their remuneration, they would 
evaluate their performance from an approach of ‘value for money’.  Interview question 2.3 
specifically asked the interviewees to comment on the reasonableness of their remuneration.
47
  
Interviewees revealed quite different opinions about the compensation they received for serving 
on their audit committees.   Some interviewees stated that they did not rely solely on the 
remuneration paid by specific audit committees and that, compared with their total annual 
income, the amount received for serving on a specific audit committee was not regarded as 
significant.  
There was also an interview question that invited interviewees to discuss the impact of 
the increased corporate governance regulations on their audit committee duties. Interviewees had 
wide-ranging views about the increased corporate governance regulations and guidelines. Some 
interviewees criticised the increased corporate governance regulations as being neither flexible 
nor practical.  Although interviewees did not evaluate their performance against the regulatory 
requirements or guidelines for audit committees, at least two of them said that the guidelines 
were helpful, but did not give any specific examples of how the guidelines assisted them in any 
particular situation.  The regulations and guidelines became part of the contents of their work in 
terms of ‘compliance’ and also increased their workload, but did not change the nature of their 
directors’ duty. Although the formal, or ceremonial, side of audit committee performance may 
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2006 and 2007 financial years, the average remuneration for AC members, including their director’s fee, was 
around NZD 45,000 per annum and the remuneration for AC chairpersons was around NZD 67,000 per 
annum.  In some cases, there was no difference between the remuneration for an ordinary committee member 




have made audit committees more visible to the public, it has not had a substantial impact on 
directorship as a whole.  Audit committee members did not tend to change their performance to 
conform to corporate governance guidelines and regulations, but their ‘compliance’ – whether in 
substance, or in appearance only - was disclosed to the public. The evaluation of their 
performance by AC members was of a more qualitative nature, with interviewees tending to 
explain the extent to which they believed they had accomplished their roles from a personal 
perspective.    
7.3 Contribution of the study  
The contributions of this research study can be assessed from two perspectives – empirical 
and methodological. The empirical contribution provides an understanding of what gives rise to 
an effective audit committee, seen through the lenses of actual audit committee members in New 
Zealand, extending the literature, as this domain has not previously been examined.  The 
methodological contribution enriches the qualitative paradigm of audit committee research 
studies, which are largely dominated by quantitative research methods.   
7.3.1 The empirical contribution  
There is disagreement in the corporate governance literature about the extent to which an 
audit committee is associated with the integrity of corporate financial reporting.  Since the 
Cadbury Committee Report (1992), establishing an audit committee in an organisation with 
public accountability has become globally accepted practice.  Both rules-based and principles-
based corporate governance regimes in the world’s major securities markets either prescribe or 
promote the establishment of independent and financially competent audit committees in 
publicly listed companies, for example, the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance (2004) 
and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002).  The audit committee quantitative literature, however, has 
failed to conclude that the presence of an independent, competent, and diligent audit committee 
is correlated with a better quality of corporate financial reporting and audit function (Turley & 
Zaman, 2004).  This research study has provided qualitative evidence about why the actual 
performance of audit committees has not conformed to the theoretical framework on which the 
preceding empirical hypotheses were based.   
Firstly, according to the evidence provided by the interviewees in the study, when 
performing the audit committee role, the independent status required by most of the corporate 
governance rules or principles, is not of concern to individual members.  On the one hand, such 
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independent status is superficial in nature, as firms with public accountability usually disclose 
the independent status by satisfying a ‘relationship test’.  For example, according to the NZX 
listing rules, one of the attributes of an independent director is that he/she must not hold more 
than five percent of the voting securities of the issuer.  This study argues that independence in 
appearance does not automatically – or necessarily - lead to objectivity as a state of mind for an 
audit committee member.  
On the contrary, as shown from the interview data, when evaluating the performance of 
audit committees, members tended to justify the effectiveness of an audit committee by 
identifying concrete changes in their firms as a result of the efforts of the audit committee.  Since 
audit committees are delegated an overseeing, rather than an executive, responsibility, the 
outcome of an audit committee’s work is attested to by an assurance opinion. The study 
demonstrated that audit committee members conclude their accomplishment of the board’s 
delegation by reporting or recommending to the board the acceptance of the financial statements 
and the audit report. It is noteworthy that the audit committees’ assurance opinions (the 
recommendations to accept the reports) were never questioned or turned down by the board. 
Before this reporting process, however, numerous significant changes, initiated or influenced by 
the audit committee, may already have been accepted and implemented by the management.  
Although in some cases, interviewees justify these changes as being contrary to management’s 
wishes and therefore reaffirming the ‘independent’ status of the audit committee, this level of 
influence nevertheless extends beyond the overseeing and assurance scope of audit committees. 
Furthermore, in some cases, audit committee members/chairpersons may also be involved in 
selecting and mentoring executives. It is arguable whether such a substantial influence by the 
audit committee is of benefit to the overall integrity of a firm’s financial reporting, which relies 
on the individual audit committee member’s judgement and integrity.  Nevertheless, it is evident 
that independent status, as one of the public expectations of an audit committee, may well stop at 
disclosure, as it is not evident in audit committee members’ accounts.  
Secondly, if audit committees are expected to oversee the process of financial reporting 
and auditing, it is expected that audit committee members will be competent in financial 
reporting-related issues.  As discussed in Chapter Two, the evidence provided by qualitative 
research studies on audit committees has not confirmed such expectations conclusively.   In 
2003, the New Zealand Securities Commission implemented the revised Corporate Governance 
Principles and Guidelines.  In the same year, the NZX amended the listing rules, requiring all 
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listed issuers to include a chartered accountant in their audit committee.  This research study 
revealed that corporate directors with a chartered accountant’s qualification and an independent 
status, formed a group of ‘professional audit committee members’ compared to the conventional 
corporate directors, who seemed more concerned with the general direction of firms.  As 
discussed previously, the ‘professional audit committee members’ tended to justify their 
existence in firms in terms of conforming to public expectations by establishing and operating a 
formal audit committee. By contrast, the other group of corporate directors serving on the audit 
committee, who were usually not chartered accountants, tended to be sceptical about the 
increased emphasis on the contribution of audit committees. These audit committee members 
justify their performance according to their interpretation of ‘good directorship’.     
The two groups of audit committee members rely on each other for financial accounting 
expertise and firm-specific experience. Furthermore, ‘professional audit committee members’, 
although they usually acted as chairpersons, did not express any willingness to accept additional 
accountability, except for the collective accountability of the board as whole.  That is the reason 
why almost all of the interviewees concluded that their duties were a fulfilment of the board’s 
delegations.  This study argues that these ‘professional audit committee members’ do not 
represent audit committees as a whole, as there is another group of directors who serve on the 
committee.  This is a possible reason why qualitative research on audit committees cannot 
conclusively prove that audit committee financial expertise is associated with the integrity of 
financial reporting and the auditing function.   
Finally, audit committee qualitative research studies have attempted to establish the 
association between the frequency of audit committee meetings and the effectiveness of audit 
committees in terms of better quality financial reporting.   In addition to the criticism against 
adopting meeting frequency as the only measure of audit committee diligence (DeZoort et al 
2002), the qualitative research results are inconsistent and inconclusive.  Several qualitative 
research studies have provided evidence that audit committee members work on audit 
committee-related issues outside formal audit committee meetings (Gédron & Bédard, 2005; 
Turley & Zaman, 2007). Some of the findings of this research suggest that when describing audit 
committee responsibilities and activities, several interviewees blurred the boundary between 
their audit committee responsibilities and other board responsibilities.  This raises the question 
of whether, without audit committee meeting formalities and documentation, an audit committee 
can indeed exist or be separated from the board of directors’ general activities.  The audit 
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committee meeting formalities and documentation made audit committees visible and created a 
sense of serious purpose when financial reporting and auditing issues were discussed by 
directors.  However, it is arguable whether such a sense of seriousness could, by itself, increase 
the accountability of audit committee members.   
Spira (1998; 2002) suggested that the audit committee is engaged in a private performance 
for a public audience.  This research study provides evidence that this private performance is 
carried out by two categories of audit committee members, each of which, in its own way, is 
striving to fulfil a public expectation.  The two distinguishable styles or approaches that audit 
committee members use to carry out their daily work provide a further possible explanation for 
the inconsistent testing results of previous qualitative audit committee studies.   
This research study concludes that recent years’ emphasis on audit committees in 
organisations with public accountability may have enhanced the formal settings of audit 
committees and created a new category of directors who are specialists in arranging formal audit 
committee structures.  Meanwhile, other directors, who have a more conventional perspective, 
also played an important role in performing their audit committee’s responsibilities.  It is 
uncertain whether the abovementioned intentionally in conforming to the public’s expectations, 
or either of the perspectives by itself, gives rise to an effective audit committee.   
These research results and conclusions should be of value to corporate governance 
stakeholders. Clearly, the integrity of the financial reporting of an organisation cannot be 
assumed.  This study recommends that the evaluation of an audit committee should be based on 
an assessment of the individual audit committee members within the context of their particular 
firms.  Furthermore, it is evident that an open, qualitative, and transparent explanation and 
justification of audit committee actions and intentions by an audit committee member has the 
potential to be of more value for corporate governance stakeholders than stringent, rules-based 
disclosures.   
7.3.2 The methodological contribution  
The methodological contribution of this study will be discussed firstly by considering the 
issue of research reflectivity and secondly by comparing the study to previous audit committee 
qualitative research.  Reflectivity is usually discussed from two perspectives: the researcher’s 
personal reflectivity, and methodological reflectivity. ‘Personal reflectivity’ involves reflecting 
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upon the ways in which the values, experiences, interests, and identity of the researcher have 
shaped the interpretation of the research results. Personal reflectivity will be discussed first, with 
‘methodological reflectivity’ discussed in the next section, when identifying limitations of the 
research design.   
Researchers have long expressed concern with the limited vision provided by the existing 
measures for audit committee effectiveness, such as independence, financial expertise, and 
meeting frequency (DeZoort et al, 2002; Gendron & Bédard, 2005).  This research study 
addresses the need for a qualitative research study to broaden the understanding of audit 
committees - not by measuring them through disclosed data, but rather by investigating what 
happens in real-life situations.   
The study analysed and interpreted interview data from 21 audit committee members of 
New Zealand listed companies. The conclusions revealed two clearly distinguishable intentional 
orientations of audit committee members when performing and justifying their roles in their 
audit committees.  Furthermore, the results and conclusions provide possible explanations for the 
inconsistent testing results of existing audit committee qualitative research studies. This research 
study is one of only four qualitative studies which have been constructed using a sociological 
theoretical framework.  It has developed a new avenue, namely, to investigate the intentional 
processes of individual audit committee members, rather than to focus on interpreting the 
interactions within the group of people who attend audit committee meetings (Spira, 1998; 2005; 
Gendron & Bédard, 2005; Turley & Zaman, 2007).  As it is the intentional orientation that 
ultimately explains and justifies behaviours, it is to be hoped that future research will develop 
this approach further, to investigate and interpret the intentional factors of other corporate 
governance stakeholders.   
In a study of this nature, it can be argued that the researcher’s values, beliefs, experiences, 
and characteristics may affect the interpretation of the research results.  In this respect, the 
following two aspects, in particular, may result in a misunderstanding or misinterpretation of the 
interview data.   
Firstly, it could be asked: ‘would the research results have been different if the researcher 
or the interviewer was a different person?’  This was addressed in the study, during the process 
of analysing and interpreting the interview data, by constantly asking: ‘whose voice is this – the 
interviewee’s or mine?’  For example, one interviewee stated that she would accept a nomination 
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to serve on the audit committee again, because that was where her expertise lay and that was 
where she could contribute.  Quoting the text of the interview transcript is an illustration of 
speaking in the interviewee’s voice.  The researcher interpreted this statement as a representation 
by a ‘professional’ audit committee member, who believes in audit committees, and conforms to 
public expectations.  Such interpretation represents the researcher speaking in her voice.  In 
summing up the research results and conclusions, the researcher put considerable effort into 
distinguishing between the voices of the interviewees and the voice of the researcher.   
Secondly, during the process of interpreting the interview data, the researcher maintained 
a critical stance towards the ‘genuine’ nature and legitimacy of the interviewees’ responses. In 
other words, the interviewer was alert to the possibility of the interviewees saying what they 
thought should be said.  Although there may well be subjectivity and bias embedded in the 
interview data, deliberately rejecting the interviewee’s perceived subjectivity and bias could 
result in the injection of the researcher’s own bias.  For example, several interviewees expressed 
satisfaction with their level of remuneration for serving on the audit committee, although the 
level of their remuneration did not reflect the actual workload. The researcher did not interpret 
these interviewees’ motivation for serving on the audit committee as being because of a passion 
or conscientiousness, but rather linked the discussion towards the interviewees’ serving on two 
or more audit committees, enabling them to generate sufficient annual income.   
From the above examples, it is evident that if the interviewer or the researcher were a 
different person, the research results and conclusions could have been different.  This fact should 
not, however, be used to undermine the validity of the research, but should rather be regarded as 
a limitation of the research findings.   
7.4 Limitations and future research opportunities 
The limitations of the study will be assessed by answering the following questions: (1) 
how have the research questions defined and limited what could be found? (2)  how could the 
research questions have been investigated differently?  and, (3) to what extent would the answers 
to these questions have given rise to a different understanding of the phenomena under 
investigation (Willig, 2001)?   
7.4.1 How have the research questions defined and limited what could be found?   
As stated previously, the motivation for this research was to answer the general research 
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problem: “What gives rise to an effective audit committee?” The study is an exploratory one that 
aims to identify the qualitative factors that contribute to audit committee effectiveness.  The 
general research problem is investigated by answering four interrelated specific research 
questions, namely: (1) what do audit committee members perceive the desired objectives of an 
audit committee to be?  (2) what do the members bring to an audit committee in order to achieve 
its desired objectives? (3) how do members help attain the desired audit committee objectives?  
and, (4) how do members assess the extent to which the audit committee objectives have been 
achieved?   This research study concluded that two distinctive intentional orientations were 
demonstrated by the interviewees to explain and justify the performance of their audit committee 
responsibilities.    
The factors which initially contributed to the formation of these intentional orientations, 
however, require further investigation.   It was noticeable that during the interview process, 
several interviewees described incidents that occurred long before they served on their current 
audit committees; this included events that took place at a very early stage of their careers.  
Because the research questions focus on audit committees per se, those events that took place 
outside audit committees were not included in the data analysis and interpretation.  It is to be 
hoped that future research will incorporate this by investigating the factors that contribute to 
audit committee members developing one particular intentional orientation, rather than another 
one.  
7.4.2 How could the research questions have been investigated differently? 
As this study was constructed using a qualitative exploratory approach, it was not immune 
from the inherent limitations of this type of research design.  The findings, using a small sample 
(21 interviewees) selected from one particular country - New Zealand - are not generalisable 
findings that can be verified through quantitative evidence.  Furthermore, as discussed 
previously, personal reflectivity may have impacted on the analysis and interpretation of the 
interview data.   
This research study stops at having identified two intentional orientations.  It is unknown 
whether, or to what extent, these two intentional orientations are shared by other audit committee 
members, or whether there could have been more intentional orientations.  Future research may 
be constructed based on the findings that there are two, or possibly more, intentional orientations 
explaining the performance of audit committee members.  Grounded theory may be used to 
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interview more audit committee members, possibly including directors who have chosen not to 
serve on the audit committee, to profile other possible intentional orientations of directors.  This 
could ultimately facilitate the development of measurable models of audit committee 
effectiveness. 
7.4.3 To what extent would the answers to these questions have given rise to a 
different understanding of the phenomena under investigation?   
This research paradigm aimed to provide an insight into audit committee members’ 
activities, rather than to measure them from disclosed information.  Spira (1998; 2002), who first 
researched audit committees using a qualitative approach, suggested that firms, in order to avoid 
the legal imposition of more stringent corporate governance rules, establish audit committees to 
demonstrate to the public that there is an emphasis on financial reporting integrity and 
accountability.  Gendron and Bédard (2005) interpreted the effectiveness of audit committees 
through the interactions between the audit committee meeting participants.  They established 
that effectiveness is internally constructed during the committee meetings and is blended with 
emotional factors.   Turley and Zaman (2007) also investigated the interactions between audit 
committee members and the parties who worked with them. They argued that audit committees 
have a pervasive influence in corporate governance, which is carried out either through formal 
meetings, or informal activities, outside audit committee meetings.  The preceding three 
qualitative audit committee studies, as well as numerous qualitative research studies, formed the 
foundation upon which the current research was constructed.         
The current research study differentiates itself from the aforementioned three audit 
committee qualitative studies in the following respects:  firstly, this study focuses on individual 
audit committee members, rather than on particular audit committees.  This focus is embedded in 
the basic assumption that social phenomena are intended by the people who live through them.  
Therefore, it is the intentions and sense-making processes of audit committee members that are 
of importance in explaining and justifying their daily lives. Secondly, in addition to revealing 
further insights into audit committee activities, the research also provides a possible reason why 
qualitative research studies cannot consistently prove that an audit committee’s existence and 
attributes are associated with the quality of financial reporting, namely, that there are at least two 
intentional orientations governing the performance of audit committee responsibilities. 
Finally, this research study contributes to the general research problem: ‘what gives rise to 
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an effective audit committee?’ by providing several insights and explanations.  In doing so, the 
research also poses the fundamental question: ‘can an audit committee exist without 
formalities?’  It is still uncertain whether audit committees do in fact provide oversight of, and 
assurance on, the financial reporting and auditing functions, or whether they simply conform to a 
public expectation. The integrity and accountability of financial reporting is a substantial 
research agenda, with which some progress has been made over the past decades. The audit 
committee is one of the central participants, but not the only stakeholder, within this agenda. It is 
to be hoped that this study will encourage further and broader investigation into the many 
stakeholders, including an effective audit committee, which contribute to improved corporate 
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Appendix A – Cover Letter 
(LINCOLN LETTER HEAD) 
 
CONFIDENTIAL  
(Name of Participant) 
(Title / “Director”) 






Dear (Mr/Ms):  
 
Subject: Invitation for Participation 
 
This letter is an invitation to participate in PhD research being conducted on audit committee 
effectiveness of New Zealand listed companies. 
The audit committee, as one of the most important elements of corporate governance, has been 
the subject of much discussion by practitioners, scholars and policy makers in recent times.  
Little research, however, has examined the perceptions of audit committee members about audit 
committees.  By interviewing audit committee members, this study aims to understand the 
qualitative factors that give rise to an effective audit committee. 
Participation in this project will involve an interview that will last for a maximum of sixty (60) 
minutes in a venue that is convenient for you.  All information that you provide will be 
considered to be completely confidential.  For further information about the research and the 
procedures taken for ensuring confidentiality, the following documents are attached:  
 Research Information 
 Interview Questionnaire  




It is hoped that the results of this study will be of benefit to audit and assurance practitioners, 
audit committee members, regulators and other stakeholders, all of whom are concerned with 
corporate governance and accountability, as well as to the broader research community. 
If you agree to participate, I would appreciate it if you could fill out and sign the attached 
consent form and return it to me before (Date) August 2007 by using the stamped and addressed 
envelope provided.  I will contact you to arrange an interview time and venue shortly after 
receiving your consent form.   
Should you have any questions regarding this study, or would like additional information before 
deciding whether or not to participate, please contact Julia Wu at (03) 325-3838 ext. 8518 or by 
email at wuy9@lincoln.ac.nz.  
I look forward to hearing from you and thank you in advance for your support in this project. 
Yours sincerely, 
 
Julia YH Wu    
PhD Student  
Commerce Division    






Associate Professor Sidney Weil  
Supervisor of Julia YH Wu 
Centre of Accounting Education and Research  
Commerce Division 




Appendix B – Interview Questionnaire 
INTERVIEW QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
Topic 1: Perceptions of responsibilities of the audit committee 
 
1.1 What motivated you to become an audit committee member?  
 
1.2 Are you assigned any specific responsibility by the audit committee of (Company Name)?  
Why are you assigned with this responsibility?  
 
1.3 What do you think helps you most in achieving your assigned responsibility?  Please 
describe how this helped you in a specific situation.  Was this typical?  
 
1.4 Have you encountered any difficulties or conflicts in achieving your assigned responsibility?  
If so, please specify.  
 
1.5 On a scale of 1 to 10, with 10 being the best, how well do you believe you achieved your 
assigned responsibility?  Please explain why you chose this score.  
 
 
Topic 2: Operation of the audit committee 
 
2.1 Please describe the process for discussing and resolving issues in your audit committee. 
 
2.2 Are you able to achieve your assigned responsibility during the scheduled audit committee 
meetings?  
 
2.3 Do you need to do additional work by yourself in addition to attending the scheduled audit 




 2.3.1 Please give one or more examples of any additional work you have done by 
yourself. 
 
 2.3.2 Approximately how many hours per annum do you need to work by yourself in 
addition to attending the audit committee meetings?  
 
2.4 In addition to attending scheduled audit committee meetings do you also need to work with 
other people in order to achieve your assigned responsibility?    
 
 2.4.1 Please give one or more examples of any additional work you have done with 
other people. 
 
 2.4.2 Approximately how many hours per annum do you need to work with other 
people in addition to attending audit committee meetings?  
 
2.5 Please describe an audit committee meeting in addition to the regular scheduled meetings 
during the last financial year.  What was the meeting about?  Please describe what happened 
during that meeting.  
 
 OR 
   
  Please describe the most recent audit committee meeting that you attended, the reason it 
was called, what took place and any subsequent follow-ups. 
 
Topic 3: Relationships with audit committee stakeholders 
 
3.1 Are the recommendations given by the internal auditors followed by the management?  If 
not, how did the audit committee resolve the conflict?  Please give an example.  How 
typical is this?  
 
3.2 Are the recommendations given by the external auditors followed by the management?  If 
not, how did the audit committee resolve the conflict?  Please give an example.  How 




3.3 Was (were) any recommendation(s) made by the audit committee during the last financial 
year accepted by the board?  If not, please explain why you think the board turned down 
the recommendation(s). 
 
Topic 4: Perceptions of the environment around the audit committee 
 
4.1 Has your relationship with other executives changed since you were nominated as an audit 
committee member?  Please give an example.  What do you think might be the reason?  
 
4.2 Do you believe your remuneration for serving on the audit committee is reasonable?  
 
4.3 How have the increasing regulations and guidelines governing audit committees affected 
your work on the audit committee?  Please give an example. 
 




Appendix C – Research Information Sheet 
Lincoln University 
 
Division:  Commerce 
 
Research Information Sheet 
 
You are invited to participate as a subject in a PhD project entitled Audit Committee 
Effectiveness – from the Perspective of Audit Committee Members in New Zealand Listed 
Companies. 
 
The aim of the research project is to enhance understanding of the qualitative factors that give 
rise to an effective audit committee.  Examining audit committees is important because market 
participants view them as providing effective oversight of the financial reporting of public listed 
companies.  The research argues that the effectiveness of an audit committee ultimately lies in 
the efforts and attributes of its committee members.   
 
Audit committee development in New Zealand reflects recent overseas trends.  Investigation of 
the functioning of audit committees in New Zealand companies, however, is very rare.  This 
research into audit committee effectiveness in companies listed on NZX markets will address the 
following questions:   
(1) What do audit committee members perceive the desired objectives of an audit 
committee to be? 
(2) What do the members bring to an audit committee in order to achieve its desired 
objectives? 
(3) How do members help attain the desired audit committee objectives? 





The data will be collected by interviewing selected audit committee members..   
 
Your participation in this project will involve an interview based on the attached questionnaire.  
As a follow-up, you will be asked to review the transcript of the interview.     
 
All data gathered in this investigation are strictly confidential.  All participants are assured of 
complete anonymity in any publication of the research results.  The identity of the participants 
will not under any circumstances be made public or revealed to any parties other than the 
researcher and her supervisors.  To ensure confidentiality, the following detailed procedures will 
be followed: 
 
 The interview will be taped and transcribed.   
 Pseudonyms will be assigned to you and your organisation(s) in the interview transcripts 
and in any text content quoted or discussed in any publication format.   
 The interview transcript will be reviewed and edited by the interviewee.  Shortly after each 
interview has been completed, you will receive a copy of the transcript to confirm the 
accuracy of the conversation and to add to or clarify any points. 
 You may decline to answer any of the interview questions.  Furthermore, you may 
withdraw at any time by advising the researcher telephonically or in writing.   
 The researcher and her supervisors will be the only persons having access to the tapes (or 
other storage devices) recorded during the interviews.  The tapes (or other storage devices) 
and the transcripts will be kept for six (6) years from 2007.   After six years, the tapes (or 
other storage devices) and the transcripts will be destroyed under the supervision of the 
researcher, or any person authorised by the researcher, or her supervisors.  
 
The project is being carried out by: 
 




Commerce Department  
P O Box 84 
Lincoln 7647  
Tel: +64 3 325 3838 ext. 8518 
Email: wuy9@lincoln.ac.nz 
 
She will be pleased to discuss any concerns you have about participation in the project.   
 
Names of Supervisors: 
 
Associate Professor Sidney Weil  
Dr. Ahsan Habib  
 
Centre of Accounting Education and Research 
Commerce Division, 
PO Box 84,  
Lincoln University  
Lincoln 7624  
Ph +64 3 325 2811 




Appendix D – Consent Form 
Consent Form 
 
Name of Project:  
 
Audit Committee Effectiveness – from the Perspective of Audit Committee Members in New 
Zealand Listed Companies 
 
I have read and understood the description of the above-mentioned project.  On the basis 
described in the Research Information Sheet, I agree to participate in the project and I consent to 
publication of the results of the project, on the understanding that anonymity will be preserved.  I 
understand that I may withdraw from the project at any time, and may also withdraw any 




Name:    
 
 
Email:    
 
 
Telephone number:    
 
 
Signed:      
 
 
Date:    
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